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Privacy in Database Designs: A Role Based Approach 
Gary A. Poe 
ABSTRACT 
Privacy concerns have always been present in every society. The introduction of 
information technology information has enabled a reduction in the cost of gathering 
information, management of that information and the permitted that same information to 
become increasingly portable. Coupled with these reductions of cost has been an increase 
in the demand for information as well as the concern that privacy expectations be 
respected and enforced through security systems that safeguard access to private-type 
data. Security systems enforce privacy expectations. Unfortunately there is no consensus 
on a definition of privacy making the specification of security often over broad and 
resulting in the loss of critical functionality in the systems produced. This research 
expands the understanding of privacy by proposing a replicable type-based taxonomy of 
privacy that is grounded in philosophy and law. This type-based system is applied to a 
Role Based Access Control System to specify and control access to data in a in a hospital 
setting as a proof of concept.  
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
Every firm, profit and nonprofit, has always required information. Today one 
problem faced by organizations is how to obtain, manage and use information that is 
nominated as private information. 
With private information the firm faces the following questions every day: What 
makes an item of information private information? How must they safeguard their 
customers’ and employees’ sensitive data? While companies recognize that information 
privacy is a vital management issue for today’s organizations, how do we manage 
privacy? Do our systems meet current privacy expectations? The privacy environment in 
which firms must operate is dynamic and constantly evolving. When does the firm 
correctly anticipate changes in privacy standards and avoid being managed by the 
environment? How do we evaluate proposed decisions and actions to ensure that they are 
privacy compliant? While acknowledging that privacy consists of a complex web of 
political, social, and legal issues which impact the firm daily – what is the character of 
this environment and how can a better understanding of this environment be achieved? 
Firms recognize that protection of privacy could create a competitive advantage for the 
firm – how can we create a sustainable competitive advantage with a privacy strategy? 
How do we design and implement such a strategy? 
In addition to these questions, the tools and design techniques used to manage 
private information as well as the mechanism of designing privacy into these tools are in 
their infancy. Privacy concerns are addressed haphazardly and in non systematic ways 
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(Kayworth et al, 2005) usually at the later stages of system design by placing control 
mechanisms over a pre-designed data model. Privacy is often designed on a case by case, 
instance by instance basis using bottom up development and no top down methods to 
manage the direction of the project. A better tool or design methodology would assist the 
firm to manage its environment but how do we improve existing tools or create new tools 
that design privacy into organizational structures and systems? 
It has been observed that a societal adoption of a significant technological 
advancement can affect social values (Inglehard, 1977). Technological development in 
management information systems and the reduction of costs realized through their use in 
the areas of communication, procurement of information, processing and storage have 
enabled greater efficiency and effectiveness in business and fueled their adoption and 
use. 
This adoption of information technology has produced a change in values. In 
general, people have become angry and frustrated because societal norms and laws have 
been ill equipped to deal with the changes (Spencer, 2002 and Zweig 2002)). Part of this 
conflict has produced an increased effort in the enforcement of existing privacy laws but 
has also resulted in the proliferation of new laws protecting privacy. Because a business 
operates in a sea of law and societal norms, this makes it difficult and at times impossible 
to manage the enterprise. As a result, increasingly costs are expanding to provide privacy 
protections for data as a response to these changes. Decisions are increasingly more 
difficult to make as often privacy considerations have become part of the decision even 
though what is or is not private is often not clear. Finally, businesses are increasingly 
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recognizing that privacy protections are a cost of doing business both from the standpoint 
of being a good moral citizen as well as from the viewpoint that the failure to do so will 
result in high social and monetary cost to the enterprise.  
This effect on values is demonstrated as concerns about privacy have increased 
despite the fact that government has made efforts to protect privacy and business have 
undertaken efforts to manage privacy. Polls conducted by Louis Harris and Associates 
show increasingly individuals hold a concern that their private lives are being exposed. In 
1978, 64 percent interviewed in the Harris Poll expressed concern about their privacy 
being violated. In 1995, over 80 percent interviewed expressed that same concern (Harris 
Equifax, 1993). The growing concern stems from the increased use of interconnected 
media used in business and personal activities (Federal Register, 2000). In 2005 this 
concern was not abated. Nationally, 67 percent were concerned over privacy of their 
medical records, 52 percent fear medical insurance information would be used to limit 
their opportunities, only 30 percent were willing to share health information with health 
professions not directly involved with their case and only 27 percent were willing to 
share health records with drug companies (Forester Research, 2005). That interconnected 
media is embodied in a variety of information technologies. 
In the remaining of this chapter I will provide background on the concept of 
privacy to illustrate the problem privacy faces in an environment of rapid technological 
change and show the development of the concept of privacy in light of technological 
changes in Information Systems. Following that I will point out that defining what is 
privacy has proven very difficult, demonstrating there is no precise definition of privacy 
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and point out some of the reasons for why there is no agreed upon definition. Next I will 
outline the privacy research in Information Systems pointing out that research in the field 
of privacy is of vital importance but such research is in its infancy. Anticipated 
contributions of this work will follow, after which I will present how I will conduct the 
study. 
1.1 Technology Change and Privacy: Three Examples 
Following are three examples of how information technologies have created 
changes that impact privacy. 
• The first example shows that adopted technological change has increased 
technical capabilities that have permitted invasions into places traditionally 
thought as private areas. These invasions have forced a reconsideration of the 
question of  what is privacy – that is what places are private, what type of 
information is protected as private and under what circumstance is information 
protected as private. For each iteration of technical change, the scope of 
protection of privacy has been modified to accommodate technological change 
and preserve traditional notions of privacy.  
• The second example shows that the adoption of technological change is often 
made without any consideration or the foresight of how those increased 
capabilities enabled by technological change impact upon traditionally held 
values, norms and laws that were defined when technological capabilities were 
not as refined. Technological change has enabled an expanded use of certain types 
of information due to the increased ability to control and compile information. 
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Because of the previous inability to control or compile this information, this 
information was deemed to be private-even if it was in the public domain or in the 
possession of an entity but no formal law or norm prohibited its use. To preserve 
the status quo and while harnessing new technological capabilities, new 
restrictions in the form of norms, guidelines and statutes have been placed on the 
compilation and subsequent use of information to ensure privacy - many of which 
have been found to be inadequate. Questions exist how do we create effective 
guidelines and restrictions that ensure values and norms but are flexible enough to 
permit technological change?  
• In the third example, technology changes affecting information use causes 
corresponding effects upon society, particularly the roles and relationships created 
by society to protect and ensure privacy. The third example demonstrates that 
unless change is managed, technological change creates change in those roles and 
relationships. Certain roles and relationships in society require privacy protection 
to function optimally. Institutions that encompass these roles and relationships 
have evolved rules of behavior that protected this information. The adoption of 
information technology change and the hunger for the information have disabled 
the effectiveness of these institutional rules- thwarting both the ability of the 
institution and the individual to control sensitive information. As a response, 
information providers have adopted counter measures. These counter measures 
have included the withholding of information, the delay of disseminating 
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information and the providing of inaccurate information all of which have harmed 
the effectiveness of the institutions serving the information providers. 
1.1.1 Example One: The Telephone 
• This example shows that adopted technological change has permitted invasions 
into places traditionally thought as private areas- under the control of the 
individual. Each such invasion has forced a reconsideration of the definition of 
privacy - that is what places, what information and under what circumstance is 
information protected as private. Upon each iteration of technical change, 
protection of privacy has been modified sometimes  to accommodate 
technological change, to preserve traditional notions of privacy with restrictions  
placed upon technology use to preserve the control of the individual. 
 
The invention of the telephone and its adoption by society occurred in 1876. The 
telephone’s advance as an information technology was immediately grasped and 
incorporated into its every day operations. In 1877, construction of the first regular 
telephone line from Boston to Somerville, MA, was completed. By the end of 1880, there 
were 47,900 telephones in the United States. Service between Boston and Providence had 
been established by 1881. Service between New York and Chicago was initiated in 1892, 
while service between New York and Boston started in 1894. Transcontinental service by 
overhead wire was not inaugurated until 1915. Most consumers of phone service were 
commercial enterprise. Home use lagged largely due to availability and cost but in the 
1920’s the presence of the phone in the home was more common.  
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In 1928, government agents seized a telephone conversation of a known 
bootlegger through the placement of a wiretap on the phone line. The wire tap, enabled 
police to listen to conversations taking place on the telephone. In his prosecution, the 
bootlegger sought to have the conversations of this activity excluded from evidence on 
the ground his right to privacy was violated by the action of placing a wiretap on his 
phone line and listening to his telephone conversation.  
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld his conviction using traditional 
notions of privacy of the time. Traditional notions of privacy protected places from being 
intruded upon and as such required a physical trespass into the home of the person to 
occur. Because the wiretap was made outside the home there was no physical trespass. In 
this case the “seizure” of the conversation took place outside the individual’s home there 
was no privacy violation. A second protection of privacy was that persons were protected 
from unlawful seizures of tangible items such as personal papers and effects. What was 
seized here was not tangible - what was seized was his conversation - an intangible item 
not entitled to protection. 
Justice Brandeis advocated a broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
privacy protections to insure that the government refrained from intruding into the 
privacy of the individual. In his dissent in the Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis 
stated (Olmstead v. United States, 1928): 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the 
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his 
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought 
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions 
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and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every 
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 
 
What Brandeis was in effect saying is we must recognize the potential for this 
new technology and reconcile the changes this technology brings with our value of 
privacy that a person has the right to be left alone. Brandeis' position in the Olmstead 
dissent was a minority opinion at the time. This opinion gradually gained momentum 
over time. In 1965, in the case Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 1965) opinion, 
Justice William O. Douglas citing Brandeis found a penumbral right to privacy 
emanating from the Constitution and its First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Later in 
1967, in United States v. Katz, the 1928 decision of Olmstead v. United States (389 U.S. 
347) was overturned when the judges adopted Brandeis' minority opinion as the decision 
of the Katz court. The Court in Katz recognized that regardless of technological change, 
people have a right to privacy even if technology exposes them to some degree. 
1.1.2 Example Two: The Computer and Database 
• The second example shows that the adoption of technological change is often 
made without the foresight of how those increased capabilities enabled by 
technological change impact upon traditionally held values, norms and laws. 
Technological change has enabled an expanded use of certain types of 
information due to the increased ability to control and compile information. 
Because of the previous inability to control or compile information, information 
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was deemed to be private-even if it was in the public domain or in the possession 
of an entity as far as the rule of law applied even though no formal law or norm 
prohibited its use. While new restrictions in the form of norms, guidelines and 
statutes have been placed on the compilation and subsequent use of information to 
ensure privacy many of these laws have been found to be inadequate. Questions 
exist how do we create effective guidelines and restrictions that ensure values and 
norms but are also flexible enough to permit technological change? 
 
The Katz opinion occurred at the time people was developing a new awareness 
that a portion of their private life was subject to being exposed to others. This awareness 
surfaced in the early 1960's when the advent of computer technology that made it feasible 
to aggregate and process data in ways never before imagined. Research on the creation 
and use of computerized databases, which had begun in the 1950’s fueled concerns over 
“Big Brother” collecting information on citizens and invading and controlling their lives. 
This reached a fever point in the mid 1960’s when stories emerged of the federal 
government constructing super computers and operating them on the individual 
information of its citizens. A realization was made by the general public that the Federal 
Government, in its course of doing business had many unconnected data stores on 
individual people. Should these islands of information be merged, various details of a 
person’s life could become exposed as a result of the merger. Citizens and legislators 
alike began to contemplate the ways this information if compiled could be abused. 
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A report entitled Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, 1973) issued by the, made specific recommendations for 
laws that would implement and enforce the code. Specifically they recommended that 
governmental organizations that kept automated databases on individuals enact 
safeguards to protect this data and be required to report to the public each year what 
databases they were keeping and what information they were collecting. Additionally 
they set out rights of people whose information was stored would have over the access to 
and correction of data. 
This report recommended a code of fair practice be enacted by Congress for 
automated personal data systems. For this Code of Fair Practices four principals were 
enumerated: 
• There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose existence is secret.  
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is 
in a record and how it is used.  
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent.  
• There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable 
information about him.  
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended 
use and must take precaution to prevent misuse of the data. 
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In response to this report, The Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted to insure that 
individual privacy was maintained in light of the technical advances in the creation and 
use of computerized databases (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2003). The Act 
was far from comprehensive. The Act only applied to U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents. Not all federal agencies, and no state and local agencies are covered by the act, 
although all federal, state and local agencies are subject to limits placed on the use of 
Social Security numbers (Privacy Act of 1974, §7, 2003). Government controlled 
companies like the Post Office, the military, Executive agencies like the Department of 
Education, the FDA and the FBI, executive departments; independent regulatory agencies 
and government controlled corporations are all exempt. Of the agencies under the 
umbrella of the Privacy Act, only the databases of those agencies which retrieved 
information by the name of the individual or a personal identifier of the individual (this 
schema was referred to in the act as a system of records) were subject to its provisions. 
Should a database contain this information but that information not be retrieved by the 
individual’s name or a personal identifier, that database would be exempt from this act so 
as to create a huge privacy gap. 
The Act required publication in the Federal Register notice that the agency was 
keeping such records and include the details of their systems, the records and the 
intended uses of the system. People were allowed to submit data, views and arguments to 
the agency. An emasculating provision of this act was how change would be managed. 
Any proposed changes did not require a publication but only required notice to be sent to 
a committee in the House and Senate as well as to the Office of Management and 
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Budget.1 These bodies were charged to evaluate the probable and possible effect of the 
proposed action on the rights of individuals only. These bodies did not have authority 
over the agency, no direct ability to stop the proposed action or any ability to propose a 
compromise solution.  
Other provisions of the act limited the collection and use of the information of 
individuals by the government and provided means in which the individual could monitor 
governmental activity through requirements of disclosure by government to the 
individuals of both the information held in their files and its use by the government. Any 
individual who has access to any records the agency held on him, be allowed to review 
the record and make copies. If the record were incomplete or inaccurate, the individual 
could ask the record be corrected and the agency had 10 days to respond by either making 
the change or telling them why they refuse to make the change. The agency must also 
provide a name of a supervisor in which to appeal the action taken. If appeal is taken 
action must be completed within 30 days unless extended for good cause. If the appeal is 
unsuccessful, the agency must tell the individual how they can pursue this matter in court.  
The act required agencies to keep accurate records of when, to whom it has 
disclosed personal records maintained five years or the lifetime of the record what ever is 
longer. Agencies are also required to maintain only the minimal amount of information 
relevant and necessary for its operation. When the information can have an adverse effect 
upon the individual, effort must be taken to collect the information from the individual 
                                                 
1 Notices to the House would go to the Committee on Government Operations of the House of 
Representatives. Notices to the Senate would go to the Committee on Government Affairs of the Senate. 
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directly. When collecting this information directly, the agency must tell the law which 
gives them the authority to collect the information, the uses of the information and the 
effects that might result from the data not being provided. Other collection restrictions 
include the collection of records describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed 
by the first amendment and places limits on data sharing between government agencies.  
The act provided both civil as well as criminal penalties for its violation.  
Many of the shortcomings of the act are contained in the paragraphs above. As 
significant as those may appear, there were more. The act required the creation of the 
Privacy Protection Study Commission, whose purpose was to submit recommendations to 
Congress regarding further implementations and enforcement. The act also required the 
President to submit a report every two years on the oversight of the Privacy Act. The first 
and only report made by Privacy Protection Study Commission was a report that was 
issued in 1977. This report concluded that the act was a great step forward but it failed to 
bring about the benefits intended (Privacy Protection Commission, 2007). The 
shortcomings of the act were the result of the fact that much of the act’s language was 
unclear and a key term “systems of records” 2enabled wholesale violations of individual 
privacy. No action was subsequently taken by Congress to address these shortcomings or 
limitations. The Act’s requirement of the President submitting a report every two years 
                                                 
2 The Privacy Act applied only to databases where database records were retrieved by name, Social 
Security Number or other individually identifiable information. These records were the systems of 
records. If a record contained this information but could be retrieved by another manner that did not use a 
system of record, it was not subject to the provisions of the act. Conceivably a governmental agency 
could circumvent the act in this manner causing harm to the individual.  
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on the oversight of the Privacy Act was repealed in 1995 (Public Law 104-66, 1995). To 
date there is limited oversight of the Act.  
Use for Law Enforcement and the routine use exception continue to erode the 
effectiveness of the Privacy Act of 1974. Effective law enforcement requires the ability to 
exclude criminals from the files that involve the investigation of them by a law 
enforcement agency. Agencies use the law enforcement exception to justify exception to 
the provision of the act. The effects of 9/11 and the Patriot Act has further limited the 
ability to keep this provision narrow and have opened up new and greater exceptions.  
Agencies can only disclose information to others if they either have the 
individual’s permission or the disclosure meets one of twelve conditions outlined in the 
act. Examples of such permissible disclosure include a disclosure pursuant to a court 
order, a disclosure to Congress, a disclosure of compelling circumstances affecting 
someone’s health or safety. Agencies also can disclose information if it is for a routine 
use an exception that agencies have abused. Routine use is defined in the Act as "the use 
of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was 
collected." This phrasing can often lead to "mission creep" for a system of records, in 
which the routine uses for a particular database gradually increase until its scope is far 
greater than its originally stated goals (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2003). 
While it is a requirement of law that routine uses be stated in the Federal Register this 
requirement is met with broad sweeping language which can justify any use under the 
sun. While some court decisions have limited how broadly an agency can describe 
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"routine uses" (Britt v. Naval Investigative Service, 1989) a large number of uses can still 
be covered by a short, general statement.  
1.1.3 Example Three: Medical Information and information portability 
• Technology changes affecting information use causes corresponding effects upon 
society, particularly the roles and relationships created by society to protect and 
ensure privacy. The third example demonstrates that unless technological change 
is managed it will recreate roles and relationships. Certain roles and relationships 
in society require privacy protection to function optimally. Institutions have 
evolved rules of behavior that protected private information. Technology change 
and the hunger for the information it can produce have disabled the effectiveness 
of these institutional rules- thwarting both the ability of the institution and the 
individual to control sensitive information. As a response, information providers 
have adopted counter measures. These counter measures have included the 
withholding of information, the delay of disseminating information and the 
providing of inaccurate information all of which have harmed the effectiveness of 
the institutions serving the information providers. 
The increased use of private insurance in the mid 1960’s altered the doctor patient 
relationship by adding new participants into the relationship such as insurance 
companies, HMOs, self-insuring companies, ending the era when all medical information 
remained between the doctor and patient.  For a variety reasons such as cost containment, 
risk management, fiscal responsibility, efficient practice of medicine and or the need to 
monitor professional practice abuse, the disclosure of medical information and 
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information given in pursuit of medical treatment was required to be disclosed to these 
third parties. These third parties had no direct relationship to the patient and no incentive 
to protect the patient’s information. In many cases third parties often profited greatly 
from having access to this information through either its use or its dissemination with the 
patient bearing the entire expense (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2003). 
Information technology lowered the cost to share information and created new 
ways to aggregate and use information. This better enabled better use of information in 
ways never before imagined. Information technology enabled more reviews to take place 
of the physician work, and enabled health care organizations to be better able to follow 
and to review practice guidelines and utilization standards compliance by physicians 
(Field, 1994). Information technology also allowed more information to be shared outside 
the medical caregiver context. Insurance companies increasingly ask for more 
information and use that information to assess risk and implement policy of insurability. 
Employers are increasingly using private medical information. Employers can assess 
their employee’s potential in new ways. Employers can use the studies compiled from 
computerized medical records to compare the performance of different managed care 
plans (Field, 1994). In addition, employers may use this information to screen workers 
for preexisting susceptibility to workplace health hazards (Field, 1994). 
The concern that interconnected medical and insurance information systems 
caused medical privacy erosion surfaced during the debate of the Health Security Act in 
1994. The debates evidenced a concern that the increased ease of transmitting and sharing 
individual health information resulted in an increase in concern regarding privacy and 
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confidentiality of that information (Federal Register, 2000). It was found that increased 
protection of medical information access and use was necessary for the quality of medical 
care to increase (Rotenberg, 1994). 
What fueled the debate was the recognition that the United States as a country 
expends about one trillion dollars on health care each year (Hoekendorf, 1996). Despite 
these expenditures, healthcare outcomes in the United States fail to achieve high 
outcomes. In fact when ranked with other countries, the United States fails to outperform 
and in many cases lagged far behind other countries in results obtained despite those 
countries expending less money in total and per capita (Federal Register, 2000)..  
When obtaining medical treatment patients must participate with a medical 
caregiver. For the optimal treatment effects to occur an accurate and full disclosure of 
relevant facts must be provided by the patient to the treatment giver.  It was also found 
that many of these fact and information required to be provided by the patent to the 
caregiver are of a personal and sensitive nature (Federal Register, 2000). In studies 
conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human Services a relationship 
between trust and treatment outcome was found. When the patient has high trust in the 
provider, more information and more accurate information is provided to the medical 
provider by the patient. On high trust situations patients seek care earlier. When the trust 
is low the patient withholds information, knowingly gives inaccurate information or 
delays or fails to get treatment. As accurate and full disclosure of information and prompt 
seeking of medical care is a prerequisite of delivery of quality medical care, it was 
concluded that health care professionals who lose the trust of their patients cannot deliver 
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high quality care (Federal Register, 2000). It was specifically found that the medical 
community in the United States had lost the trust of its patients due to the belief that their 
privacy in their medical information was violated (Federal Register, 2000). 
During this study, patients voiced great concern over the dissemination of their 
medical information to others outside of the patient caregiver relationship. Many patients 
noted stories of harm that had come to them by individuals or company or companies 
acting upon this information. Firings, demotions, loss of upward mobility in the 
workplace, decreased insurability, loss of insurance, humiliation are just a few of the 
effects that have been suffered by individuals when this information has became 
disseminated. In many cases individuals and their families admitted to having delayed 
treatment or failed to seek treatment resulting in more illness, spread of illness to others, 
loss of productivity, greater medical costs and in some cases premature death. In a 
separate study, the United States Department of Health and Human Services has noted 
these same concerns (Federal Register, 2000). In an effort to foster improved health care 
information privacy and increase the quality of medical information HIPAA was enacted 
in 1996. 
1.2 Difficulties with the Existing Definition of the Nature and Purpose of Privacy 
Gerty expressed the problem faced by lawyers and judges when they attempt to 
define the nature and purpose of privacy, “…comes not from the concept’s meagerness, 
but from its amplitude, for it has a protean capacity to be all things to all lawyers.” And 
he also provides the warning, “A legal concept will do us little good if it expands like a 
gas to fill up the available space” (Gerty, 1977). 
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This problem expands beyond lawyers and judges. Take any group of people and 
ask them to define the nature and purpose of privacy and you will get varied responses. It 
should come as no surprise that philosophers and legal scholars have attempted to define 
the nature and purpose of privacy and have failed to reach a consensus. W.A. Parent, a 
philosopher, defined privacy as a condition of not having undocumented personal 
knowledge about one possessed about another (Parent, 1983). It has not been widely 
accepted. To others control over information is the basis of their definition of privacy. 
Fried saw privacy as control over personal information about one’s self (Fried, 1968). 
Westin another advocate of control proffers that information privacy is the claim that 
individuals or groups have to determine the conditions under which information about 
themselves is communicated to others (Westin, 1967). Froomkin centered on what 
happens after the proper release of information. Privacy according to him is the ability to 
control the acquisition and release of information about one’s self (Froomkin, 2000). 
Privacy has been defined as a necessary condition for the construction of 
autonomous individuals. This is described in the literature as private psychological space 
(Zweig and Webster, 2002), or as a condition necessary for the construction of self 
(Reiman, 1976), a place to construct their identity (Goffman, 1957) intellectual privacy 
(Cohen, 2003) or emotional space. Privacy has been seen as a right: a right to be left 
alone, a right to autonomous choice regarding intimate matters, the right to autonomous 
choice regarding personal matters (Froomkin, 1996). Privacy has been characterized as 
an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and an interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions (Whalen v Roe, 1977). 
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Others define it as a limit on what is known and who may know about one's personal 
affairs (Gross, 1971). These philosophers discuss this type of privacy in terms of access 
to the person and information about the person. 
Still another group of philosophers focus on privacy as a condition necessary to 
form relationships. Rachels sees privacy as necessary to maintain the variety of social 
relationships that we want to have (Rachels, 2006). Fried sees the title to information 
about oneself and protected  by privacy provides the necessary something to the 
relationship “ ... intimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs, or 
emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with 
anyone" (Fried, 1968). Reiman finds that privacy protects the individual’s interest in 
becoming, being and remaining a person (Reiman, 1976). Inness defines privacy as a 
defensive action, protecting intimacy and ensuring freedom of action and the protection 
of our autonomy (Inness, 1992). 
There are many reasons why there is no consensus on a single definition of the 
nature and purpose of privacy. Some of the reasons discussed here are: the nature and 
purpose of privacy is socially constructed concept through a process that is influenced 
from forces within and without society and although the concept is socially constructed it 
varies both within and across cultures. The defining of the nature and purpose of privacy 
is a work in progress. Privacy is multidimensional in purpose. It is not only a value that 
has many dimensions but also is a perspective that orders life. Privacy is a value and 
process that produces data. It is difficult to translate any value into a control mechanism. 
Privacy is particularly difficult because the translation process is often attended by self 
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interest and politics. Often time these specifications are purposefully poorly done. 
Privacy is a value that encompasses many diverse values and purposes and is not a single 
valued concept. Finally, definitions and rights of privacy change as technology changes 
1.2.1 Reason One: Privacy is a value that is socially constructed 
Social construction is subject to influences both from within and without societal 
boundaries. These influences cause conceptions of what is private often to vary across 
cultures and within the culture itself. 
Conceptions of privacy are socially constructed (Bezanson, 1991, Scanlon, 1975, 
Rachels, 1975). This social construction is from the summation of all entities in society 
and is not the conception of privacy of any one individual of that society. As an 
illustration, in law, Justice Harlan explained that reasonableness of the individual’s 
expectation of privacy entailed a two-part, expectation-driven test. First, the defendant 
must have an actual or subjective expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation must be 
"one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable” (Katz v. United States, 1967). 
This illustrates the symbiosis between the expectation of the individual and society’s 
conception of privacy. What a society deems as private is ultimately constructed from the 
views of its members. While each member of society has their own personal, actual, and 
subjective perspective as to what is or is not private for it to reap to a level where it is 
respected and protected, society must sanction that individual view as being reasonable. 
The conception of the nature and purpose of private is not static. As change occurs in the 
privacy expectations of individuals so will the construction of privacy change (Spencer, 
2002). This change occurs during the periods where individuals express and assert their 
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perceived conceptions of privacy. During this process societal opinion is examined in 
light of the assertions made. Some of the new ideas of privacy grow, while others fail to 
flourish and die. It is only when the majority or dominant opinion of society accepts that 
individual opinion that a social expectation of privacy is formed. Therefore the 
construction of privacy is an interactive process between the individual and society itself 
influenced by forces that influence society itself   
 
Individual
Execrations of
Privacy
Societal
Expectat ions of
privacy
Is influenced by
         
Figure 1 Interactivity of Individual and Society Privacy Expectations 
 
1.2.2 Reason Two: The defining of the nature and purpose of privacy is a work in 
progress. 
The definition of privacy is a work in progress. The definitions of privacy are 
difficult because not all individuals within society agree with the social construction 
while social construction determines the extent to which people are expected to expose 
their lives, their personalities, their attributes and their behavior to public scrutiny 
(Schauer, 2000). Often entities will express their disagreement openly and work to effect 
changes in its definition and application even after specification. Additionally an 
individual entity or group of entities with power and purpose can affect a change in a 
society’s conception of privacy. It has been observed that individuals and groups who use 
cutting edge technology and knowledge of the legal process have affected societal change 
in the past (Spencer, 2002). 
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The environment where privacy is constructed is also undergoing constant 
change. Technological change places pressures on and affects social values through the 
changes it makes in economic and social systems making what is private a moving target 
(Inglehard, 1977). As technological capabilities increase traditional conceptions of 
privacy have undergone change. "People's subjective expectations of privacy tend to 
reflect the amount of privacy they subjectively experience; and as advances in the 
technology of monitoring and searching have made ever more intrusive surveillance 
possible, expectations of privacy have naturally diminished” (Rosen, 2000). 
Because privacy is socially constructed, privacy varies across different cultures, 
even between strata with in a society, as it is a product of varying social and cultural 
understandings (Schauer, 2000) as each culture has its own unique environment. What is 
private appears to depend upon the situation, the type of privacy invasion and the parties 
involved which has lead to the conclusion that privacy is contextually specific. 
1.2.3 Reason Three: Privacy Supports Not One but Many Purposes 
Privacy as a value does not support a single purpose. One reason for the lack of 
consensus on the nature and purpose of privacy is privacy supports many different 
purposes, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes these purposes conflict. The nature 
and purposes of privacy include: Privacy stems out of respect, fairness and responsibility 
due toward others (Innes, 1992). Privacy emphasizes that a person is an agent free to act 
who is only responsible to others in cases of necessity or agreement (Nissenbaum, 1998). 
Privacy is the value that a person should be able to construct and shape relationships with 
others (Reiman, 1976). Privacy also emphasizes the value that the individual should be 
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able to construct his own self. Privacy also recognizes with in limits, each individual has 
the right to determine the extent of his thoughts, sentiments and emotions be 
communicated to others (Brandeis and Warren, no year). Historically privacy has been 
used to protect a person’s property and liberty (Warren and Brandeis, no year). It is also a 
value that ensures structures that support privacy which in turn ensure a desired way of 
life such as the ability to have intimate relationships, or to read, study or develop one self 
in private. Without privacy, life as we know and enjoy it would be very different and less 
desirable (Inness, 1992). With each purpose the specification of the value of privacy 
varies contributing to why there is no consensus on a single definition of the nature of 
privacy. 
1.2.4 Reason Four: Privacy is a perspective that orders life.  
Through privacy, daily life is regimented through social and technical 
mechanisms that arbitrate which data (and information) is produced (Agre, 1998). Once a 
value is created it becomes a perspective that orders life. 
 “…(privacy is) … infects our way of experiencing the social 
world and which affects social life in profound and subtle ways. 
As a social concept it has normative and descriptive functions that 
interact with one another. The concept of privacy regulates 
institutions, practices activities and social and individual life 
generally. It controls what people feel they have legitimate access 
to and in this way fosters both possibilities and limitations.” 
(Schoeman, no year) 
 
1.2.5 Reason Five: Privacy is a both a value and a process which produces data 
Privacy is a social technical process that produces data. Privacy is translated into 
definitions, laws and norms (Agre, 1997). These laws and norms create roles of 
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acceptable and unacceptable behavior that are characterized as rights. It is through rights 
privacy becomes the arbitrator of what data and information is useable and what data is 
off limits. Data and information that is designated as not available and useable is private 
while all other data is public data available for all to use.  
It is difficult to translate any value into a control mechanism. This difficulty is 
increased because the translation and interpretation process is attended by self interests 
and politics. Additionally confounded definitions of privacy are often created to obtain 
personal agendas when consensus cannot be met. 
In the specification of control mechanisms, values of privacy are translated into 
laws and norms enabling the realization of desired values of privacy.  
1.2.6 Reason Six: Privacy is Not a Rational Concept 
We cannot forget that the people who compose society and define their nature and 
purpose of privacy are both rational and emotional beings. As a result privacy as a 
concept and construct has both rational and emotional elements. For many people, the 
personal natures of the decisions which accompany privacy do not wholly allow a person 
to coldly remove the emotion from the decision. Often a person develops his opinion of 
privacy, at least in part, in an irrational manner, and subject to their whims and emotions 
(Inness, 1992). Additionally society is not largely composed of mature rational thinkers. 
Many more people make their decisions on privacy not on rational thought but on the 
feeling that they have about the decision. Additionally the construction of the nature and 
purpose of privacy at least on the part of individuals is often motivated by self interest. 
Many times individuals looking at the calculus of the situation will weigh out the 
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advantages and disadvantages of privacy looking for the advantages to them not the 
benefits that would accrue to others or benefit the whole of society.  
1.3 Privacy Research in the Information Sciences 
While the field of Information Sciences recognizes that privacy issues present 
pressing issues to business and is a critical area of research, past research is sparse, 
inadequate, single paradigmatic in nature, and possesses few theories. Privacy as a term 
does not have a single agreed upon definition; nor is there an espoused epistemology, 
ontology or axiology. 
Little research on the topic of privacy has been done in the Information Sciences 
despite Mason’s statement that privacy research was one of the most important "ethical 
issues of the information age" (Mason, 1986). Links between organizational privacy 
practices, individual perceptions of those practices and societal responses have been 
recognized (Smith et al, 1996). Davison in 2003 observed that studies in privacy appear 
not to be keeping pace with the growing interest in privacy (Davison et al, no year). As 
late as 2005, Greenaway has characterized the present stream of research has been proven 
insufficient and the research relies upon a single paradigm to explain all organizational 
level privacy behaviors (Greenaway and Chan, 2005). 
When privacy research pursued, it is generally discontinuous with previous 
studies. While there have been numerous studies conducted in privacy in the MIS 
tradition, this researcher could find no MIS work building upon previously completed 
studies in privacy other than an acknowledgement that other researchers had done some 
type of privacy research. As a result there is a paucity of theory in the Information 
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Science discipline to guide the understanding of organizational information privacy 
behavior (Greenaway and Chan, 2005). While calls for a new theory have been made to 
assist in the understanding of similarities and differences in the information privacy 
approach among firms (Milne and Culnan, 2002), only Greenaway has offered research 
in this area that provides new theory. 
In an effort to assist with privacy concerns, privacy research has increased in 
many academic fields. In each of these disciplines, they have in place a definition of what 
is privacy, what is private information, and what is the value of privacy. In some fields, 
their definitions reference definitions in other disciplines most notably law referencing 
philosophy on this topic. But in MIS research, we have not referenced another discipline 
nor have we adopted a definition of privacy. At best, only a handful or researchers have 
attempted to define privacy or what private information is or what values privacy is 
supportive. All that exists are general sweeping statements exist about privacy based 
upon control. As way of example, Greenaway uses the definition that privacy is the 
ability of the individual to personally control information about them (Greenaway, 2005). 
Hu and Teo adopt Westin’s definition that privacy is an individual’s ability to control the 
terms by which their personal information is acquired and used (Westin 1967).  
MIS research has not focused on the axiology of privacy having only tangentially 
commented on the importance of privacy and the values that privacy supports. Other 
disciplines have directly explored the values privacy supports directly and from that focus 
on values, they have defined privacy in ways outside that of control The following is just 
a sampling of what has been offered as a definition of privacy in past research from fields 
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outside of MIS through the focus on values: Privacy is the right invaded (Prince Albert v. 
Strange, 1849). Privacy pertains to the regimentation of diverse aspects of everyday life 
through social technical mechanism by which data is produced (Agre, 1998). Personal 
privacy is simply another extension of property rights; like income and wealth, privacy is 
an emanation of each man’s ownership over his own life (Newhard, 2004). It has been 
described as a right: a right to be left alone, a right to autonomous choice regarding 
intimate matters, a right to autonomous choice regarding personal matters Froomkin, 
1996). "(Privacy is) part of the inner person" (Emerson, 1979). It is the freedom from 
unreasonable constraints on the construction of ones identity (Clarke, 1994). Privacy can 
be an interest: “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and 
“the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions” (Whalen v. 
Roe, 1977). “Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge 
about one possessed by another” (Parent, 1983). Studies need to be conducted on what is 
the value of privacy research and what values does privacy support. This will clarify what 
is privacy and the understanding of the construct of privacy and enable us to construct a 
better construct.  
Writers in other disciplines before espousing theory, have often discussed the 
philosophical concepts they believe that are directly related to research such as ontology, 
epistemology, values, ideologies, history, politics, and social and cultural contexts 
(Patterson, 2000; Paul & Marfo, 2001; Slife & Williams, 1995; Smeyers & Verhesschen,, 
2001). Slife and Williams observe that the hermeneutic philosopher Gadamer (Gadamer, 
no year) contends that before the development of theory there is always an operative 
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understanding of truth. It is this (pre)understanding of truth that makes it possible to 
frame any method at all. Without this understanding we could not formulate any method 
because we would not know what the method should be like—or that we even need a 
method. This means that understandings of truth produce methods, rather than methods 
producing truth. Methods, including the scientific method, are only devices we use to 
convince others and ourselves that our ideas are in some sense sound. Methods do not 
establish the truth of the matter (Efinger et al, 2004). 
In philosophy privacy’s epistemology has been exhaustively studied but to date, 
no attempt been made in MIS research to examine the basic epistemological basis of our 
construct of privacy. An examination of privacy’s epistemology will not only help us in 
the choice of methods in which to conduct research but also through an specification of 
an epistemology a paradigms for research will be established. Those paradigms will 
improve our understanding of privacy. The understanding of the epistemology of privacy 
will enable the development of theories of privacy in the MIS discipline. It will assist us 
in the choice of methods to study the concept. Another benefit of this examination is that 
it will allow us to compare justifications for truth and understand seeming similar studies 
that differ in conclusions that are in fact not based on the facts of the study but on the 
epistemology of the researcher. 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
This section will identify the audience to which this study is directed and after 
specifying the audience will specify  problems that need to be solved.  
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1.4.1 Intended Audience  
A study of privacy in the MIS tradition can be directed to both the business 
community and the technical community. It can also be directed to the legal community, 
particularly where laws impact upon business and business operations. I will address this 
proposal to all of these audiences.  
1.4.2 Problems and Opportunities 
To the business and technical community privacy presents many opportunities to 
the organization that can manage the problems of privacy. Some of the problems that can 
be addressed from this study include the following: 
1.4.3 Address the calls for a better understanding of privacy.  
Despite Mason’s statement that privacy is one of the most important ethical issues 
of the day (Mason, 1986), MIS field have not made our statement as what constitutes 
privacy. We as a discipline are calling for more theory on privacy to support 
organizational privacy research, but we have no epistemology, ontology nor do we 
discuss what the value of privacy is. Where privacy definitions have been attempted it 
has been defined only in terms of control. When we have conducted research, our 
research does not build upon past research.  
To address this problem an exploration of the epistemology of privacy adopted 
from philosophy will be undertaken. From this a new multi dimensional construct of 
privacy which encompasses relationships, privilege relationships, personal development 
and expression, business secrets and public life will be proposed one that will be 
grounded in philosophy and supported by law which establishes roles of behavior.  
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1.4.4 Integrate Legal and Business Knowledge and Research in Privacy 
The adoption of new media involves the shifting or blurring of the boundaries of 
public and private. (Meyrowitz, 1985). Due to increases in technical capacity to gather, 
transfer, store and farm information, a pressure exists to both assure and protect the 
fundamental values that compose privacy. As a response, seemly endless streams of new 
laws are being enacted to ensure traditional values, to protect existing norms, and clarify 
privacy boundaries. 
Responding to changes in social and legal privacy mandates has become an ever 
increasing cost of doing business. Business has high motivations to act in this manner as 
the penalty for non compliance is high. When any system is found to be insufficient 
almost certain loss in money and time will occur to the business due to legal action – real 
or threatened. Other losses include the inability to attract and keep customers, effects on 
employee productivity, morale and retention, and the inability to keep up with other key 
players in the industry. In a firm both the business side and the IT side of the firm need to 
make adjustments in strategy, tactics and operations to meet these mandates for privacy. 
Business lacks the language and understanding of law to fully recognize these mandates, 
to interpret and define what is required and to anticipate how best to implement privacy 
measures in a manner that protects legally and socially mandated privacy protections. 
This lack of understanding of law also hinders business in making assessments on 
whether the proposed measures are sufficient to meet both the mandated and anticipated 
future privacy standards. One cost borne by a firm is the seemingly constant rework of 
plans and in place systems to meet mandated privacy standards resulting in substantial 
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costs in time, effort and money. To avoid these costs and to ensure socially and legally 
mandated privacy, businesses have resorted to implementing plans and systems that are 
overly specified, costly to implement only to find the resulting system fails to meet the 
requirements for the business, is cumbersome to use, full of vulnerabilities, and prone to 
be reworked and redesigned at great cost when the next unanticipated change is 
mandated.  
Laws are that are enacted by legislatures often interpreted by lawyers and judges 
are done by individuals with no understanding of the implications on the business 
community. These same individuals do not understand how business operates let alone 
how their law, or the application or interpretation of law will affect business. Strong 
criticism has been levied by the business community toward the legal/legislative 
community on these issues. Recently a call has been made in the legal community to 
bring together both the legal and business schools of thought to create a single integrated 
legal/managerial school of thought (Holloway, 2005). From the business side the purpose 
is to promote a better understanding of law by business decision makers. This would 
assist business decision makers in the making of decisions that are compatible with law 
and policy. A second purpose is to provide better tools and methodologies to evaluate 
that both the decisions made and the consequences of the decision are compatible with 
law and policy. The end result would enable decision makers to better weigh decisions 
against the public policy and promote better decisions that affect society growth, stability 
and direction For the legal and policy practitioner, the purpose is to promote a better 
understanding of business theory and methodology so that the impact of law and policy 
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on business theory and methodology can be better assessed. It would also assist lawyers 
and legal decision makers understand how legal advice and legal analysis can assist the 
process of business decision making. These goals would assist in the alleviation of the 
trend toward pervasive regulation of the workplace by law and better instruct law in how 
it impacts business theory and directives. The end result would promote a better 
integration of law and business (Holloway, 2005). This study will assist in reaching those 
goals. 
A specified privacy basis in philosophical and legal terms as well 
as a better specified construct of privacy will enable both law and 
business a better understanding of privacy and make clearer the 
requirements that must be met to enable legal and business  
privacy solutions to be proposed, selected,  implemented more 
effectively and efficiently and understood more completely. Less 
time and effort will be spent on reworking systems to add 
unanticipated functionality or in designing into systems the 
requirements to meet mandated functionality for both the present 
and the future. Finally this will provide a better way to exploit 
technological change and preserve status quo or at least reconcile 
status quo with technological changes. 
 
1.4.5 Increase Privacy Management Capability 
Privacy management is a skill required to meet the problems and opportunities 
faced by the firm. In many cases privacy management is a potential competitive 
advantage. 
With mandates from law and society for increased privacy protections, business 
find themselves involved with solving problems or exploiting opportunities. In some 
instances a business’ ability to meet privacy concerns can provide them a competitive 
advantage over firms that do not meet these concerns. These problems, opportunities or 
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potential competitive advantage can result from creating better relationships with external 
customers or creating an better working environment for its employees. 
Business strategies are frequently adopted to respect various privacy interests of 
its external customers. These strategies include building better customer relationships and 
loyalty, developing and sustaining trust, promoting an image that engenders favorable 
attitudes toward the business, assisting in the development of brand to name a few. This 
is especially effective when the company is able exceed the privacy expectations of its 
customers yet gain maximum benefit for itself. Because individuals have a great concern 
over the erosion of their privacy, privacy standards and controls can create, build and 
sustain these conditions especially when used as a methodology of maximizing the value 
of the customer relationship.  
Employers are always looking for ways to increase productivity. In knowledge 
creation environments, creativity has been found to be stifled when too much control is 
placed over the individual. The line between what is seen as an invasion of privacy and 
what is not is critical when developing the optimal work environment for the creation of 
knowledge. Worker productivity, morale and satisfaction suffers when privacy is invaded 
in the workplace.  
Business however has difficulty in developing these relationships because of these 
types of questions: How do we capitalize on consumers concerns for privacy and create a 
sustainable competitive advantage? How do we construct privacy strategies that 
encompass the concerns of the external customer that enable the solving of problems, 
exploitation of opportunities and create competitive advantages? How do we provide for 
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worker privacy concerns yet retain needed control over the workplace? How do we 
implement and enforce privacy yet remain competitive with our rivals?  
This study will give business a new tool to address problems and 
opportunities presented by privacy. When initiatives are taken 
often they fail due to unanticipated functionality and requirements 
and the inability to develop solutions with existing understandings 
and tools. Being able better model privacy and from those models 
create information tools that support the business strategy of 
capitalizing on consumer and employee concerns over their 
privacy invasions will result in substantial benefits accruing to 
business. The specifications of privacy provided by this paper will 
enable businesses to construct a strong privacy strategy, develop a 
sound tactical plan and execute the plan to its best potential.  
 
1.4.6 Design privacy into the tools of business to ensure privacy 
How do we design privacy into our information tools? A problem exists of how to 
implement technical controls on private information and solve the issues of planning for 
privacy in the initial design stage. Should this be accomplished, the result would be lower 
costs of implementing privacy safeguards, increased performance of systems using 
privacy safeguards, fewer security concerns, fewer security breaches and less risk of 
failure. 
Presently privacy is designed into the system after the data model has been 
established. Once the data model is completed, a database tool is implementing on top of 
the data often using a system of views, privileges and security tools to ensure privacy. 
Other methods are a series of triggers which utilizing programming to enable those with 
the correct access codes to obtain information they desire. Oracle has introduced a 
concept called the Virtual Private Database which matches roles and permits greater 
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abilities to program security into the system but this too is done after the fact. New 
methods include notifications issued when certain information is accessed but this suffers 
as a check on the system and is not proactive. The problems with these after the fact 
systems are numerous. First is they are very expensive to design and implement. Risk of 
failure is high due to the fact privacy is not designed at the inception of the system. 
Privacy controls and protections are placed over the data model. Often these are custom 
designed. Holes and vulnerabilities are often found once the product has been 
implemented. Other times the tool fails to provide the level of privacy mandated by law 
or expected by consumers or fails to provide a required level of service or both.  
This study will assist in the creation of tools, the planning and 
construction of infrastructure and systems, and the applications of 
these to the problems and opportunities of the business  I propose 
to create a role based information technology design tool 
composed of law and social norms and information technology 
design. This tool will design privacy into the information as well as 
into the mechanisms that sit on top of the information. Each data 
attribute will have a sensitivity level as well as certain possible 
data values with in the range of possible data attributes. I propose 
that the user’s role and view instead of being a first level protection 
is but a third level of privacy protection.  This tool will enable the 
an evaluation of the instantiation to be made regarding its 
compliance with legal and social norms, its ability to cope with 
changing environments,  The tool will enable more effective 
designs, at less cost in term of money, time and resources. The tool 
will enable better designs in terms of quality. Designs constructed 
will meet the strictures of society and law, be better able to 
withstand changes made in the environment by technology changes 
and the accompanying legal changes made to insure traditional 
values. 
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1.5 Nature of the Study 
This research study will be conducted using Design Science methodology. Hevner 
(Hevner, no year) presented a framework for understanding, evaluating, and executing 
Design Science research in IT. Design Science in the context of Information Technology 
is ultimately concerned with the construction of solutions to problems as well as the 
creation and exploitation of opportunities in the business environment.  
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Figure 2 Hevner et al Design Science Model 
 
Business seeks solutions to problems. Problems are the difference between where 
we are and where we want to be. Business also needs to exploit known opportunities and 
to create new opportunities. These can exist in the organizational context or in the 
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business process themselves. For business to meet its objectives efficiently and 
effectively, technology must be aligned with the business structure and business strategy. 
There are often issues in the infrastructure, information systems, applications and 
communications architecture that must be solved in order to better meet business 
problems and opportunities. Design Science can accomplish this directly through the 
solving of a business or technology problem or opportunity through the construction of a 
solution. The solution created can extend human and social capabilities or these solutions 
can modify the environment to enable a new solution (Heavner, no year). Indirectly these 
problems can be solved and opportunities created and exploited through design science 
by the creation of new ways to evaluate proposed solutions. Another indirect solution to 
problems and opportunities is through the creation of new and or bettering our existing 
theoretical foundations or through new and or better research methodologies. The goal of 
design science is to have these new artifacts (solutions, new evaluation techniques, better 
theoretical foundations or research methodologies) become adopted and “cause humans 
to abandon their previous problem producing behavior and devices” (Fuller, 1992). 
The knowledge base is used in design science to construct both the search and 
solutions to problems and opportunities and to create new opportunities. The knowledge 
basis of Design Science is composed of Theoretical Foundations and Research 
Methodologies. Theoretical foundations include constructs, models methods and 
Instantiations. Constructs provide a language in which problems and solutions are defined 
and communicated; Models enable understanding and the exploration of effects of design 
decisions and changes. Methods provide guidance to solve problems. Instantiations 
  
39 
demonstrate feasibility as well as provide empirical evidence that the artifact achieves its 
purpose, or enables the researcher to learn and study the real world and how the artifact 
affects it. Each of these will be examined with the rigor of those fields.  
Previously stated privacy presents both a problem and an opportunity for 
business. Since Design Science is concerned with the creation of solutions to problems 
and the exploitation of opportunities this makes it an ideal vehicle to conduct this 
research. The creation of a role based information technology tool and applying it to 
improvement of privacy in the business makes Design Science a suitable tool for this 
research. Design Science support the creation of both tools and instantiations to provide a 
proof of concept. 
1.6 Anticipated Contributions  
This proposal anticipates four contributions: Provide a better understanding of 
privacy; Integrate legal and business knowledge; Increase privacy management 
capability; Increase the ability to design privacy into business tools. 
1.6.1 Address the Calls for a Better Understanding of Privacy 
Present research in MIS has failed to recognize or define an epistemological, 
ontological, axiological basis for privacy. The contribution of my study will increase the 
MIS knowledge base in privacy. My proposal will contain an epistemology of privacy 
adopted from philosophy. I will also extend from philosophy and law an ontological and 
axiological base for privacy.  
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While both law and philosophy have examined privacy, each has approached 
privacy much like MIS, seeing it as a single construct3 and attempting to apply it to a 
variety of situations. This application has created a morass of conflicts making privacy 
appear to be situational specific. Certain patterns emerge in my examination that show 
privacy is not a single unified construct but a multidimensional construct which is 
differentiated by the role information plays for the entities providing or using that 
information. I will provide a new multi dimensional construct of privacy that captures the 
control, access and combination elements and explains the purpose behind the role. This 
will enable future researchers to gain a better grasp on this concept and apply it as a tool 
both in their research and to define and solve business problems. I will propose a multi 
dimensional construct of privacy which encompasses relationships, privilege 
relationships, personal development and expression, business secrets and public life. The 
proposed construct will be grounded in philosophy and supported by law which 
establishes roles of behavior. 
1.6.2 Integrate Legal and Business Knowledge and Research in Privacy 
How can we integrate legal and business? A specified  privacy basis in 
philosophical and legal terms as well as a better specified construct of privacy will enable 
both law and business a better understanding of privacy and make clearer the 
requirements that must be met to enable legal and business  privacy solutions to be 
                                                 
3 In philosophy privacy is viewed either as control based, or as access based or relationship based which is 
a combination of control but not as a combination. When a philosopher takes that stand all things private 
are examined in that base. Law has applied these concepts in its construction of societal roles that cover a 
wide variety of circumstances. Law has not however articulated whether the basis is that of control, 
access or a combination of control and access.  
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proposed, selected,  implemented more effectively and efficiently and understood more 
completely. Less time and effort will be spent on reworking systems to add unanticipated 
functionality or in designing into systems the requirements to meet mandated 
functionality for both the present and the future. Finally this will provide a better way to 
exploit technological change and preserve status quo or at least reconcile status quo with 
technological changes  
1.6.3 Increase privacy management capability 
How do we manage privacy? Privacy management is a skill required to meet the 
problems and opportunities faced by the firm. In many cases privacy management is the 
insurmountable problem that sits between high rewards, competitive advantages and 
mediocrity. This study will give business a new tool to address problems and 
opportunities presented by privacy. When initiatives in privacy management are taken 
often they fail due to unanticipated functionality and requirements and the inability to 
develop solutions with existing understandings and tools. Being able better model privacy 
and from those models create information tools that support the business strategy of 
capitalizing on consumer and employee concerns over their privacy invasions will result 
in substantial benefits accruing to business. The specifications of privacy provided by this 
paper will enable businesses to better construct a privacy strategy, develop a sound 
tactical plan and execute the plan.  
1.6.4 Increase the ability to design privacy into business tools.  
How do we design privacy into the tools of business to ensure privacy? The 
problems and unrealized opportunities faced by both the business and technical 
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community in the arena of privacy are in part due to the failure to understand the concept 
privacy and apply its understandings to its tools. Many business problems and 
opportunities cannot be resolved because the infrastructures, information systems and the 
applications are constructed on the present understanding of privacy and fail to 
effectively and efficiently support levels of privacy service required by business today.  
This study will assist in the creation of tools, the planning and construction of 
infrastructure and systems, and the applications of these to the problems and 
opportunities of the business. I propose to create a role based information technology 
design tool based on philosophical and legal concepts and applied to information 
technology design. This tool will assist in the design of privacy into the information as 
well as into the technical mechanisms that sit on top of the information in the form of 
software and hardware. Each data attribute will have a sensitivity level as well as certain 
possible data values with in the range of possible data attributes. I propose that the user’s 
role and view instead of being a first level protection is but a third level of privacy 
protection. This tool will enable the an evaluation of the instantiation to be made 
regarding its compliance with legal and social norms, its ability to cope with changing 
environments. The tool will enable more effective designs, at less cost in term of money, 
time and resources. The tool will enable better designs in terms of quality. Designs 
constructed will better meet the strictures of society and law, be better able to withstand 
changes made in the environment by technology changes and the accompanying legal 
changes made to insure traditional values. 
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1.6.5 Proof of construct 
Finally as a proof of concept, I will utilize the proposed new construct of privacy 
to demonstrate how it will assist in the construction of privacy into a role based data 
access tool. As proof of the concept, this new method will be compared to existing 
methods and the systems constructed by those methods in terms of functionality and 
correctness. This will also demonstrate the capability of the definitional artifact as well as 
enable an evaluation potential benefit. 
1.7 Outline of the Rest of the Proposal 
Numerous contributions will be made by this dissertation which will be presented 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4. In Chapter 2, I will present additions to the MIS knowledge base 
from the fields of philosophy and law. In Chapter 3, I will present my new construct of 
privacy. In Chapter 4, I will detail how I will apply this model to a Role Based Access 
Control System to improve security in the database/data warehouse environment. 
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Chapter 2: Philosophy and Law of Privacy 
In this chapter a review of the privacy literature from philosophy and law is 
presented. Law and Philosophy are distinct yet related disciplines. Where philosophy 
debates the course of society, law implements the course society wishes to pursue. For 
each discipline a historical review of privacy and the methods of philosophy and law 
are presented in order to facilitate understanding. 
The first section will review privacy’s epistemological, ontological axiological 
basis and relate it to rights and values. The section on privacy will conclude by showing 
the values privacy seeks to protect are rooted in specific ontology which in turn 
determines a distinct pattern of rights that ensures the various values of privacy.  
The second section of this chapter will review privacy law. The purpose of law 
is to coordinate, motivate and direct human and non human action through use of value 
based laws. These laws create rights which define roles that direct human action toward 
desired activities. A case study of American privacy law is presented to demonstrate 
that over time the law of privacy has undergone changes to meet the ever changing 
needs of society. 
In Chapter Three, this philosophical and legal analysis is used to demonstrate 
that the existing conceptualization of privacy is inadequate. Chapter Three will 
conclude with a new conceptualization of privacy.  
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2.1 Philosophy and Privacy 
This section of the review includes a discussion of philosophical analysis as a 
method that debates the course of society. Next the epistemological, ontological and 
axiological bases of privacy in philosophy are presented. From this will emerge three 
conceptual dimensions of privacy one based on control, another based on access and 
the final based on both control and access. 
2.1.1 Philosophy Is 
The word "philosophy" literally translates to “love of wisdom.” It represents a 
vocation for questioning, learning, and teaching. Philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom 
pondering questions which are beyond the scope of science. The essence of philosophy 
is the study of fundamental ideas and methods that are not adequately addressed in 
specialized empirical disciplines, such as physics or history. Philosophy studies the 
foundations upon which all belief structures and fields of knowledge are built. 
Philosophy is sometimes seen as a particular method. The method almost 
always involves rational inquiry but not all philosophers would agree that rationality is 
fundamental. Among the rationalists, the form of that rationality varies considerably. 
As way of example, the Socratic Method focuses on asking questions while the focus of 
analytic philosophy is on logic and language.  
Philosophy can also be seen as the study of a particular subject matter. The 
subjects of philosophical inquiry are diverse, including metaphysics (the nature of 
being), epistemology (methods of knowing), and ethics. 
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Other philosophers see philosophy as a process. Goals of this process include 
the perfection of the human soul, an answer to the command "Know thyself", seeking 
the Tao, or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed, an antidote to certain confusions of 
language 
Method
Study of a
subject matter
Process
Philosophy is
           
Figure 3 Philosophy Is 
 
The four major orderings of philosophy are Logic, Ontology, Epistemology, and 
Axiology. From these orderings philosophers conduct their analysis and investigation. 
Typical concepts analyzed or investigated include existence or being, morality or 
goodness, knowledge, truth, and beauty. Privacy is one matter studied in philosophy. 
2.1.1.1 Rigor in Philosophical Research 
Philosophical research is undertaken to discover new facts, to gather new data, 
to put hypotheses and theories to the test by way of new experimental evidence or 
calculations all in pursuit of knowledge. Another forum of research in philosophy seeks 
to refine analyses, develop and advance or criticize interpretations, explore alternative 
perspectives and new ways of thinking, suggest and apply modified or novel modes of 
assessment, and promote new understanding. A special case of this type of research is 
conceptual and methodological critique, involving the scrutiny of the basic concepts 
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and methodologies of other disciplines, scientific as well as humanistic. Other types of 
research involve interpretive and evaluative inquiry contributing to the enhancement of 
our comprehension of ourselves and our world (American Philosophical Association, 
no year). Philosophical studies also often focus on the meaning of an idea and on its 
basis, coherence, and relations to other ideas viewing them both microscopically and 
from the larger perspective of concerns of human existence (Audi, no year). 
The purpose of philosophical inquiry is the attempt to think clearly and 
rigorously about difficult and complex issues and questions. Despite this laudable goal, 
the American Philosophic Association notes that, “(T)he criteria of assessment of work 
in philosophy is complex” (American Philosophical Association, no year). This 
assessment is not always easily made in philosophical circles because of the wide 
varieties of research conducted on a wide variety of topics. As a rule, research in 
philosophy must be viewed and assessed in relation to the kinds of issues with which it 
deals and conform to the norms, standards and practices of the community. Rigor in 
philosophical research consists of a logical assessment and elucidation assessment. In 
any assessment of logic of a philosophical work, the quality of the reasoning set forth is 
paramount. Good logical rigor must not only be logically sound but should not ignore 
counter examples to the proposed schema even should they be irrelevant or rare. The 
elucidation requirement is the overall impression of the work asking the question: Does 
the work create a greater understanding of the matter under consideration?  
Agreement with other philosophic work is not a criterion of rigor.  
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“Disagreement and criticism are among the hallmarks of philosophical life; and 
it is rare to find two philosophers working in the same area who are in complete 
agreement with each other. The very best research in philosophy serves more often to 
generate disputes and differences than to resolve them. It is precisely through such 
ongoing argument and debate that sophistication with respect to the issues at hand 
increases, comprehension of them deepens, and understanding concerning them is 
enhanced” (American Philosophical Association, no year).  
2.1.2 Philosophical Underpinnings in Privacy: Epistemology 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature, origin and 
scope of knowledge. A basic concept is justified true belief. For something to count as 
knowledge, it must be true, and be believed to be true. Socrates argues that true alone is 
insufficient. Additionally one must have a reason or justification for that belief. 
Knowledge, therefore, is distinguished from true belief by its justification, and much of 
epistemology is concerned with how true beliefs might be properly justified. This is 
sometimes referred to as the theory of justification (Trochim, no year). 
There are two different schools of thought in the epistemology of privacy which 
are diametrically opposed. One school is the Reductionist who believes that privacy is a 
non meaningful, invaluable concept. The other school is known as the Non 
Reductionist who take the opposing stance (DeCew, 2002). In the Non Reductionist 
camp there are two epistemological schools one known as the Schoeman 
Distinctiveness Thesis and the other known as Coherentists. The Schoeman School is 
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Foundationalistic in its epistemology. The Coherentists is based in its epistemology in 
another theory of knowledge known as Coherentism. 
Reductionists Non Reductionist
Coherentist
(Coherentism)
Schoeman Distinctive
Thesis
((Foundationalism)
Privacy
Epistemological Schools of Thought in Privacy
Schoeman
Coherent Thesis
  
Figure 4 Epistemological Schools of Thought in Privacy 
 
2.1.2.1 Reductionism and Non Reductionism 
Reductionists deny that there is anything useful in considering privacy as a 
separate concept (DeCew, 2002) and that there is “no need to settle disputes within its 
boundaries” (Thomson, 1975). In reductionism, privacy issues are seen as diverse and 
disparate and only nominally or superficially connected (Shoeman, 1984). This is 
supported with the Judith Thompson’s observation that with respect to privacy that “no 
body seems to have a very clear idea what it is” (Thomson, 1975). Besides seeing 
nothing about privacy is coherent, the reductionist sees nothing that is distinctive or 
morally and legally illuminating. Privacy is often stated to be represented by a set of 
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diverse values common to many other social issues that exhaust privacy claims 
(Shoeman, 1984). Often privacy concerns are viewed as analyzable or reducible to 
rights and claim of other sorts such as rights over their own person or property 
(Thomson, 1975) or as a derivative of another construct (Thomson, 1975). When 
derived, the real basis of privacy is seen by the reductionist not as a concern for privacy 
but as a concern for one’s property interests or for one’s right to be his own person 
(Thomson, 1975) (such as having liberty) or in the stake in maintaining or enhancing 
his economic or social leverage or defend our concerns in standard moral and legal 
categories such as emotional distress and property invasions (such as trespass and 
misappropriation of assets) (Shoeman, 1984).  
Thompson elucidates the reductionist position in the following statement: 
“Someone looks at your pornographic picture in your wall-safe? 
He violates your right that your belongings not be looked at, and 
you have that right because you have ownership rights – and it is 
because you have them that what he does is wrong. Someone 
uses an X-ray device to look at you through the walls of your 
house? He violates your right not to be looked at, and you have 
that right because you have rights over your persons analogous to 
the rights you have over your property and it is because you have 
these rights that what he does is wrong.” (Thomson, 1975) 
 
2.1.2.2 Non Reductionist Conceptualizations 
Another school of thought in opposition to reductionism has argued that privacy 
has conceptual distinctness from other constructs and stands independently on its own. 
What is interesting is there is a wide diversity of opinion of what makes the concept 
distinct. All do agree that when privacy is attempted to be reduced something is lost. By 
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way of example, Inness notes that privacy has been claimed to be composed of the 
construct liberty and property, yet when examined, a conceptual distinctiveness from 
liberty and property is found. Privacy claims, according to Inness are conceptually 
distinct from liberty and property claims as they cohere about intimacy. Claims 
concerning liberty associated with intimacy might be privacy claims but not all of these 
privacy claims can be collapsed into liberty. Intimate property claims might be privacy 
claims but not all property claims are privacy claims (Innes, 1992).  
2.1.2.3 Schoeman School 
Schoeman created a refinement on the construct of privacy and further 
elucidated the differences between the reductionists and non reductionists. What 
Schoeman was attempting to develop was a sharper contrast between Reduction and 
Non Reduction thought. In this refinement he created a continuum of construct of 
privacy, by redefining privacy into two distinct camps at opposite polls — One having 
no common connection which was called his Coherent Thesis (reductionism), and the 
other having a common connection which later was called his Distinctive Thesis (Non 
Reductionism).  
A reductionist, according to the Schoeman Coherence Thesis would espouse 
that while all privacy claims are believed to hold similar justifications and thus hold 
something in common in fact have no coherence as the very privacy claims they 
espouse are defended with moral principles independent of the concern with privacy. 
Therefore there are no moral principles distinctive to privacy and the construct holds no 
coherence. A member of this group would espouse that a distinctive privacy construct 
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cannot be constructed because it is a diverse and disparate collection of objects that are 
only superficially or nominally connected.  
At the other end of the spectrum is Schoeman’s Distinctiveness Thesis. This 
thesis recognized that there is something special, fundamental, distinctive and coherent 
about the human moral or social character that is lost in reductionism. It espouses that 
privacy captures this in a definable construct that is distinguishable from other 
constructs and defendable on principles distinctive to the construct of privacy – such as 
an inviolate personality or human dignity, as a key component in structuring the very 
possibility of diverse social relationships and making possible the deepest kind of love 
an individual can share or share a role in protecting private life or individual’s intimate 
self.  
2.1.2.4 The Coherentist School – Foundationalism v. Coherentism 
A second Non Reductionist School has emerged called Coherentism. 
Coherentists have rejected Schoeman’s Distinctive Thesis while agreeing with 
Schoeman in the rejection of Reductionist thought. They agree with Schoeman that 
there is something fundamental and distinctive and coherent about the various values 
that have been called privacy interests. Also agreed upon is the fact that most 
individuals recognize privacy as a useful concept and that privacy has value as a 
coherent and fundamental concept. How the Coherentist school differs from the 
Distinctiveness Thesis is in the epistemology.  
Foundationalism is the epistemological basis of the Schoeman Coherence and 
Distinctive thesis as well as the Reductionist School. Foundationalism is a theory of 
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knowledge that requires that all logical arguments stem from an objective true which is 
a basic self justifying belief. The Coherentist school however bases its epistemology in 
another theory of knowledge known as coherentism. Coherence theories stress the 
importance of mutual support among a network of emerging beliefs as a criterion of 
justification. 
“Coherentism may be thought of as analogous to a ship, the hull 
of which is constructed of many metal panels, none of which 
float on their own, but which form a floating whole when 
appropriately connected. No particular panel on a ship can 
properly be considered foundational: the ship's ability to float 
arises spontaneously when a sufficient number of panels are 
appropriately connected.” (DeCew, 2002) 
 
Most commonly, this set of beliefs is held by a particular individual; however it 
is also possible for Coherentist models to range over the beliefs of a group. If we accept 
that the nodes in a coherent network are "beliefs", then it is entirely feasible to construct 
a beautifully consistent network of beliefs which nevertheless bears little or no relation 
to the world it purports to describe. This can result in strong logical arguments with a 
consistent network of beliefs that support false conclusions (known as the Isolation 
Objection).The coherence relationship itself is rather harder to pin down, precisely. It 
may involve logical or probabilistic consistency, inferential connectedness, lack of 
anomalies, explanatory value, relevance, and so on. These issues have impaired the 
cohesiveness of this school of privacy because its members hold quite diverse, and 
sometimes overlapping, views on what it is that is distinctive about privacy and what 
links diverse privacy claims (DeCew, 2002). 
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Unlike the field of philosophy, there is no raging debate in the MIS discipline 
over the epistemological basis of privacy. This ignoring of epistemology and failing to 
taking an epistemological stand are two reasons why privacy research has been 
impaired.  Epistemology is important to the conceptualization of a construct. 
Epistemology accounts for differences on the conceptualization of a construct as the 
epistemology provides the justification for the knowledge and belief that the construct 
is true. Privacy researchers fail to note the distinctions present in the different 
epistemologies of privacy which is one of the reasons there is no consensus on the 
construct of privacy and is a reason why privacy research appears to be a series of 
unconnected, context specific studies with little generalization outside the context of 
the study. It is important that an epistemological basis of the study of privacy be 
specified so that theories can be constructed, understood and results compared between 
research conducted with differing epistemologies.  
This paper adopts the Schoeman Distinctive Thesis and Foundationalism as its 
epistemological basis. 
2.1.3 Philosophical Basis of Privacy: Ontology and Axiology 
Ontology has two questions: How do I define and distinguish the object or 
entity under inquiry? What are the fundamental categories of being? Any ontology 
must give an account of which words refer to entities, which do not, why, and what 
categories result.  It must provide what are the essential, as opposed to merely 
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accidental, attributes of a given object. It must provide what constitutes the Identity4 of 
an object? What are an object's properties what is its relationship to other entities and 
how are they related to the object itself?  
Axiology is the study of value or quality. Axiology includes the study of ethics 
and aesthetics—philosophical fields that depend crucially on notions of value. 
Axiology lays the groundwork for these fields, having strong similarity to value theory 
and meta-ethics. The term was used in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but in recent 
decades, value theory has tended to replace it in discussions of the nature of value or 
goodness in general. 
Value theory concerns itself with the value of people and things5 - or the 
combination of all these. Research suggests both human beings and at least some other 
sentient organisms can hold values, which express themselves in behavioral 
dispositions - the predisposition to act by choice in a certain way, when faced with a 
certain condition or stimulus which permits different responses. The expression of this 
predisposition ranges from very primitive behavioral routines, to very complex ones 
which may be difficult to detect or elucidate.  
Values are implicitly related to a degree of behavioral freedom or autonomy 
which goes beyond a conditioned response; as values steer or guide the organism, on 
the basis of internally chosen options. Thus, values imply the (conscious) prioritizing of 
                                                 
4 Identity here is used in the sense of what makes the object definable and recognizable in terms of 
qualities and characteristics that distinguish it from other entities. 
5 Value is said to include worth, utility, trading or economic value, moral value, legal value, quantitative 
or aesthetic value 
  
56 
 
different behavioral alternatives which are perceived to be possible for the living 
organism. Conversely, value-conflicts can disorient the behaviors of the organism, 
throwing it out of balance. Values are at the basis of all moral, political and economic 
behavior. 
The ontology of privacy differs depending upon the axiological view of the 
person offering the ontology. Three values dominate privacy research in philosophy 
and law. “Privacy promotes individual autonomy, personal growth, and human 
relations” (Graham, 1987). Lockian privacy emphasizes the value of being an 
autonomous free agent responsible to others only in cases of necessity or agreement. 
Under this view, privacy is necessary to insure that individual actions be free from the 
influence of others. Privacy allows the individual great autonomy and latitude in the 
choices available to the individual. Kantian privacy looks to the individual constructing 
his own self. Kantian privacy emphasizes the importance of a space apart from the gaze 
of others to develop and live life. The final view of privacy, which is a combination of 
the Kantian and Lockian schools looks to the necessity of privacy to promote 
relationships. 
2.1.3.1 Lockian Privacy 
Frequently privacy is discussed in reference to a distinction between public and 
private.  
“This public private distinction has sometimes been taken to 
reflect differences between the appropriate scope of government 
as opposed to self regulation by individuals. It has also been 
interpreted to differentiate political and domestic spheres of life. 
These diverse linguistic descriptions capture overlapping yet non 
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equivalent concepts. Nevertheless they share the assumption that 
there is a boundary marking off that which is private from that 
which is private.” (DeCew, 1997) 
 
The Lockian ideal of the politically free man in a minimally regulated society 
extends the right to privacy as a necessity to protect the individual against intrusions by 
others. Locke maintained that governmental, societal or individual power should not 
infringe upon  another person’s power, liberty or autonomy except upon exceptional 
circumstances and then the intrusion should be reasonable and limited. The value of 
this privacy is it provides the means by which individuals may sustain power, liberty 
and autonomy against potentially overwhelming forces (Nissenbaum, 1998). Lockes’ 
viewpoint is based upon the belief that everyone has an area of their life where they are 
not responsible to the state for what they do so long as the rule of law is maintained: 
rights of others are respected. Accountability of the individual toward society should be 
minimal unless the individual is either a member of society’s administration or some 
special ground exists why the individual cannot please themselves. 
Keeping the rights a society holds over a person reasonable and limited, permits 
societal roles be constructed to allow considerable autonomy to the individual to choose 
how they live (Benn, 1975). This justification of privacy has been represented as the 
power in the individual to determine what to reveal and determine how accessible they 
want to be (Bellotti, 1998). It has also been stated as justification for privacy in public 
(Nissenbaum, 1998). These views are in opposition to the totalitarian school which 
holds that in everything that man does, man’s individual action in toto has significance 
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for society at large. As such, man has both a responsibility toward society and 
accountability to society members that requires all be revealed (Benn, 1975). 
2.1.3.2 Lockean Control Based Privacy 
To some, privacy “is not simply the absence of information about us in the 
minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves” 
(Fried, 1968). Alan Westin’s influential account of privacy defines it as “the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967). This has 
been called the control over information of oneself (Parent, 1983). Privacy is defended 
as a value that accords us the ability to control the access others have to us (Gavison, 
1980, and Allen, 1988). It has also been expressed as a right and duty to make some 
information generally available concerning their relationship and a right and duty to 
leave unsigned other information because “in society there is the right and duty of 
partial display” (Goffman, 1971). It been observed that the control of outflow of 
information may be of strategic or aesthetic value6 to the person and the control of 
inflow of information including the initiation of contact (Samarajiva, 1998).  
An appeal of this position is it is seen as more morally neutral than the rights, 
claims and entitlements approach. Control based privacy theories are not without their 
criticism. One criticism has been that it is vulnerable to counter examples which make 
                                                 
6 Aesthetic Privacy violations expose things that victims may feel inappropriate to reveal to others. 
Strategic Privacy violations compromise the victim in the pursuit of his or her interests see Rule, J.B. et 
al, eds. The Politics of Privacy: Planning for Personal Data Systems as Powerful Technologies, 
Elsevier, (1980). 
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the position appear ill considered. Example: a person lost in a forest has lost control 
over who has control over his information yet in reality he suffers from the fact that he 
has too much privacy (Shoeman, 1984). The foremost criticism however is that control 
based privacy claims are vulnerable to examples of threatened losses where privacy has 
not been lost but there is an issue of control over disclosure (Parent, 1983). Imagine an 
X-ray device that can look through the walls of a home. You lose control over the 
disclosure of the activities in the home even if nobody uses the device. You lose control 
over privacy in your home only if someone uses this device. What this example exposes 
is control is not a necessary condition for privacy. Control has also been shown not to 
be a sufficient condition for privacy. You may have complete control over your 
personal information but chose to give up your privacy by freely divulging the 
information. Because you freely disclose this information it makes it difficult to 
describe it as a loss of privacy on a control based definition of privacy. In this way 
control is not sufficient condition for privacy (Austin, 2003). In the circumstances 
where individuals control the outflow of information and initiation of contact subject to 
some objective rule additional issues of knowing how they and their information is 
accessible, by whom and when becomes apparent. Control based privacy offers little 
explanation on why some information should be private while other information is not 
private except through an explanation based upon social conventions (Parent, 1983). 
With control based privacy, requirements to control the access easily and intuitively, 
feedback of who has access to what and personal control, trust development all become 
issues (Bellotti, 1998). Control based privacy cannot answer the question over what 
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information we should have control. Further, a definition of privacy as control over 
personal information depends upon our acceptance of an entitlement to this 
information, fail to justify an entitlement to privacy and in many cases presuppose an 
entitlement (Austin, 2003).  
2.1.3.3 Kantian Privacy 
Privacy can be constructed through the Kantian theory of the morally 
autonomous man who acts on principles he accepts as rational (Benn, 1975). Our 
society and culture value people who are independent minded. Characteristics of this 
type include that they step out and set themselves apart from the masses. Often found to 
be leaders including leaders of nations, they are champions to causes and blaze new 
horizons.  This type of person is an innovator, inventor and possess the independent 
mind and inner strength and courage to act upon their principles and to resist the 
pressure to conform to the rest.  These types of person doesnot just appear; they need to 
be nurtured.  
With out development people in general will tend to adopt the views held by 
others without question. To avoid this, people need to be able to act freely and develop 
their own character. Former Senator Hubert Humphrey wrote, “We act differently if we 
believe we are being observed. If we can never be sure whether or not we are being 
watched and listened to all our actions will be altered and our very character will 
change” (Long, 1967). People need to be spontaneous and not hold back input. Senator 
Edward V. Long observed, “because of the diligent accumulation of facts about each of 
us, it is difficult to speak or act today without wondering if the if the words or actions 
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will appear ‘on the record’. ”(Long, 1967). People need freedom to develop their own 
principles. They need a sanctuary and a retreat to be their selves and be placed outside 
the gaze of society while they nurture themselves and develop. People cannot develop 
into autonomous beings unless they are allowed to practice independent judgment. 
Privacy must be afforded to the individual so that the individual develops personal 
autonomy necessary to develop these traits. This is described in the literature as private 
psychological space (Zweig, 2002), or as a condition necessary for the construction of 
self (Reiman, 1976), construct their identity (Goffman, 1956), Clark, 1994) intellectual 
privacy (Cohen, 2003) emotional space. 
2.1.3.4 Kantian State of limited access 
The ability to control access differs from the ability to control information. This 
appears to have its basis in Kantian philosophy. The ability to control access creates a 
zone of non interference or a zone of limited access to private information. This is often 
used when information has been provided in the context of one relationship and another 
seeks access to that information.7 It can also mean a zone of limited access to the 
person for the purpose of limiting the gathering of personal information (Innes, 1992). 
During the infancy of the privacy conceptualization, Brandeis and Warren proposed 
privacy as a right to be left alone. They championed that an individual’s private life 
should be free from the gaze of the public and others and that same individual had the 
right to determine the conditions under which access to his person could be obtained 
                                                 
7 An example of this is an insurance company seeking access to the medical information provided by the 
patient to the doctor for purpose of diagnosis. 
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(Warren and Brandeis, no year). One problem with this conception of privacy is there 
are innumerable ways to leave someone alone that have nothing to do with privacy 
(Parent, 1983). A second problem related to the concept of liberty. Brandeis and 
Warren’s assertion was based upon their belief that an individual possessed the liberty 
to enjoy life and property. Liberty is the absence of external constraints or coercion on 
the individual. The right of liberty embraces the right of persons to make important 
choices about their lives but this was distinguishable from a right of privacy which 
condemned the unwarranted acquisition of personal knowledge. Liberty constructs 
placed constraints and restrictions on the individual control over information and did 
not create a zone of non interference. A need for more conceptual clarity was apparent. 
Later definitions attempt to avoid this by stating that privacy is a condition in which 
others are deprived of access to you (Reiman, 1976) or to self (Garrett, 1974, and 
Gavison, 1980). When privacy is defined in operational terms, this capability is often 
coupled with an ability to control access (Bellotti, 1996) with this control over access 
enhancing personal expression and choice (Shoeman, 1984) or some combination of 
these (DeCew, 1997).  
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State of Limited
Access
Anticipatory
Concerns
Non Anticipatory
Concerns
Inhibition
Self
Consciousness
Self
Actualization
      
Figure 5 Taxonomy of Limited Access 
 
2.1.3.4.1 Anticipatory Concerns – Limited Access 
There are many values that are supported by the creation of a zone of limited 
access. Anticipatory concerns have been expressed over the possible abuse of power by 
a corrupt government which gathers information to weed out undesirables (political or 
religious) and dissidents. In private relations, anticipatory concerns include certain 
information about ourselves if known to others it would leave us vulnerable to 
harassment, discrimination, identity theft and other types of abuse (Information and 
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, no year).  
Non anticipatory concerns – Inhibition 
Zones of no access support other values, these of a non anticipatory nature. 
Where there is a zone of no access, individuals have fewer inhibitions and do what they 
would not do without it because of a lack of fear of an unpleasant or hostile reaction 
from others” (Gavison, 1980). The types of expression affected include both the 
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expression of emotion and expression of action. The reason we value freedom from 
physical access is that it insulates us from “the inhibitive effects that arise from close 
physical proximity with another individual” (Gavison, 1980). It is not simply that we 
are identified by others that creates the loss of privacy, but the fact that the 
identification subjects us to the kind of inhibiting standards of public norms and 
justification that underlie our concerns regarding being subject to observation and the 
public gaze (Austin, 2003). Inhibitions will occur even should the anticipated reaction 
would stop short of harassment and discrimination. In this sense the zone protects our 
ability to act and think in unpopular ways; as well as it protects individuality 
understood in terms of our ability to be eccentric.8  
2.1.3.4.2 Non-anticipatory Concerns - Self Consciousness 
While there are many acceptable ways to present our thoughts in public, there 
are some expressions that are not acceptable (such as the expression of strong 
emotions). All humans suffer from self consciousness. Self consciousness is affected by 
the zone of limited access and can be promoted or inhibited. Some aspects of our inner 
lives, our thoughts, emotions and actions, simply cannot exist if exposed to the public 
gaze even if these are in some sense wholly conventional. This arises under the 
circumstance where individuality arises not from the need to be different but the need 
to express ourselves.  
                                                 
8 See also Bloustein, “The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose 
every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his 
individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass.”  
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(This) awareness of how one appears from outside is a constant of human life, 
sometimes burdensome, sometimes an indispensable resource. But there are aspects of 
life which require that we be free of it, in order that we may live and react entirely from 
the inside. They include sexual life in its most unconstrained form and the more 
extreme aspects of emotional life – fundamental anxieties about oneself, fear of death, 
personal rage, remorse, and grief. . . .The public gaze is inhibiting because, except for 
infants and psychopaths, it brings into effect expressive constraints and requirements of 
self-presentation that are strongly incompatible with the natural expression of strong or 
intimate feeling. And it presents us with a demand to justify ourselves before others that 
we cannot meet for those things that we cannot put a good face on (Nagel, 1998). 
Non anticipatory concerns - Self actualization 
Some authors recognize a right to become, to be and to remain a person 
(Reiman, 1976). A pressure to conform leads to conformity and decreases in diversity 
but it also leads to a condition where self cannot be actualized. People require some 
respite from the public gaze to collect our self and form our self through the 
development and affirmation of our own ideas even should they become the same as 
our peers. This zone of no access enables us to become distinct individuals to live and 
remain individual.
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The Condition Value of the Zone of Limited Access 
Privacy ? Lower Inhibition Freedom to do and experiment 
Privacy ? Decreases Self 
Consciousness 
Freedom to express thought, emotion and act 
Privacy ? Increases self 
actualization 
Freedom to be different, be non conforming, to 
develop self, to remain self 
Table 1 Zones of Limited Access 
 
Problems with a zone of limited access position surface when access is 
examined as physical proximity as non privacy concepts such as personal property, 
solitude and peace surface to describe what is at stake by limiting access. If access is 
described as acquisition of personal knowledge it becomes evident that the limitations 
of cognitive knowledge are not privacy but are safeguards of privacy. By way of 
example: A taps B’s phone and overhears conversations of an intimate nature. Official 
constraints are placed on A’s activities where A must obtain permission from a judge 
before listening in on B (Parent, 1983). Access definitions leave open the question of 
whether privacy is a desirable state and how valuable it is in relation to other things. 
Additionally access definitions have the advantage of allowing you to separate the 
question of what if privacy was lost from the question whether a right of privacy has 
been infringed or violated (Shoeman, 1984). 
  
67 
 
 
2.1.3.5 Lockian and Kantian Privacy Combined: Promoting Relationships 
Privacy insures autonomy of the individual to be independent it also ensures 
that individuals form and develop desired relationships of his/her choice. 
In forming of a relationship we ask a series of questions: Do I want to consider 
a relationship which means what is my attitude toward this relater and relationship, 
what are its benefits and detriments? Is this a desired relationship, is this relationship 
appropriate for me. If the decision is made to pursue the relationship questions of what 
should be the character (type) of the relationship and how to develop the relationship 
follow. These considerations determine how to construct the relationship including the 
choice and control over the timing of release of information, the nature of information 
released and to whom is information released and how the relationship is continued in 
the future. All these decisions require autonomy. 
 
Relationship Decision Tree
Consider entry into a relationship
Pursue relationship
No Yes
Do not create a
relationship
Autonomy requires that no
outside influence be exerted
or unintended relationship(s)
be created on either step
 
 
Figure 6 Relationship Decision Tree 
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2.1.3.5.1 What is autonomy? 
Autonomy is the freedom from being manipulated or dominated wholly by 
others (Westin, 1967). Privacy provides the structure to avoid this manipulation and 
domination and ensures the autonomous choice of the individual to pursue relationships 
including the choice of how to construct the chosen relationship9. Relationships created 
with the individual maintaining control over the what, when and who receive the 
information about them protects the individual from being demeaned, embarrassed, and 
even disempowerment or fear (Nissenbaum, 1998). Thus it is necessary that when we 
initially consider a relationship that our attitude toward another relater/relationship and 
what that relater/relationship may do from us be free from the manipulation and 
domination of others. It is a form of respect for our potential capacity to develop 
relationships (Innes, 1992).  
2.1.3.5.2 Autonomy while considering entering the relationship 
Having the ability to consider both your attitude toward another and what a 
relationship/relater will do for you implies that a voluntary choice exists in the 
individual to pursue and shape relationships. Autonomy requires the ability to choose to 
pursue or not a relationship (Nissenbaum, 1998). A real opportunity to pursue the 
chosen opportunity must be free from another’s interference for autonomy to exist. The 
capture of private information in public or the use of non private information found in 
the public domain that enables intrusion into ones privacy causes the loss of this 
                                                 
9 Autonomy differs depending on the axiology. Locke would see the individual having the requisite 
privacy to ensure the being live as a free being in a social setting, while Kant would see autonomy 
ensuring the requisite freedom to become the person desired. 
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autonomy because of the influences capable of being placed upon individual that 
interfere with this choice. This exists as a result of the inability to insulate self from 
monitoring by third parties and the aggregation and use of stored information. This part 
of autonomy flows from the philosophy of Locke. 
Third party relaters effect the formation of these relationships through both the 
influence over the individual’s attitude and on the assessment made on the 
relationship/relater. The third party colors the attitude and the assessment made by the 
individual effectively interfering with their autonomous choice. This is in derogation of 
the potential capacity all individuals hold to form relationships.  
The third party also affects the choice to pursue. When information is captured 
and aggregated, relations are shaped based on captured information. With no capture of 
public information the individual would not consider highly his or her actions in public. 
The entire focus would be on the relationship pursed by the individual. With public 
attention the individual must consider the detection and capture of their public 
information both private and non private. They must consider what relationship could 
form in addition to the relationship pursued. Individuals will be influenced to adopt 
behaviors appropriate for that unintended relationship as well as the one initially 
pursued. In some cases this mediation may not permit a relationship to form or may 
even impede relationship formation as the information needed to form the relationship 
will not be disclosed.  It may move relationship in a direction not desired by the 
individual as the individual will make compensating changes in his intended disclosure 
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to accommodate the potential capture. Unless its scope and reach is limited this rather 
than the individual, can become the mediator of relationships formed and not formed. 
After the decision to enter a relationship, the autonomous control over information 
enables the construction of relationships 
Relationships are constructed on information, in particular on information 
shared between the relater and the relatee. The relater’s right to control information and 
their capacity to share information are key aspects of personal autonomy (Rachels, 
2006) of which privacy supports (Nissenbaum, 1998). Information appropriate in the 
context of one relationship may not be appropriate in the context of another relationship 
(Shoeman, 1984). This same ability to control information enables the individual to 
present only relevant and appropriate information needed for the relationship and keeps 
other information private. Having the power to share information discriminately also 
enables people to define the nature and degree of the relationship (Rachels, 2006). 
Privacy empowers the individual to have a choice over what information to share, when 
and to whom (Rachels, 2006). Autonomous individuals can provide nothing or the 
entire portfolio of information. They can provide the information now, never or at some 
time in the future. They can provide the information to no one, to a designated person 
or to everyone. This part of autonomy flows from Kantian philosophy. 
Despite the background in Lockean and Kantian philosophy, the importance of 
privacy with respect to human relations has an additional variety of emphasis and focus 
despite the fact that each recognizes to varying degrees the importance of autonomy 
and a sanctuary for action. The following is not an exhaustive rendering of these 
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writings but provides the general scope and breadth of the value of privacy as it 
concerns relationships. 
2.1.3.5.3 Rachels  
Rachels sees privacy as important because it is necessary to maintain the variety 
of social relationships that we want to have (Rachels, 2006). Differing behavior 
patterns define different relationships. There are differing patterns of behavior when 
relationship type differs. People vary behavior with people due to the different social 
relationships we have with them. Why we value privacy is the fact that different 
relationships are marked and constituted by differing degrees of sharing information. 
Our ability to control who has access to us, who knows what about us, allows us to 
maintain a variety of relationships with other people that we want to have (Rachels, 
2006). This ability is obtained by our ability to separate our associations with others. 
Separation allows us to behave in a way appropriate to the sort of relationship we have 
with them without violating our sense of how it is appropriate to behave with and in the 
presence of others we have a different relationship.  
2.1.3.5.4 Fried  
Fried wrote on the "Commodity Theory" of intimacy. Fried’s intimacy is the 
sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not 
share with all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone” (Fried, 1968). He 
postulated that close relationships "involve the voluntary and spontaneous 
relinquishment of something between friend and friend, lover and lover. The title to 
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information about oneself and protected by privacy provides the necessary something to 
the relationship. 
“Privacy is the necessary context for relationships which we would hardly be 
human if we had to do without - the relationships of love friendship or trust” (Fried, 
1970). The sharing of one’s actions, beliefs and emotions is intimacy when that 
information is not shared with everyone and it is accompanied by a right to not share 
the information in the first place (Fried, 1970). This operates both as a signal of 
intimacy as well as constitutes intimacy.  
2.1.3.5.5 Reiman 
Reiman finds that privacy protects the individual’s interest in becoming, being 
and remaining a person (Reiman, 1976). Right of privacy is a two fold process. The 
initial process confers the concept of self and conveys to the person exclusive moral 
rights in their body that permits a person to view his body, thoughts and existence as his 
own. .The second part of the process confirms and demonstrates respect for developed 
persons by conferring the right to the individual to control when and by whom the body 
is experienced and reaffirming that right through the demonstration for the respect of 
people. 
Reiman makes the point that privacy plays a vital role in the creation and 
maintenance of self. The elimination of privacy essentially results in the destruction of 
self. Reinman noted that Goffman maintained that the goal of the “total institution” (an 
asylum) is “the mortification of the self” (Goffman, 1957) and to accomplish this 
mortification of the individual’s self the total depravation of privacy is an essential 
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ingredient. In the “total institution,” mortification is accomplished through a variety of 
means. One is by way of information collected about the inmate and made available to 
the staff and others. From this collected information, discredible facts that are 
ordinarily concealed can be learned. Also others can also observe these facts directly as 
being placed in the institution alone are a discredible fact. Inside the institution the lack 
of privacy is even more evident as the resident is exposed physically, never alone 
always in the sight of someone. Rei,man concludes that social practices that penetrate 
the private reserve of individuals (Goffman, 1957) and kill the self of the person 
suggest that privacy is essential to the creation and maintenance of self (Reiman, 1976).  
To have moral ownership of the body requires the right to do with the body as 
you wish. It also requires the right to control when and by whom the body is 
experienced. This requires that you have both the power to act and awareness of that 
power to act. You also need the ability to withhold the awareness you and your actions 
from others. 
This ownership is appropriated actively and cognitively. Something is mine 
because I have the power to use it or dispose of it. Active appropriation is having the 
power to use and dispose of as you see fit.  
Cognitive appropriation is the right to control when and by whom the body is 
experienced. Cognitive appropriation enables the individual to know what I know is my 
knowledge as well as know what I experience is my experience and not the experience 
of another. To have control over the cognitive apparition requires that individual have 
control over whether or not his physical existence becomes part of someone else’s 
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experience. This requires the individual be treated as entitled to determine by whom 
and when his concrete reality is experienced. (This applies to both thoughts and actions 
of the individual) 
Self is that part of the human that regards his existence, body and his thoughts 
as his own. Self is not created from some “inborn seed”. Rather, Reinman sees self 
created through a social ritual and the social interaction between society and the 
individual (Reiman, 1976). Through this ritual an individual’s moral title to existence is 
conferred through the social recognition and communication to the individual that his 
life is his to do with as he or she chooses and through the conferring to the individual 
the right of active appropriation over his body. An individual must recognize his 
capacity to shape his destiny by his choices. He must recognize that he has an exclusive 
moral right to shape his destiny. After conveying to the individual that his body is a 
body in which he has some exclusive moral right society subsequently confirms and 
demonstrates respect for the personhood of already developed persons by conferring the 
right to the individual to control when and by whom the body is experienced and 
reaffirming that right through the demonstration for the respect of people. 
2.1.3.5.6 Benn 
For Benn, the right to privacy stems from this respect for persons as choosers. 
“Every man who desires that he himself not to be an object of scrutiny has a reasonable, 
prima facie case of immunity” (Benn, 1975). In order for this to be upheld it must have 
as its basis either an intimate connection between one’s self and one’s body, through 
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cultural norms or be required to ensure the character of life and ideals of persons (Benn, 
1975). 
A person through their attempts to steer themselves through the world through 
their adapting for changes to their life brought about by the world or through their 
correcting for mistakes he or she makes is a chooser in actuality or potentially. The 
right to privacy stems from this respect for persons as choosers. “To respect someone as 
a person is to concede that one ought to take account of the way his enterprise might be 
affected by one’s own decisions” (Benn, 1975). 
All personal relationships need some freedom from interference. Specifically 
alluding to Locke, Benn states that the average individuals are subject to reasonable and 
legally safeguarded limits to the power of others and the requirements of social roles 
which leave considerable breadth and choice of how he lives (Benn, 1975). Specifically 
citing Kant, Benn states that individuals should remain independently minded and their 
actions governed by their own principles. We are only free to be ourselves with in an 
area that observers can be excluded. In order to ensure this there is a need for a 
sanctuary in order to drop the mask and project the person’s real nature and not the 
nature that projects the values of peers we adopt to become acceptable to others (Benn, 
1975). This sanctuary enables us to become independent in mind. Covert observation 
and unwanted overt observation deny this respect because they transform the actual 
conditions in which the person chooses and acts and make it impossible to act in the 
way the planned or choose in a way he thinks he is choosing (Benn, 1975). 
Inness 
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2.1.3.5.7 Inness  
Inness speaks of the need for relationships. Her work is a focus on intimate 
relationships which she defines as relationships that emanate from “love, caring and 
like” (Inness, 1992). Her work implicitly adopts the philosophy of Locke that men 
should be autonomous and free from the influences of others when persons are seeking 
to form the relationship. Her work implicitly adopts Kant as well noting the need for a 
sanctuary within which to conduct this activity. 
According to Inness, intimate relationships do not result solely from the transfer 
of information (Inness, 1992). What marks them as intimate is not the behavioral 
content but the role the activity plays in the life of the individual -they emanate from 
love, caring and like. Intimate information is restricted information and constitutive of a 
close relationship. Certain activities are inherently intimate and are protected by 
constitutional privacy law.10 Inness cites the case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
for the proposition stated by the court that intimate activities embody the fact that we 
all depend on the "emotional enrichment of close ties with others."11 She also cites with 
approval the dissenting opinion to Bowers v. Hardwick, in which Justice Blackmun 
suggests that intimate activities regulate the nature of an agent's personal associations 
with others (Bowers v. Hardwick). She concludes that these activities regulate our 
                                                 
10 See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,685 (1977) for a list of the cases which 
outline the reach of constitutional privacy claims. 
11 Note that Roberts v. United States Jaycees contains an explicit warning against limiting the scope of 
privacy to the family. 
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relationships with others by regulating our emotional ties, especially the ties of love, 
liking and care 
Given the character of this information, privacy should ensure that the agent has 
control over decisions concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the 
agent's love, caring, or liking. These decisions cover choices on the agent's part about 
access to herself, the dissemination of information about herself, and her actions. Since 
matters draw their meaning and value from the agent's love, liking, or care according to 
the role they play for the agent, the construction of intimacy lies on the agent's 
shoulders. Therefore, privacy claims are claims to possess autonomy with respect to our 
expression of love, liking, and care. 
Inness sees privacy as valuable for three reasons: First, it promotes the creation 
of close, intimate relationships. Secondly privacy's value stems from our respect for 
persons as rational choosers. Finally, privacy is valuable because it acknowledges our 
respect for persons as autonomous beings with the capacity to love, care and like 
To ensure the control over decisions regarding intimate matters remains in the 
individual society must protect that the choice is that of the individual and not another. 
To accomplish this a zone of privacy must be constructed and respected in which 
society neither uses them nor fails to treat them as ends in themselves with respect to 
their intimate lives. Adopting Onora O'Neill's "there are two separate aspects to treating 
others as persons: the maxim must not use them (negatively) as mere means, but must 
also (positively) treat them as ends in themselves" (O’Neill, no year). This requires that 
the freedom of action of the individual must be protected. These are the reasons behind 
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the cases of Roe v. Wade the agent's privacy claim protected her freedom to have an 
abortion. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the agent's privacy claim protected her freedom to 
use contraceptives. Secondly a duty of noninterference or nonparticipation in the 
intimate life of the agent on the part of others must exist. This is most evident in the 
privacy restrictions concerning access, restrictions commonly embodied in tort privacy 
law. 
This zone must have these characteristics a zone in which she possesses 
autonomy of action and a zone that gives rise to duties of noninterference from external 
parties. To satisfy the first requirement, the agent requires autonomy with respect to the 
actions she takes to embody her love, liking, and care; society must not use the agent in 
such a way that she lacks the autonomy of action to express these emotions. To satisfy 
the second requirement, the agent requires a zone to which she can regulate the access 
of others (including informational access); society must not use the agent in such a way 
that she is rendered incapable of understanding herself as a source of intimacy. 
Following is a table which compares these theories. 
 
Author Privacies Importance Autonomy 
Rachels Necessary to Maintain 
Desired Social Relationships 
The individual must 
have an ability to 
separate associations 
with others 
Sanctuary 
Fried Provides the necessary 
something to the relationship 
The individual must be 
able to choose when to 
share private 
information 
We need an ability to 
control who has access 
to us, who knows what 
about us and allows us 
to maintain a variety of 
relationships with other 
people that we want to 
have 
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Reiman Protects individual’s interest 
in becoming, being and 
remaining a person and plays 
a vital role in the creation 
and maintenance of self.. 
Privacy is a demonstration of 
respect toward people.  
The individual has a 
right to control when 
and by whom the body 
is experienced 
The individual has the 
ability to conceal 
information that is 
private 
Benn Protects the persons right to 
choose  
Average individuals are 
subject to reasonable 
and legally safeguarded 
limits on the power of 
others and the 
requirements of social 
roles which leave 
considerable breadth 
and choice of how he 
lives 
Until the right is 
relinquished no one has 
a right to access or 
information about the 
person 
Inness Privacy first promotes the 
creation of close, intimate 
relationships. Secondly 
privacy's value stems from 
our respect for persons as 
rational choosers. Finally, 
privacy is valuable because it 
acknowledges our respect for 
persons as autonomous 
beings with the capacity to 
love, care and like—in other 
words, persons with the 
potential to freely develop 
close relationships. 
Society must protect that the 
choice is that of the 
individual and not another 
A zone must be 
provided in which a 
person possesses 
autonomy of any 
decision or action taken 
that embodies love, like 
and caring.  
Society must not use 
the agent in such a way 
that she lacks the 
autonomy of action to 
express these emotions. 
Society must respect 
the individual and 
neither use nor fail to 
treat them as ends in 
themselves with respect 
to their intimate lives. 
We are only free to be 
ourselves with in an 
area that observers can 
be excluded. In order to 
ensure this there is a 
need for a sanctuary 
Table 2 Summary of Philosophical Theories of Privacy that  
Combines the Lockian (control) and Kantian (access) Perspectives 
 
2.2 Philosophy and Rights, Claims and Entitlements 
This section shall demonstrate that rights, claims and entitlements embody 
values and determine behavior. It will be further demonstrated that privacy rights, 
claims and entitlements vary in terms of control and access depending upon the 
axiological basis of the privacy protection sought. 
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2.2.1 Rights, claims and entitlements determine behavior 
Rights, claims and entitlements determine behavior by enabling and 
constraining conduct. The traditional conception of rights occurs when some legal or 
other institutional mechanism is there to enforce them (James, 2003) such as a court or 
regulatory body. Rights however can exist independent of these institutions. 
Hohfeld defined seven normative positions for the purpose of analyzing rights 
(James, 2003). Hohfeld positions include the following (Hohfeld, 1964): 
• X holds a claim that Y performs an act if and only if Y holds a duty toward X to 
perform act A. 
• X holds no claim that Y perform act A if and only if Y holds a privilege against 
X not to perform act A 
• Y holds a privilege against X not to perform act A if and only if Y holds no duty 
toward X to perform act A 
• X holds a power if X holds the ability to create or remove some claim, duty, or 
privilege (a claim, duty or privilege which might be held by X himself or by 
someone else 
• X holds a power to create some specific duty, claim or privilege for Y if and 
only if Y holds a liability to have that specific duty claim or privilege created 
for Y by X 
• X holds a right whenever X holds a claim, privilege, power, immunity, liability, 
or a cluster of the above and if infringed, un enforced or not properly respected 
X would hold a claim to some form of apology or recompense.  
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• X holds a disability to create some specific duty, claim or privilege for Y if and 
only if Y holds an immunity from having that specific duty, claim or privilege 
created for Y by X 
While Hohfeld confined his position to legal rights, this analysis has been found 
to apply equally well to moral relationship structures (Kramer, 1998). Hohfeld’s 
Normative Position is composed of seven positions: claims, duties, privileges, powers 
and liabilities, disabilities and immunities (Hohfeld, 1964). A claim exists when a duty 
is owed to perform an act for the holder of the claim. When no duty is owed to perform 
an act, a privilege exists. A power enables the holder to create, remove some claim, 
duty or privilege. The person subject to a power has a liability. Immunity disables a 
power held by another (Hohfeld, 1964). The holder of immunity has the right to be free 
of claims, duties and privileges being created or removed. A right exists when a 
person’s behavior is constrained in distinctive ways (Rainbolt, no year). Therefore a 
person holds a right whenever they hold a claim, privilege, power, immunity a liability 
or some cluster involving several of one of more of these and if the position were 
infringed, not enforced or not respected that person would be entitled to some apology 
or recompense (Cruft, 2004). Rights of others determine constraints on our actions 
(Nozick, 1974). Conversely our rights determine constraints on another’s actions as 
well. 
A system of rights enables the specification of expected behavior of individuals, 
organizations and government to direct action toward a desired state. In essence rights 
specify a coordinated model of behavior through the specification of relationships, rules 
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and actions. When we look at rights in congregate, these rights determine the roles 
expected to be assumed. 
What protections of privacy an entity possesses depends upon the rights, claims 
and entitlements assigned to that type of privacy. These specify what data and 
information is private and what is not private as well as how one in possession of the 
private data can utilize the data. They identify who is entitled to the right and the 
conditions under which the right can or cannot be exercised by its holder. 
2.2.2 Rights, Claims and Entitlements Embody Values That Define Conduct  
Right emanate from many value-based sources. The Natural Law tradition holds 
that some rights are pre legal moral requirements whose existence gives people a reason 
to introduce laws and enforcement mechanisms that were previously absent (Cruft, 
2004). Societal norms are also a source of rights. Norms embody values that a society 
holds important. Norms can emanate from society, a stratum in society or be 
conventions of a locale or a group of individuals and agreements are sources of 
specification of conduct. Norms are often obeyed despite a lack of legal sanction for 
their violation (Posner, 1998). Private ordering12 is the name given to the private groups 
often trade groups like diamond merchants and cattlemen who exist to promote values 
and rights important to that group. Their efforts are directed toward members only. The 
enforcement is limited and directed only toward its members and include emotional 
                                                 
12 Private ordering is the process of setting up of social norms by parties involved in the regulated 
activity (in some manner), and not by the State. Private Ordering aims to achieve public goals, such as 
efficiency, enhancing the market, and protecting rights. Private Ordering must adhere to the principle 
of voluntary acceptance. It can be imposed only on those who have agreed to subordinate his or her 
activity thereto. See  www.isoc.org.il/hasdara/private ordering.doc accessed March 29, 2005. 
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appeals, and threats of ridicule, coercion, ostracism or disapproval for those members 
who value to abide by the rules and values of the group (Posner, 1998). A system of 
laws and regulations embody values and specify rights.13 Legislatures enact laws that 
contain rights that reflect societal values. Agreements whether made voluntary or 
involuntary are a final source of rights that are value based.  
Rights enable values to be specified into codes of conduct. Rights embody the 
conventions, values and principles of a society and specify behavior consistent with its 
conventions, values and principles through its laws, norms, private ordering or 
agreements.  
2.2.3 Privacy rights, claims and entitlements are defined by their ontological and 
axiological basis 
Privacy rights are ordained through law, societal norm and/or protected it in 
agreements to provide for a variety of desired values. Some of values of privacy include 
to provide for the respect of persons (Benn, 1975), to establish relationships (Rachels, 
1975) for the development of varied and meaningful interpersonal relationships (Fried, 
1970) Because privacy rights have been touted as necessary for the creation of self, 
protecting a person’s interest in becoming, being and remaining a person (Reiman, 
1976) these philosophical principles have compelled law to create zones of privacy that 
shield from the gaze of others the use of birth control or decisions to abort a pregnancy, 
membership in certain groups (NAACP v. Alabama), restrict third party access to 
library records and video rentals (Video Privacy Act) or protect peoples homes, papers 
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and conversations from outside access (Katz v. U.S.). Others types of rights in privacy 
have been created in law to protect “special interests” (Scanlon, 1975) such as in the 
enforcement of trade secrets while others defend it as a broader concept required for 
human dignity (Bloustein, 1962). 
Privacy regiments diverse aspects of every day life through the construction of a 
complex web of norms and laws that reflect and ensure the values of privacy. Through 
this regimentation privacy dictates which data is produced (Agre, 1998). Through laws 
and norms that reflect privacy’s value, the appropriate data and information and use of 
that data and information a given relationship is specified (Schoeman, 1984). 
Additionally norms and law arbitrate how, when and what data and information can be 
possessed and used and by whom. In effect values specify the type of norms and laws 
necessary to ensure the value is realized. Norms and Laws specify the behavioral roles 
necessary for privacy to be obtained. Because there are many purposes for privacy, 
there are many specifications in laws and norms necessary to ensure the purposes are 
met.  
The norms, laws and agreements that specify rights become control mechanisms 
that structure our behavior through the sanctioning of appropriate behavior and the 
prohibition of inappropriate behavior for the varied transactions, situations and 
relationships in which people engage. Through their structures they create roles that 
embody appropriate behavior, obligations owed and rights. These structures are the 
building blocks that orders society at all levels of societal interaction and dictates the 
behavior expected of the individuals within. One aspect of a role created by a law, norm 
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or agreement is the specification of the appropriate behavior, rights and obligations 
owed toward information. This includes what is appropriate information to access or 
possess, who controls access to information and once accessed who controls its use, 
once information is obtained how can it be used, how much of it can be used, when can 
it be used and who can use it (Schoeman, 1984). One such ordering is the determination 
of what information, how much information is fitting and proper and what information 
is appropriate or inappropriate.  
Laws, Norms,
Agreements
Reorder
Behavior
Create Roles
        
Figure 7 What Laws, Norms and Agreements Do 
 
In each of the above, the privacy rights, claims and entitlements of the entities 
vary greatly by the axiological basis of the privacy sought. Each type of privacy has a 
distinct ontology of control and access. Thus ontology specifies privacy rights through 
the specification of the control and access over data and information that an entity 
possesses. Therefore two conclusions can be made. First as each distinct type of privacy 
will bear a unique signature in terms of rights, claims and entitlements that any entity 
enjoys. Second: As privacy changes, signature of control and access should also 
change.  
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Privacy that is
Control Based
Privacy that is
based upon
Limited Access
Privacy Rights
Claims and
Entitlements
      
Values chosen to
pursue, paths of
pursuit
  
Figure 8 Relationships between Rights, Control and Limited Access 
 
2.3 Law and Privacy 
This section will focus on the legal basis of privacy.  It includes a discussion of 
how rigor is accomplished in legal research, the purpose and nature of law and a case 
study of privacy in American law. 
Like philosophy, law is a social science constantly seeking. What it seeks is 
different from philosophy. Where philosophy seeks the truth, law seeks to implement 
the truth. In many ways law is pragmatic while philosophy is theoretical. Law is 
concerned with the coordination, motivation and direction of human and non human 
action through use of value based rights. Law implements privacy through the 
establishment of specifications of behavior to ensure information that is private remains 
private. Law uses control and access to information to implement rights and define 
roles so privacy can be ensured. A history of the law of privacy is provided that will 
demonstrate that the topics of privacy at law are broad, covering a wide variety of 
information under an equally broad situational area.  
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2.3.1 Purpose and Nature of Law 
The nature of law is to find an optimal solution to a wicked problem. The 
purpose of law is to coordinate, motivate and direct human and nonhuman action 
through use of value based laws. These laws create rights which define roles. A set of 
roles creates a relationship. All human relations involve role expectations. Both people 
and entities structure and evaluate relations according to an understanding of what is 
expected from the respective roles (Benn, 1984). 
Law must be a reflection of society, including its politics, technological state 
and its social fabric and account for the fact that all are interactive with each other 
(Lessig and Lemley, no year). Law is not neutral and frequently advances the goals of 
society’s ruling members. The question of law being good or bad is often debated. 
Whether law is good or bad is often a subjective experience depending on the law’s 
impact. Good law supports goals and aspirations of those advancing it as good while 
bad law has negative impacts on the debater’s goals and aspirations.  
Law is not limited to statutes and case law - the formal law, but includes social 
norms and agreements made between individuals. Laws, norms and agreements are 
interactive with each other and in a healthy society each supports one another. 
Frequently they are the formal embodiment of normative rules that are the socially 
constructed laws of society.  
Formal laws can act as a supplement to norms enforcing fundamental social 
norms (Posner, 1998). Normally, laws are but a reflection of the norms of the society it 
serves (Posner, 1998) but in some instances law shapes new norms. Agreements enable 
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the harnessing of law and norms to accomplish societal desired tasks. To a limited 
extent agreements can modify laws and norms but basic rights insured by law and 
norms are not capable of change by agreement. 
Law is a system based on moral principles, scripted roles and sacred symbols 
(Edelman and Suchman, 1997). Law, whether it be formal law, norms or agreement, 
expresses society’s values, its moral principles and sacred symbols through the rights 
defined. These defined rights in turn define roles. Through the definition of rights and 
obligations, roles are established and protected for every individual, group and 
organization with in society as well as for government and its relationship with 
individuals and entities within its control. 
Law constructs and legitimates organizations and organizational forms that are 
socially acceptable or needed.14 Law determines what types of organizations come into 
existence. It provides the qualifications and ground rules for organizational forms 
(Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1987, and Krasner, 1988) and defines what type of activity 
and how that activity can be conducted. 
Law provides a model of and for organizational life, defining roles for 
organizational actors and meaning for organizational events and imbuing those roles 
and meanings with positive or negative moral valence (Geertz, 1983). Law provides the 
identities and capacities of organizational actors, both empowering and emasculating 
classes of organizational actors. Organizations adopt these structures and practices for 
                                                 
14 Typical organizations in the western world would include the corporation, partnership and limited 
partnership to name a few. 
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the following reasons. One reason is the socio-legal environment nominates those 
structures and practices as proper, responsible, legitimate and natural. Organizations 
look to the law for assurance as to which actions to take and avoid as well as for 
normative and cognitive guidance. The second reason is their adoption enables them to 
pursue goals more efficiently and effectively provides them either an advantage or 
shielding them from punishment.  
In one way laws are premised upon the view they seek to minimize harm that 
society seeks to avoid (Schauer, 2000). Laws announce and provide a record of what is 
acceptable or not acceptable behavior. Through laws, societal norms find increased 
respect and compliance through engineering behavior through punishment by legal 
sanctions when behavior exceeds what is expected. 
Rewards are ensconced in law to direct individual and corporate behaviors in 
ways that improve society. Sanctions are enacted to direct behavior away from other 
non effective behaviors especially when those behaviors reflect substantial social costs 
(Posner, 1998). 
Economics has advocated the construction of efficient rules to minimize 
transaction costs in the market thus maximizing the scope of markets over 
organizational and regulatory hierarchies (Coarse, no year). Transaction cost analysis 
states that organizations are devices for efficiently governing economic relations when 
markets fail due to uncertainty, bounded rationality, monopoly, and opportunism. Legal 
rules may provide for the more effective functioning of society through rights and 
immunities that enhance or impede the efficiency of individual or organizational 
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governance mechanisms and affect their desirability relative to markets. The result is 
that legal rules may provide a substantial influence on individuals and organizations by 
creating an encompassing framework of basic property rights that includes both 
structure and substance (Masten, 1990, and Williamson, 1991). 
Constitutive law not only defines the basic blocks of organizational forms it also 
establishes the rules of individual-organizational relations, inter-organizational relations 
and organizational-governmental relations. Through this structure of categories and 
definitions relationships can be understood, entered into and manipulated acceptably 
from this accepted set of routines. It establishes the background understanding that 
frames social discourse. This provides the fundamental definitional building block for 
the use of law to meet goals of individuals and organizations and empowers by 
providing a tool kit that can be drawn upon in their interaction such as contract, tort, 
and bankruptcy law. 
The formal law of privacy, that is the law codified in forms of laws and case 
decisions establishes and informs the citizenry of the parameters of what is private 
while coordinating, motivating and directing the roles of the individual, the 
organizations it enables and creates and society as a whole (Schauer, 2000). Law is a 
tool that serves society but it is an inexact science; it is constantly evolving in its search 
to find an optimal solution in an ever changing environment where not only the 
environment changes but the perceived needs and desires of those within also change 
(Lessig and Dershowitz, no year). 
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2.3.2 Rigor in Legal Research 
Legal research is marked by some very different approaches, many of which are 
in their infancy. The following will provide background on legal research. Legal 
research is accomplished in three schools, doctrinarism, empiricism and grounded 
theory. Doctrinarism has its purposes in opposition to that of the typical academic 
faculty member. Despite recent interest in empirical legal research is in its infancy. 
Finally, legal research in grounded theory will be discussed. While this methodology 
has been practiced for many years, it is not practiced widely. Legal research using 
grounded theory similar to research done in academia, adopts the same principles and 
methodologies utilized in the Information Science field 
2.3.2.1 Doctrinarism 
Most research in law is conducted in the doctrinarism method. This method is 
very much different from the methods used in traditional academic settings creating a 
chasm between legal scholarly research and research conducted in the traditional 
academic setting. Professors Lee Epstein and Gary King put it very succinctly: 
While a Ph.D. is taught to subject his or her favored hypothesis 
to every conceivable test and data source, seeking out all possible 
evidence against his or her theory, an attorney is taught to amass 
all the evidence for his or her hypothesis and distract attention 
from anything that might be seen as contradictory information. 
An attorney who treats a client like a hypothesis would be 
disbarred; a Ph.D. who advocates a hypothesis like a client 
would be ignored (Epstein and King, 2002). 
 
This difference is the result that the tasks and objectives of teaching of law and 
that of research university faculties have traditionally differed. Law faculty have 
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traditionally trained students to be professional lawyers, who are learned in the law but 
the “learning consists of a “skill set” for practicing law, not a learning that equips them 
to participate in the scholarly life of a law professor” (Ulen, 2004) while traditional 
academic faculty has trained students to be scholars and teachers. To be a successful 
legal scholar meant addressing in a meaningful way practitioners outside of the 
academy, principally lawyers and judges rather than scholars from within the academy 
(Ulen, 2004). In contrast, academic faculty writes for their peers, other scholars, they 
share their work in progress in seminars and workshops and reduce their teaching load 
to have more time to write scholarly articles and books (Ulen, 2004). In law, the goal of 
scholarship is to bring coherence to the practice of law, to impart in the scholar how to 
have an impact upon judges and lawyers, how to influence the doctrine, how to 
persuade those in a position to make law to adopt the persuader’s view, how to 
recognize past errors and how to gain standing as a source of guidance and how to 
reform the law - with indoctrinating its students into the ways of the profession and 
imparting into them how to be successful (Ulen, 2004). Additionally with doctrinarism 
rules are confined to a particular area of the law as well as confined to a time or place. 
As a result commentators would note that vast differences in institutional, cultural, 
historical and social aspects of legal systems made theorizing about law inapposite 
(Ulen, 2004). In academia, the goal is to advance the body of knowledge and to 
accomplish those ends students are taught how to critically evaluate old propositions, 
construct new propositions and evaluate the tested propositions in light of objective 
truth. Finally in law, it is the student not the law professors who act as editors and 
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reviewers of law journals. The student’s role is to make certain the articles are 
complete, containing all relevant cases and arguments advanced in past work. This is in 
stark contrast to academia journals which advance theory and knowledge in the field 
through the review of prospective articles by other scholars.  
As a result of the above: 
 “… law faculty have been wed to a non scientific conception of 
their scholarship that they do not readily and naturally think of 
the connection between theory and empirical work that the 
scientific method necessarily implies” (Ulen, 2004). 
 
In Doctrinal Analysis either a case or a string of cases are examined historically. 
This case (or cases) is then stripped to the bare factual essentials. From these facts 
universal rules are constructed and espoused making the output rule centric. This rule 
centricity tends to relegate its findings to a high level of generality so that its rules can 
be universally applied. Under this approach rigor is achieved through the framing of 
issues, analysis of the facts and framing of universal laws. 
Examine a case or string of cases 
Strip out the unnecessary facts 
Construct universal rules 
Apply the rules 
Table 3 Rigor 
 
2.3.2.2 Empirical Legal Research 
To some degree the legal faculty is adopting empirical scholarship like activities 
similar to those of research universities. At present these activities are in their infancy 
and are principally confined at the present to law and economics research. 
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The topic of empirical scholarship has been done in a very limited basis with 
most of this confined to law and economics studies15. For a variety of reasons some law 
professors today are seeking to establish credentials that compare with the credentials 
held by faculty in research universities.16 This interest in empirical work was ramped 
up in 2001 in a symposium organized at the University of Illinois Law Review 
(McAdams and Ulen, 2002). This was followed in 2002 through a series of exchanges 
in University of Chicago law review (Revesz, 2002). In 2004 American Association of 
Law Schools (AALS) devoted its annual meeting to the topic of empirical research on 
law. Its President Bill Hines in 2005 announced that designs of this kind of research as 
a top priority for the legal academy today (Hines, 2005). The theme for the 2006 AALS 
annual meeting was "Empirical scholarship: what should we study and how should we 
study it?" Furthermore, there are signs of convergent lines of thinking from different 
corners of law and social science, pointing toward the possibility of a new synthesis 
(Erlanger et al, 2005).  
This is not to say there was no empirical type of research conducted in law. 
Nearly all law review scholarship offers some statement about the real world, and thus 
has an empirical component because nearly all legal scholarship makes empirical 
claims, it must also satisfy basic inferential rules (Tracey, 2006). Epstein and King 
                                                 
15 Richard Posner has conservatively published over 200 books and articles over the years applying the 
field of economics to law. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
(1st ed. 1972). 
16 Richard Posner posits that this change in legal scholarship is motivated because of valuable 
independent developments in non law disciplines and the dramatic increase in law professors over the 
years is driving them to seek new ways to distinguish their work from other peers. See in general 
Posner, Richard, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 Harvard Law Review,1314 (2002) 
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provided some rules in which empirical legal research should be conducted (Epstein 
and King, 2002). These rules include research should have a clear goal, and its 
methodology should be subjected to the rules of replicability, it must be a social 
enterprise – its underpinnings are accessible for review and extension of others in the 
field. Researchers must acknowledge the uncertainty associated with empirical work, 
research should engage existing empirical literature, only important research should be 
conducted with theories with observable implications and make an effort to account for 
rival hypothesis. In essence there is little disagreement with non legal academics as to 
the methodology required to be performed. Early papers such as Epstein and Ulen did 
not distinguish between a descriptive and positive approach, instead they concentrated 
on conducting legal research in the tradition of the academic although recent studies 
now are beginning to distinguish between descriptive and positive empirical research 
(Tracey, 2006). 
Epstein and King 
Clear goals 
The work is capable of being replicated 
Underpinnings are available for review and extension by others in the field 
Researcher acknowledge the uncertainty associated with empirical work 
Engage existing empirical literature 
Theories advanced with observable implications 
Table 4 Standards for Legal Empirical Research 
 
2.3.2.3 Legal Research in the Case study tradition 
Case study research has been preformed as a research method in the law field 
for a number of years. The earliest example of a contextual case study found is by 
Walter Nelles (First American Labor Case , 1931). It appears that this type of work was 
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resurrected in the 1975 article by Richard Danzig (Hadley v. Baxendale, 1975), who is 
an acknowledged leader in the use of the methodology both as a method of research as 
well as pedagogy (Danzig, 1978). This method again surfaced in 2003 by Debora L. 
Threedy, Unearthing Subversion with Legal Archaeology, 13 Tex. J. Women & L. 133, 
136-38 (2003). Many legal archeologists freely adopt the principles and guidance 
provided by Glasser and Straus (Glasser and Straus, 1967) and Yin (Yin, 2003). 
The term "legal archaeology" refers to a type of legal history that makes use of 
case studies. "Legal archaeology17 involves both a microscopic examination of the 
shards uncovered by painstaking digging, and a macroscopic assessment of how the 
component parts fit together to describe and explain the culture left behind" (Maute, 
2000). 
Legal archaeology is defined by an approach to legal materials that employs a 
methodology that academics call grounded theory. To "do" legal archaeology is to 
develop an in-depth study of an individual case by reconstructing its historical, 
economic, and social context. Legal archaeology posits that there is much to be learned 
from a case that does not show up in the "official" narrative in the reported opinion and 
it seeks to recover alternative, "unofficial" accounts of the dispute. These alternative 
accounts provide a different and complementary way of knowing the law than that 
derived from more traditional studies 
What is so revolutionary about it in the legal field is that it is contrary to 
doctrinal analysis which is a historical, strips facts to essentials, is rule centric, and 
                                                 
17 This is a term coined by Debora Threedy to describe grounded theory in legal research. 
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tends to aspire its findings to a high level of generality so that its rules can be 
universally applied. It is the methodology in which the bulk of the scholarly research is 
done in law. Legal archaeology is a philosophical descendant of American pragmatism 
and its offshoot, legal realism. The legal realists conceived law as being situated in the 
social fabric of its time and place. The legal archaeologist sees value in the study of a 
single time and place. Pragmatism and legal archaeology both have a "commitment to 
finding knowledge in the particulars of experience" (Radin, 1990). Both turn away from 
abstraction and "atemporal universality" and embrace "historicity, concreteness, 
situatedness, contextuality, embeddedness, narrativity of meaning" (Radin, 1990). 
Doctrinal Analysis Grounded Theory 
High level of generality – Very specific and detailed 
A-historical Historical 
Rule centered. Rules are framed at a 
high level of generality so to cover a 
magnitude of factual scenarios 
Specific knowledge 
Facts are stripped to essentials 
and abstracted 
Factual details in all the 
multifaceted splendor 
Table 5 Comparison between Grounded Theory and Doctrinal Analysis 
 
Threedy provides a primer on how to conduct a rigorous legal archaeology 
(Threedy, no year). Legal archaeology does not resemble more traditional legal 
scholarship because it begins where most legal scholarship ends, with a reported case 
opinion. Once you have the opinion, it is then analyzed. Next you recreate as complete 
a record of the litigation as possible, including the trial and appellate records. The next 
step involves placing the litigation in historical context by searching nonlegal sources 
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for information regarding the events and participants in the litigation, as well as the 
economic and social background against which the litigation unfolded. These nonlegal 
sources include archival material, newspaper accounts, biographies and 
autobiographies, and fieldwork such as interviews and nonlegal secondary literature 
Once this is all assembled - describe. At a minimum, processing requires 
description, that is, the structuring of the information uncovered by the project into a 
coherent narrative. The purpose of this descriptive narrative is to "get the story 
straight." Such projects can be analogized to what in sociology is sometimes called 
"Chicago school" monographs, meaning qualitative data consisting of rich descriptions 
of social phenomena (Threedy citing Glasser and Strauss, 1967). 
Once the description is created you then proceed and begin to investigate 
explanations and causal connections between the reconstructed facts and the outcome 
and rule in the excavated case. The best use of legal archaeology projects is to consider 
them as historical case studies that provide the raw data from which to develop theories 
about how law operates in society (Threedy citing Yin, 2003). 
Threedy goes on to cite Glaser and Strauss’s bottom-up theorizing or what has 
been called "grounded theory." In grounded theory, "one generates conceptual 
categories or their properties from evidence; then the evidence from which the category 
emerged is used to illustrate the concept (Threedy citing Glasser and Strauss, 1967). " 
Another way of describing this type of theorizing is to say that the case method allows 
"the data to set the theoretical agenda, rather than vice-versa" (Threedy citing Glasser 
and Strauss, 1967). Each individual legal archaeology project can and should 
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incorporate grounded theory; by analyzing the raw data of the case study, the legal 
archaeologist develops insights into the judicial process or the role of law in society. 
This dissertation shall adopt the case study methodology of Glaser and Strauss. 
2.3.3 Changes in what is Private in American Law: a Case Study 
The notion of privacy is ancient. The Bible and Aristotle alluded to privacy 
(DeCew, 1997). John Locke applied this concept to distinguish between private 
property and property owned publicly or in common with all (Locke, 1988). 
Anthropologic studies by Margaret Mead and others suggest that the concept of privacy 
is cross-cultural and present in all but the simplest, most primitive societies (DeCew, 
1997). In the realm of health law, one can argue that privacy has always been valued, 
because the Hippocratic Oath required physicians to keep private what they learned 
through their physician-patient relationship. 
2.3.3.1 Confidences 
Historically, privileges were created to protect confidential information. In 
Elizabethan times the gentleman owed a duty of confidentiality toward those who 
reposed in them their confidences. This duty required the gentleman to act with honor 
and integrity and hold this confidential information against all inquiries and forbade 
them to disclose under any circumstance other than with the consent of the person who 
reposed in them the information (Annesley v. Anglesea, 1743). This privilege was 
assaulted in 1562 when an act of Parliament made it a universal duty to testify.18 While 
                                                 
18 Act of Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit any Willful Perjury See also Cobbetts State 
Trials 769. 788 (1612) (“(A)ll subjects, without distinction of degree owe to the king tribute and service 
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this act interfered with the gentleman’s honor to keep confidences shared, this act 
seriously also threatened confidentiality between the client and the lawyer as with the 
enactment of this law, judicial search for truth could no longer be obstructed by 
voluntary pledges of secrecy. Judges of that time soon created an exception and decreed 
that legal communications formed a special category of exception to testify because of 
the importance of the client obtaining advice would be hindered by the clients fear of 
disclosure of his confidences. Later privileges were also extended formally (at law) or 
informally (by convention) when information subject to privilege is sensitive to the 
owner of the information19.  
2.3.3.2 Castle Doctrine 
''Every man's house is his castle'' was a maxim much celebrated in England, as 
was demonstrated in Semayne's Case (5 Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 
1604))20, decided in 1603. A civil case of execution of process, Semayne's Case 
nonetheless recognized the right of the homeowner to defend his house against 
unlawful entry even by the King's agents, but at the same time recognized the authority 
of the appropriate officers to break and enter upon notice in order to arrest or to execute 
                                                                                                                                              
not only of their deed and hand but of their knowledge and discovery”-  Sir Francis Bacon) Prior to this 
act the opponent in a jury trial was not compellable to be a witness. Wigmore, J.H., A Treatise on the 
Anglo-American Law of Evidence, Mc Naughton Rev. Edn, Little Brown, Boston, Section 2217 at 169 
(1961) 
19 This information is sensitive because when disclosed, this information often brings both real or 
potential shame and harm to the individual, family or associates. 
20 One of the most forceful expressions of the maxim was that of William Pitt in Parliament in 1763: 
''The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the crown. It may be frail--its roof 
may shake--the wind may blow through it--the storm may enter, the rain may enter--but the King of 
England cannot enter--all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.'' 
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the King's process. Most famous of the English cases was Entick v. Carrington21, one of 
a series of civil actions against state officers who, pursuant to general warrants, had 
raided many homes and other places in search of materials connected with John Wilkes' 
polemical pamphlets attacking not only governmental policies but the King himself. 
Entick, an associate of Wilkes, sued because agents had forcibly broken into his house, 
broken into locked desks and boxes, and seized many printed charts, pamphlets and the 
like. In an opinion sweeping in terms, the court declared the warrant and the behavior it 
authorized subversive ''of all the comforts of society,'' and the issuance of a warrant for 
the seizure of all of a person's papers rather than only those alleged to be criminal in 
nature ''contrary to the genius of the law of England.''22 This case became the basis of 
the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which among other things 
provided, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”23 
2.3.3.3 Sentiments and Thoughts  
Every person at common law was allowed to determine the extent of sharing 
their thoughts, sentiments and emotions with others24 and could not be compelled to 
share them except in limited circumstances. As justification, Lord Cottenham declared 
“a man is that which is exclusively his.”25  
                                                 
21 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. 807 (1705). 
22 5 Eng. Rep. 817, 818 
23 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
24 Yates, J., in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769). [p. 198 Note 2 in original.] 
25 Lord Cottenham in Wyatt v Wilson 1820 
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It was acknowledged in the English courts that “every man has a right to keep 
his own sentiments, if he pleases. He has certainly a right to judge whether he will 
make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends”.26 The right is lost 
only when the author communicates (publishes) his production to the public.27 The 
produce of mental labor, thoughts, and sentiments preserved by writing was at common 
law required to be protected as property and provided security, at least before general 
publication by the writer's consent.28  
Knight Bruce, Vice Chancellor stated: 
"Upon the principle, therefore, of protecting property, it is that 
the common law, in cases not aided or prejudiced by statute, 
shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought and sentiments 
committed to writing, and desired by the author to remain not 
generally known" (Prince Albert v. Strange, 1849).  
 
A more liberal doctrine was recognized in Prince Albert v. Strange (Prince 
Albert v. Strange, 1849) where a less clearly defined principle yet one more broad then 
mere property right was advanced. The court stated that the mere publishing of a 
statement that a man had ‘written to particular persons or on particular subjects” as an 
instance of possibly injurious disclosures as to private matters that the courts would 
prevent. 
2.3.3.4 U.S Constitution 
                                                 
26 Yates, J., in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2379 (1769). [p. 198 Note 2 in original.] 
27 Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329 (1758), Bartlett v. Crittenden, 5 Mc Lean 32, 41 (1849) 
28 Knight Bruce, V.C., in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 695 (1849). [p. 199 Note 5 in 
original.]  
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The U.S. Constitution adopted the law of England as its basis for the obvious 
reason of the respect the colony had for this body of law. Americans can never be sure 
what her founding fathers intended regarding federal protection of a right to privacy. A 
"right to privacy" is not explicitly mentioned in the United States Constitution or the 
Bill of Rights. In fact, the word privacy never appears in these documents at all, 
arguably suggesting that the founding fathers thought the states were capable of 
protecting citizens' privacy rights as a part of their general welfare. Despite this lack of 
clarity, both state and federal courts, as well as legislatures, have demonstrated a 
willingness to protect some forms of personal privacy (Eddy, 2000). The concept of a 
fundamental right to privacy is bifurcated into two distinct rights: one right is based in 
natural law, 29 the Judeo-Christian law, Aristotle and Locke's philosophy of law and 
British common law; a second right is implied from the language of the United States 
Constitution (DeCew, 1997).30  
The 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides, “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…” Arguably the right to be 
secure in person is directed to the confidences, right to be secure in houses is an attempt 
                                                 
29 The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively, 
consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its existence. Any person whose intellect 
is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to each individual member of society there are 
matters private, and there are matters public so far as the individual is concerned. See Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).  
30 Ms. DeCew quotes Milton Konvitz pointing out that the Adam and Eve story introduces the feeling of 
shame at the violation of privacy and emphasizes how Aristotle divided an individual's life into two 
realms: the polis (the realm common to all citizens) and the oikos (the realm of the private household). 
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to codify the Castle Doctrine, and the right to be secure in papers is the sentiments and 
thoughts.  
2.3.3.4.1 The Right to be let (left) alone 
The famous phrase, the right "to be let alone" has a long history. As far back as 
1834, the U.S. Supreme Court mentioned that a "defendant asks nothing — wants 
nothing, but to be let alone until it can be shown that he has violated the rights of 
another."31  This ruling only set the boundary between the government and the 
governed and did not provide strictures against other violations of individual privacy.  
This right to be left alone was extended to individuals in a limited way about 50 
years later but indirectly. In 1880, Thomas Cooley, a judge and legal scholar of the day 
applied the "right to be let alone" doctrine to intrusions by individuals on another 
individual. He explained privacy as a "right" to one's person or personal immunity.32 
Cooley never created a separate right of privacy but rather used it as a pretext to control 
access to the individual. Later, in a medical setting, this right to be alone was linked to 
the term privacy to support a personal injury claim of battery when a woman was 
observed during childbirth without her consent. In this case, the Michigan Supreme 
Court held: "the plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, 
and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain 
from its violation." 33  
                                                 
31 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 634 (1834). 
32 Thomas C. Cooley, Law of Torts (1880). 
33 De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160 @165-166 (1881) 
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2.3.3.4.2 The Developing of State Mandated Privacy - Warren and Brandeis  
After Cooley, American law began to address privacy in the nineteenth century. 
At the height of the Muckraking Era, where the forces of industrialization and 
urbanization began to challenge and change society, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis published an article entitled The Right to Privacy in the Harvard Law Review 
(Warren and Brandeis, 1890). This work further developed Cooley's right of privacy.  
They proffered a historical evolution of the law to buttress their claim for the 
recognition in the legal field of a right to privacy that encompassed thoughts, emotions 
and sensation. Looking at life, liberty and property they noted the law initially only 
protected physical interferences with life and property and saw the right to life as 
freedom from battery, liberty as freedom from actual restraint and right to property 
limited to tangible things such as land and cattle. Later as the law recognizes a man’s 
spiritual nature, his feelings and intellect, the right to life expands to include not only 
battery but the right to enjoy life. Liberty now encompasses freedom from actual 
constraint but the exercise of civil privilege, and property not only the right to land and 
cattle but ownership of anything you can possess is it tangible or intangible. When the 
law recognized sensation further changes were made to these concepts of life, liberty 
and property.  
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Legal Remedies Translation 
Physical Interference 
with life and property 
Right to life = Freedom from Battery 
Liberty = Freedom from actual restraint 
Right to Property = Right to land and cattle 
Recognition of man’s 
spiritual nature, feelings 
and intellect 
Right to life = Right to enjoy life 
Liberty =Exercise of civil privileges 
Property = Every form of possession both tangible and 
intangible 
Recognition of 
Sensation 
Protection against bodily injury is expanded to attempts 
Laws of nuisance develop 
Slander laws develop 
 Inventions and 
Business methods 
Require that a step needs to be taken for the protection of 
the individual and to secure her right to be left alone.34 
Table 6 Legal Remedies and Translation 
 
Brandeis' and Warren's article stated that "political, social and economic 
changes entail the recognition of new rights." 35 They saw that advances of civilization 
(technological change and organizational practices) have intensified intellectual life, 
emotional life, and heighten the senses of human kind.  
“As the result of the intensification of intellectual and emotional 
life and the heightening of the senses that came with the advance 
of civilization made it clear to men that only part of the pain, 
pleasure and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts 
emotions and sensations demanded legal recognition” (Warren 
and Brandeis, 1890). 
 
Warren and Brandeis championed a call to protect the privacy of the individual 
and proposed an extension to privacy, in reaction to a perception that the press was 
overstepping the bounds of decency: the right to be let alone and the right to be 
                                                 
34 Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., p. 29. [p. 195 Note 4 in original.]   
35 Ibid 
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protected from the unauthorized publicity of essentially private affairs. The individual 
should have full protection in person and property. They urged the common law to 
vindicate and protect those rights. They further observed that the common law already 
offered some protection against the mental distress associated with public publishing of 
private information (e.g., the protection against making private letters available to the 
public) (Warren and Brandeis, 1890). 
They argued this protection should be extended to protect the individual's 
privacy more generally saying: 
"The principle which protects personal writings and any other 
productions of the intellect or of the emotions is the right to 
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it 
extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, 
and to personal relations, domestic or otherwise" (Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890). 
 
Brandeis and Warren adopted the definition of privacy as "the right of the 
individual to be let alone" (Warren and Brandeis, 1890).36 Warren and Brandeis argued 
that the individual should enjoy, cognizable in the law, freedom from unwanted 
publicity (Warren and Brandeis, supra note 22, at 206, 1890). They reinforced their 
argument by the review of various court decisions that protected privacy (but had never 
used the term privacy) and made the conclusion that an individual had a type of 
ownership interest in the facts of his private life. From this Warren and Brandeis 
concluded, that the common law secures to each individual the right of determining, 
                                                 
36 Justice Brandeis dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, a wiretapping case, stated that "[the makers 
of our Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).  
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ordinarily to what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated 
to others in other words the “right of the individual to be let alone” (Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890). 
Brandeis and Warren conceded their proposed common law right to privacy was 
not absolute. For example, matters of general public interest or pertaining to public 
figures could be investigated and published without legal recourse. Further, they 
stipulated that consent should be a defense to invasion of privacy (Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890). 
Years later Dean Prosser suggested that when Brandeis and Warren spoke of a 
right to privacy, they were really describing four rights -- a right to be protected from 
intrusion, a right to control the disclosure of private facts, a right to protect the 
commercial value of one's name or likeness, and a right to protect against "false light" 
disclosures. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (B, C, D, E ) recognizes four common 
law torts for invasion of privacy. Three of these torts are appropriate for our 
consideration. Intrusion upon seclusion deals with protecting people against both 
physical intrusions into the space they claim their own and various forms of 
eavesdropping in the same protected space. The dissemination of private facts occurs 
when publicity is given to facts about a person that the person would prefer not to be 
known, without that persons consent. False light is the publication of facts the person 
would prefer not publicized, but the person is portrayed in a way that is not true.  
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2.3.3.4.4 Personal Rights of Privacy – Constitutional Protections 
Personal rights of privacy were very limited despite some extension to activities 
relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); family relationships, Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 
(1922).  Each of these cases stopped short of declaring a constitutional right of personal 
privacy.  Beginning in 1965 and continuing through the 1980’s a series of cases began 
to tout that the right of personal privacy was a right guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution.  
For a determination to be made that the U.S. Constitution guaranteed a right of 
personal privacy, it must be found that privacy was a fundamental right or that privacy 
was a right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty (Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)). This did not come all at once. In the case of  
In Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479 (1965)) the first step was taken. 
Connecticut law had made it criminal to counsel married couples regarding the use of 
birth control. In striking down the law as unconstitutional the court found that though 
the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various 
guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to 
privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new 
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constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations: Privacy is a personal right 
of non interference 
What is important to note is that the ruling in Griswold did not tie the right of 
privacy to any one amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment 
protected privacy from forms of governmental invasion by limitation upon 
governmental abridgment of freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. The 
Third Amendment prohibited the non consented peacetime quartering of soldiers. The 
Fifth Amendment reflects the Constitution's concern for the right of each individual to a 
private enclave where he may lead a private life. 
The 4th Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated while prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.”  This was never 
interpreted as general constitutional "right to privacy" This began to change with the 
decision of Katz v. U.S. (369 U.S. 347 (1967)) In that case, the Fourth Amendment was 
recognized as a right to privacy that protected not only tangible property but also 
protected intangible conversations. Further its protections were extended from the 
protection of places to the protection of people – giving people the right to be left alone.  
In Katz, the court stated: 
 
“The Fourth Amendment protects people not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, but 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected. The Fourth 
Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but 
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extends as well to the recording of oral statements that are 
overheard” (Katz v. U.S. 369 U.S. 347, 1967) 
 
Katz extended privacy places to people and places and its protections to tangible 
items to both tangible and intangible items (conversations) but it had not created a right 
of personal privacy tied to the United States Constitution.  
Another case interpreting the Fourth Amendment was Terry v. Ohio which was 
decided a year after Katz.. In Terry the court pronounced that in addition to the 
protections in Katz. the 4th Amendment is a right for a person “to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
(which) shall not be violated . . . ." and is : 
“… a right of personal security (that) belongs as much to the 
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted 
in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. No right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law” (Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 
1968) 
 
In the monumental case of Roe v Wade (Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113, 1973), the 
court noted that “only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty" are included in the (Constitutional) guarantee of a right 
of personal privacy.” The court in its search to find a constitutional basis for privacy 
noted that the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. The court 
found the Constitution implicitly guarantees a right of personal privacy, or at least 
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made a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy. On basis of its analysis the court 
announced:  
 “the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under 
the Constitution”.  
 
In Whalen v. Roe this right of personal privacy was said to include “the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and "the interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" (Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 599-600. 1977). Froomkin, an eminent legal scholar notes that since Roe v. 
Wade, the law has recognized a right to be left alone, a right to autonomous choice 
regarding intimate matters, the right to autonomous choice regarding personal matters 
(Froomkin, 2000). 
In the subsequent case of Paul v. Davis (Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693, 1976), the 
Court pronounced when petitioned to extend a right to privacy to the publication of 
records of official acts such as arrests, that such extension of privacy was not justified 
as it did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights. The constitutional right to privacy 
was limited to matters relating to inherently intimate activities such as "marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." The 
importance of intimate activities was later discussed in the case of Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees (468 U.S. 609, 1984). Intimate activities are important as they embody 
the fact that we all depend on the "emotional enrichment of close ties with others" 
(Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 1984). The dissenting opinion of 
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Justice Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, further emphasizes their importance as 
intimate activities regulate the nature of an agent's personal associations with others 
(Bowers v. Hardwick, dissenting opinion, section III).  
2.3.3.4.4 The First Amendment Protections: Privacy and Association 
In addition to the pronouncement that the Fourth Amendment protected people 
not places, Katz also recognized that the First Amendment imposed a limitation upon 
governmental abridgment of the freedom to associate and ensured privacy in one's 
associations (Katz v. U.S. 369 U.S. 347, 1967).  
The freedom of association is protected in two distinct senses. In one line of 
decisions intrusion of the State in certain intimate human relationships must be 
thwarted because of the role such relationships play safeguarding the individual 
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of 
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.  
Because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty the Supreme 
Court has recognized that it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds 
of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified 
interference by the State (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 1984).37 The 
Roberts case goes on to state: 
“Without precisely identifying every consideration that may 
underlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that 
                                                 
37 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  
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certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the 
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and 
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster 
diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and 
the power of the State. See, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374, 383-386 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 232 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-
485 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra, at 535. See also 
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-462 
(1958); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-545 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such 
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much 
of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. 
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state 
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to 
define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty. See, 
e. g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977); 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-
686 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 
632, 639-640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-652 
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 
The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and 
that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the 
relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional 
protection, are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a 
family -- marriage, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, supra; childbirth, 
e. g., Carey v. Population Services International, supra; the 
raising and education of children, e. g., Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families, supra; and cohabitation with one's relatives, e. 
g., Moore v. East Cleveland, supra. 
 “Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments 
and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, 
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of 
one's life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished 
by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of 
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and 
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seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a 
general matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are 
likely to reflect the considerations” that have led to an 
understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element 
of personal liberty” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 1984). 
 
In another other line of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate 
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment -- 
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. 
The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable 
means of preserving other individual liberties.  
Keeping one’s membership in a group private may in many circumstances be 
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group 
espouses dissident beliefs (United States v. Rumely 345 U.S. 41 at 56-58). It has been 
noted that “the State-compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups who are engaged 
in advocacy may constitute an effective restraint on the freedom of association” 
(National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel 
Patterson, Attorney General 357 U.S. 449, 1958). As an illustration of a form of 
governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly, was pointed out 
in American Communications Assn., "A requirement that adherents of particular 
religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is 
obviously of this nature" (American Communications Assn. v. Douds 339 U.S. 382 at 
402).  
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Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of 
particular beliefs has been found to be an area where privacy is required “particularly in 
cases where it is shown that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its members 
has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of 
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility” (National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, Attorney General 
357 U.S. 449, 1958). This is so because it may induce the members to withdraw from 
the association and dissuade others from joining it because of the fear of exposure of 
their beliefs shown through their associations (National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, Attorney General 357 
U.S. 449, 1958). Should this occur disclosure of the association's membership is likely 
to affect adversely the ability of the association and its members to pursue their 
collective effort to foster beliefs which they have the right to advocate? 
2.4 Summary 
A rigorous review of the epistemological basis of privacy followed by a review 
of the axiology and ontology of privacy has been provided. In philosophy three 
ontology exist- one control based, another access based and the final a combination of 
control and access.  
It was demonstrated that Ontology and Axiology is related to rights theory. 
Rights, claims and entitlements of privacy determine behavior by enabling and 
constraining conduct. Through Hohfeld’s Normative Position rights have been shown 
to be a cluster of enablement or constraints in conduct. Next it was shown that privacy 
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rights embody the conventions, values and principles of a society and specify behavior 
consistent with its conventions, values and principles through its laws, norms, private 
ordering or agreements. It was demonstrated that privacy supports many different 
values each having distinct rights, claims and entitlement that vary in terms of control 
and access to ensure the value that is sought to be protected. 
The conception of privacy in the field of law was examined. Where philosophy 
is often seeking and defining ideals; law is pragmatic seeking real life implementations 
of ideals. In particular, law is concerned with the coordination, motivation and direction 
of human and non human action through use of value based rights of control and access 
to information that define roles so that the values of privacy pursued can be ensured. 
Law implements privacy through the establishment of specifications of behavior to 
ensure desired societal values are obtained. A history of the law of privacy was 
provided that demonstrated that the values privacy seeks to protect at law are broad, 
covering a wide variety of information under an equally broad situational area that is 
ever changing.  
In the following chapter, a multidimensional construct of privacy will be 
proposed. Any taxonomy should provide the ability to classify into types with each type 
classification unique and distinguishable from all other types.Through the use of the 
control/access framework established in philosophy and the examination of privacy 
laws , five distinct patterns of control and access emerge that reflect a different value of 
privacy desired and required by society. Each of these patterns has a unique 
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specification in the control and access of information. These five distinct patterns are 
then described and distinguished.   
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Chapter 3: The New Construct of Privacy 
3.0 Proposal of a new conceptualization of privacy 
When is information private? Under one theory, what is private information is 
determined by the situation. What this means is that information that is private in the 
context of one situation may not be private in the context of another situation. By way 
of example we permit a criminal to tell his lawyer all the details of his actions and 
expect this disclosure to be protected as private but we do not allow this same 
protection to be enjoyed by the criminal when they confess their crime to a passer by.  
The idea that a social activity demanded privacy was first suggested by Inness 
in her study of intimacy and privacy. In her work of defining the privacy that attended 
interpersonal relationships, Inness recognized that the role an activity plays in the life 
of the person determines whether the activity is intimate and thus entitled to protection 
through privacy (Inness, 1992). Private information is more than intimate information it 
is special information that is not subject to general disclosure and access.  
It is important to note that the information which is deemed private both enables 
a created role to be performed and the enables the benefits of the role to be realized. 
Private information enables the role as on the basis of information control and access it 
creates the role and at the same time it segregates those inside the role from those 
outside the role on the same basis of control and access to information. Additionally the 
quality of the privacy in the information determines the potential benefit of the role. A 
high degree of privacy in information ensures that a maximum benefit is to be achieved 
in the roles that require private information. In effect private information has a role – a 
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role of completing a defined role. In the above example the conveying of information 
between the attorney and his client enabled the recognized role of attorney-client to be 
preformed. The role was created because it is valuable. The information being held 
private enables the role as it segregates those inside the role from those outside the role 
on the basis of access to information. The fact the information is highly private enables 
the role to provide its fullest benefit. In contrast, the role between the criminal and 
passerby is not protected as it is not valuable. Information exchanged between the two 
parties is not deemed private because of the lack of importance and the fact that a lack 
of information will not impede the benefit of the role. 
Laws, norms, and agreements structure our society and define rights. These 
defined rights create roles that ascribe the expected conduct for societal entities38 
including the privacy in information. When societal entities interact, they form a 
relation of which the sum of the mutual ascribed roles and interactions of those roles is 
a relationship. While a person may engage in many role based activities, not all role 
based activities or relationships are entitled to privacy protection. For roles where 
privacy is at issue there is a defined control over and access to information that every 
relater possesses. Control over information is defined by the degree of control an entity 
possesses over what information is released, when that information is released and to 
                                                 
38 According to Edelman, organizations in normative models conform because law enunciates social 
values, ethics and role expectations which organizations and its members elaborate and internalize see 
Edelman, LB, Petterson, SE, Chambliss E, Erlanger HS, Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of 
Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers Dilemna, Law and Policy Vol 13 pg, 73-97 (1991) and 
Edelman LB, Abraham SE, Erlanger HS, Professional Construction of the Legal Environment: The 
Inflated Threat of the Wrongful Discharge Doctrine,  Law Society Review, Vol. 26 pg 47-83 (1992) 
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whom the information is released. Access over information is defined by what, when 
and who has access to the entity and to the information about the entity. The sum of the 
roles of control and access between relaters define relationships that are privacy-based. 
Actor
(Role)
Actor
(Role)
Relationship
Rights of Access ( )
Rights to Control ( )
     
Figure 9 Basic Privacy Model 
 
Five distinct role-based privacy relationships are proposed, each requiring 
relevant, appropriate and proper information. Each privacy relationship is grounded in a 
social role. All are composed of one or more entities. These entities can be a person, an 
organization or society itself. The roles of the relationship are supported by legal 
theories and imposed by laws, norms and or agreements that define rights of access and 
control over information that are unique in each relationship and in defining such, 
dictates to the relaters a unique role each must undertake. These different privacy types 
are based upon unique roles that entities require and demand in order to maximize their 
lives and existence and realize optimal benefits of societal life. These same privacy 
types set forward societal requirements to ensure that life.  
These private relationships are as follows: Personal Privacy is a role based 
activity that ensures personal areas of a person’s life remain their own, Privileged 
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Privacy enables the consultation of and assistance of third parties to be procured 
ensuring the ability to seek help, comfort and counsel, Intellectual Privacy permits the 
individual to develop a person’s self and intellect, a Intellectual Privacy is a role based 
activity that protects certain types of secrets so as to ensure the enlistment of help, 
expertise  and assistance of others needed for the attainment of socially desired goals 
and Secret Privacy safeguards the public domain so that life in private can remain 
private.  
Privacy Type Purpose 
Personal Privacy Ensures and enables a person so that personal areas of a 
person’s life remain their own 
Privilege Privacy Ensures and enables a person so that they may seek the 
consultation of and assistance from third parties be 
procured ensuring the ability to seek help, comfort and 
counsel. Additionally it may protect certain classes of 
persons from being interfered with by outsiders. 
Intellectual Privacy Ensures and enables a person in their development of that  
person’s self and their intellect 
Secret Privacy Protects certain types of secrets so as to ensure the 
enlistment of help, expertise  and assistance of others 
needed for the attainment of socially desired goals 
Transitory Privacy Safeguards public and  private spaces to ensure a privacy 
that meets the needs and expectations of societal 
members 
Table 7 Privacy Types and Purposes 
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3.1 The Model  
3.1.1 Relational Privacy 
3.1.1.1 The purpose 
This type of privacy is characterized by the belief that humans have the capacity 
to develop personal relationships and should develop these relationships along the line 
of their desires without the interference of others. These types of personal relationships 
run the gamut from structured (employer-employee), casual (friend/friend) to highly 
intimate (husband-wife). These relationships are important to the individuals involved 
and are often emotionally based. Often this type of relationship provides great personal 
value and satisfaction to the individuals involved in the relationship. In some cases 
these relationships also provide value to society as well. For this type of relationship to 
flourish, privacy enables the individual both the choice on which relationships to 
develop and the direction of development.   
3.1.1.2 The relationship entities and characteristics of the relationship  
In relational privacy one entity in the relationship must always be a person. The 
other entity generally can be one or more person, but it can be a representative of an 
organization, an organization itself or society.  
Relationships of this type are of two configurations. One type of relational 
privacy is the formation of relationships between one or more other persons. This 
relationship requires the ability of the person to autonomously choose, construct and 
maintain relationships of his or her choosing free from intrusion of any entity even if 
the choice is irrationally based and made on less than full information  
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The person disclosing information has full power both to disclose information 
(or not) and to determine how much information is disclosed. This ensures that 
recipient of that information should only obtain information reasonable and necessary 
for the relationship to form and be maintained. The more intimate the relationship, the 
more sensitive and personal information that is usually be obtained. The disclosure of 
sensitive and personal information is not confined to intimate relationships. The more 
professional relationships exchange personal information as well, generally including 
living addresses, home phone and familial information. Regardless of the character of 
this relationship, once information is received, only a compelling necessity justifies its 
release to a third party or enables the disclosee to use this information against the 
discloser As such this disclosee has a duty to protect this information and permit only 
necessary access to the information. 
Another type of relationship is the situation where there is no formation of any 
relationship with another individual, organization or society. This is distinguished from 
the first type of privacy in that while the person has the control over the when what and 
to whom information is disclosed it is coupled with a condition of no access to either 
the person or the person’s information. In this second type of relational privacy those 
outside (persons, organizations and society) have no access to either the person, to 
decisions made by the person or to information about the person. These walled off areas 
are more limited than in the first instance of relational privacy and confined to certain 
defined activities, decisions and information about those activities of a person’s life in 
sensitive and intimate areas of a person’s life such as in the case where a woman enjoys 
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complete privacy with respect to her decisions regarding contraception and abortion, to 
matters involving the rearing of children and childbirth to name a few.  
3.1.1.3 Philosophy Type 
This relation is based in Lockean philosophy related to control. Locke 
distinguished between the realm of intimate personal and familial relations and the 
civic realm maintaining that intimate, personal and familial relations not be invaded or 
intruded upon by government, organizations, society or others outside those in the 
relation (Inness, 1992, Rachels, 1975). Locke saw that by restricting access individual 
control increased, thus enabling individuals to sustain “power, liberty and autonomy 
against potentially overwhelming forces of government” (Nissenbaum, 1998), and 
enabling the individual to have the power to live his life separate and apart from the 
direct and indirect influence of others. The value of privacy is the construction of a 
zone that enhances the both autonomy to engage or not engage in a personal 
relationship as well as the liberty to construct personal relationships as desired by the 
individual. The ability to control access to the individual, the ability to exert control 
over access to information about the individual, the ability to access the decisions made 
by the individual and the non interference with our choice to engage or not engage in 
the expression of our love like and caring (Inness, 1992), are ways to manage role 
expectation (relations are structured according to our understanding of what they are 
and what is due to them and from them) (Benn, 1975), as well as a way to avoid 
individuals being judged out of context (Rosen, J. 2000), and are a way to ensure 
equality (Rao, 2003). 
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Role characteristics of Relational Privacy in terms of control and access 
A hallmark of relational privacy is the very high levels of control given to 
individuals coupled with others having low levels of accessibility to both the person 
and their information. In the area of access two conditions can exist. In some cases the 
individual has high control over access to their person and to their information. The 
importance of access limited is to provide a place to freely act and express the self 
outside the view of others or for the provision of a needed secure physical or private 
psychological space.  In those cases where individual control is not possible norms and 
laws have traditionally provided limits of access to the person and information about 
the person. These high levels are necessary to form the relationships desired by people, 
to have true autonomous choice on what relationships are chosen, how they are 
constructed and maintained. They also are necessary to protect sensitive information 
and intimate areas of a person’s life  
3.1.1.4 Character of Information  
The character of the information can be determined by an objective and a 
subjective test. The objective test is any information reasonable and necessary to form a 
desired relationship by a person is relational information. This can be information about 
the person themselves or their family, and generally forms an important part in the 
familial and/or intimate relationships of the person. It also can be sensitive and intimate 
information or information embarrassing to the individual or decisions made by the 
individual that are intimate and sensitive. The subjective test includes information the 
individual subjectively views as important and personal, intimate or sensitive that they 
  
127 
 
share purposely for relationship formation or relationship maintenance and growth even 
should the information shared have no value to a third party.  
Certain information is deemed so sensitive and intimate that it is always found 
to be protected regardless of the person’s subjective views toward that information. 
This type of information includes the decisions about birth control, abortion, family 
matters and relationships including marriage, child rearing and education 
3.1.1.5 Representative Laws and Court Rulings 
The following cases have recognized the importance of intimacy and declared a 
right of privacy exists: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942); family relationships, Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390 
(1922) marriage, e. g., Zablocki v. Redhail, supra; childbirth, e. g., Carey v. Population 
Services International, cohabitation with one's relatives, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 
contraceptive use Griswold v. Massachusetts and abortion in Roe v. Wade (which 
specifically recognized a right to be left alone, a right to autonomous choice regarding 
intimate matters, the right to autonomous choice regarding personal matters (Froomkin, 
1996). These rights were reiterated in Paul v. Davis when the court stated the “right to 
privacy was limited to matters relating to inherently intimate activities such as 
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education.". The importance of intimate activities in the case of Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees (468 U.S. 609, 1984) were found to be important as intimate activities 
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embody the fact that we all depend on the "emotional enrichment of close ties with 
others" (Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 1984)39 that a constitutional 
shelter of privacy afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals 
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these 
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability 
independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty. The 
dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, further emphasizes 
their importance as intimate activities regulate the nature of an agent's personal 
associations with others (Bowers v. Hardwick, dissenting opinion, section III). 
3.1.2 Privilege Privacy 
3.1.2.1 The purpose 
When social approval is given to a privilege, security and privacy are enriched 
substantially (Krattenmaker, 1973). However sometimes disclosure of private matters 
need to be encouraged in order to achieve the optimum value from the relationship. In 
the case of privilege privacy individuals when confronted with certain challenges are 
encouraged to seek professional expertise.The professional often requires information 
that is highly sensitive, potentially harmful and highly embarrassing to the disclosing 
party. Under normal circumstances help is not sought or a less than full disclosure is 
made when it is sought. The encouragement to participate in this relationship comes 
                                                 
39. Note that Roberts v. United States Jaycees contains an explicit warning against limiting the 
scope of privacy to the family. 
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through a protection that any information provided to the professional will be 
safeguarded from disclosure. An additional protection of use is also present: unless a 
competing societal need is present any information disclosed in this relationship can 
never be attributed to or used against the disclosing party. The success of this 
relationship depends on the resolve of the agent to keep a purely second order 
relationship (Benn, 1975), demanding of him or her, a sensitive and reticent 
understanding of the sensitivity of the information entrusted.  
Dissemination
of Information Protection
Certain
Designated
Individuals
Certain types of
Information
Privilege
Privacy
        
Figure 10 Purposes of Privilege Privacy 
 
This type of information is often couched in terms of privileges. Privileges serve 
the public interest (Grant v. Downs (1976) 135 CLR 675 @ 685 (Stephen, Mason, 
Murphy JJ)) promoting values important to the society40. When information is covered 
                                                 
40 A possible effect of ending lawyer/client privileges is should the client fail to disclose confidences due 
to the lack of privilege, the effectiveness of the lawyers representative maybe impaired while the search 
for truth not be advanced in the slightest degree. 
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by a privilege the owner of that information is assured that their information and 
identity would be protected.  Privileges encourage the dissemination of information and 
the “making a full and frank disclosure of relevant circumstances” (Grant v. Downs 
(1976) 135 CLR 675 @ 685 (Stephen, Mason, Murphy JJ)). Privilege permits full 
development of the public self by enabling the individual to exert a control over the 
audience who receives the information, the timing and release of the information and 
the conditions under which information is released (Krattenmaker, 1973). Privilege 
protects the right of individual to form private loyalties (Italia, 2003). 
Another rationale for granting privileges and immunities is such privileges and 
immunities allow the individuals to whom this information is disclosed to carry out 
their duties independently, without interference by others and without fear of 
retribution (OPCW, no year). Privileges also promote potential better individual care by 
professionals who serve the person when a complete disclosure is made (1 My and K 
98, 39 Eng. Rep 618, 1833). “(P)rivilege(s) promote the creation of information that 
might not otherwise exist” (Saltzburg, no year). In the field of law it has been 
recognized: 
“It is a necessary corollary to the right of any person to obtain 
skilled advice about the law. Such advice cannot be effectively 
obtained unless the client is able to put all the facts before the 
adviser without fear that they may be afterwards disclosed and 
used to his prejudice.”41 
 
                                                 
41 Lord Hoffmann in R v Special Commissioner and another ex parte Morgan Grenfell and Co Ltd [2002] 
UKHL 21 
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Privileges also operate to protect information that was disclosed. By providing 
incentives in the way of duties and penalties greater assurance is available that the 
information entrusted to another for their care will not be disclosed. This protection 
furthers the incentive to disclose sensitive information. In effect, this places a control 
over the repository of information after the information is shared (right to control 
disclosed information) Ex Post effect – when provided information is released what are 
the harms of a particular case of disclosure or non disclosure (Saltzburg, no year). 
The relationship entities and characteristics of the relationship 
The protections of privilege privacy extend primarily to individuals but 
organizations and groups of people can fall under its protection as in the case where an 
organization seeks the services of an accountant or legal counsel. In each case the 
manner of information disclosure demonstrates the desire to keep the information 
private. The entity to which the information is disclosed must possess specialized 
training and expertise or at least the discloser must believe that entity possesses this 
expertise. It is not important that the information provided is necessary for the expert to 
act. It is only important that the information is provided to the expert in the hope it will 
assist the discloser. Often these relationships are limited in time and purpose specific.  
Privilege is principally underpinned by Lockean philosophy. The decision to 
share information, to a person at a time and place is the prerogative of the individual 
solely. The holder of information determines whether to provide the information or not. 
Locke also maintained that the individual was not completely accountable to society - 
his accountability was limited only to essentials necessary for the administration of 
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society except in the case of where the individual is either a member of society’s 
administration or some special ground exists why the individual should be accountable. 
The reason given for this is the keeping reasonable and limited the rights society holds 
over another person permits societal roles be constructed to allow considerable breadth 
to the individual to choose how they live (Benn, 1975). This has been represented as the 
capability to determine what one wants to reveal and how accessible one wants to be 
(Bellotti, 1998). This capacity enables the individual to sustain power, liberty and 
autonomy against potentially overwhelming forces (Nissenbaum, 1998). For privileged 
relations the public man of Locke sets the boundary where the person can shape the 
relationship. Up to that boundary person has complete access. Control over what is 
privileged and how privileged information can be disclosed and be used by third 
parties.  
This accountability to society is what places the duty the person to whom 
information is disclosed to protect the information from access by others and ultimate 
protect the individual being identified by his information. Once information is 
disclosed, the entity to which privileged information owes a duty to protect this 
information from others. But the argument can be made that this is very Kantian in that 
a sanctuary must be created so that neither the person or his information is accessed or 
accessible. To encourage the decision to share a Kantian strict zones of no access to the 
person or to information about the person is imposed that provides the necessary 
sanctuary for the information to be shared. 
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3.1.2.2. Role characteristics in terms of control and access  
3.1.2.2.1 For dissemination of information 
There are three issues with respect to privilege privacy. First the individual has 
a right to share or not share information. This normally produces a duty in others to 
respect the information provider’s choice and not access the information shared or to 
encourage the individual share information. However in privilege privacy certain type 
of information is of more value when it is shared, so society creates incentives for the 
individual that while invading that right produce value for both the individual and 
society when the information is shared.  
A second issue is once information is shared, a duty of loyalty is owed to the 
sharing party to use the information for his benefit and not take advantage of the donor. 
Advantage is taken when the individual’s information is used in ways not intended, 
used in a way outside the agreement of use or used in way to harm the individual. Often 
time this is expressed in the terms of a fiduciary duty, which is a duty of great care 
owed by the agent for the information entrusted by the principle. These duties are 
evaluated in terms of value for the donor of information and the anticipate harm that 
would befall should the information be misused.  
A final duty of helping is owed by the agent toward the principal. Here the 
agent must act in a way that assists the principal. Here we evaluate the process not the 
outcome, asking was what was done at that point and time reasonable? Whether the 
trustee is prudent in the doing of an act depends upon the circumstances as they 
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reasonably appear to him at the time when he does the act and not at some subsequent 
time when his conduct is called in question 
For privilege privacy at the time of initial disclosure the owner of the 
information has high control over his or her information. Once information is disclosed, 
the individual loses his control over the information but in its place a duty is placed 
upon the holder of information to protect the information. Additionally there is a broad 
and strong zone of low access to both the person and their information that must be 
enforced by the person to whom the information is disclosed.   
3.1.2.2.2 For non dissemination of information 
These are characterized by the individual being infirm requiring protection due 
to minority or the character and nature of the information is such that the information is 
out of the control of the individual and but for some type of control, the individual will 
suffer damage. Under these circumstances, strong protections of non access to the 
individual’s information and to the individual are provided. 
3.1.2.3 Character of information 
This is personal information about the individual that is sensitive to the 
individual disclosing which in the hands of the wrong person can subject the individual 
to harm, embarrassment or ridicule. In the case where the information is encouraged 
most often the information’s disclosure will embarrass or ridicule the person, but in 
may cases it can subject the person to harm such as when a person must disclose details 
of a crime to a lawyer to prepare for his criminal defense, or when an employer learns 
of a medical condition of his employee, the employee may be fired, demoted or passed 
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over for advancement. In the case where we restrict dissemination of information, it is 
almost always for the purpose of protecting the individual from harm although 
incidental to this it may also shield them from embarrassment or ridicule.  
3.1.2.4 Representative Laws and Court Rulings  
To encourage these types of disclosure, historically certain roles are designated 
as sanctuaries. Inside these sanctuaries it is possible for the individual to share their 
information and enjoy the protection that their participation in the role as they are 
aware their information will not be revealed.  For this reason it has been stated: “When 
a claim of privilege is upheld so is the right of privacy” (Krattenmaker, 1973).  
Historically, Elizabethian confidentiality existed to protect the honor and 
integrity of the gentlemen who held confidential information (Annesley v. Anglesea 17 
St Tr. 1139 (1743). In 1562 an act in England make a universal duty to testify. 42 This 
act threatened confidentiality obligations of both the gentleman and the lawyer. With 
the enactment of this law, judicial search for truth could no longer be obstructed by 
voluntary pledges of secrecy. Judges of that time decided that legal communications 
formed a special category of exception to testify because of the importance of the client 
obtaining advice would be hindered by the clients fear of disclosure of his confidences. 
                                                 
42 Act of Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit any Willful Perjury See also Cobbetts State 
Trials 769. 788 (1612) (“(A)ll subjects, without distinction of degree owe to the king tribute and service 
not only of their deed and hand but of their knowledge and discovery”-  Sir Francis Bacon) Prior to this 
act the opponent in a jury trial was not compellable to be a witness. Wigmore, J.H., A Treatise on the 
Anglo-American Law of Evidence, Mc Naughton Rev. Edn, Little Brown, Boston, Section 2217 at 169 
(1961) 
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Since that date other privileges have been informally extended but the trend today is to 
codify these provisions through a formal law.  
Examples of the type of privileges in existence today that enable persons to 
disclose information include: attorney and client (FS 90.502(2)), medical care giver 
(Florida Statute 456.057(2)), clergy and parishioner (Florida Statute 90.505(2)), 
psychologist or psychotherapist and their patient (Florida Statute 90.503(2)), accountant 
and client (Florida Statute 90.5055(2)), domestic violence advocate and the victim 
spouse (Florida Statute 90.5036(3)), sexual assault counselor and rape victim and 
family (Florida Statute 90.5035(2)). 
The best known privilege is in the medical profession. Historically information 
provided by the patient to the doctor has been held in the strictest confidence. This 
tradition has eroded when medicine became a business, and the patient’s information 
became a commodity that had to be exchanged with many persons, unrelated to the 
diagnosis and treatment of the patient. At times this information has been disclosed to 
others, or used in a manner detrimental to the patient. These reasons were a major 
justification for the enactment in 1996, of The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). Justification for the HIPAA act centers on the premise 
that the provision of high quality health care requires the exchange of personal and 
sensitive information between the patient and provider (65 FR 82467 Published 
December 28, 2000). When the patient has high trust in the provider that the provider 
will protect this information, more information is provided to the medical provider by 
the patient. When the trust is low, the patient withholds information or fails to get 
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treatment. Health care professionals who lose the trust of their patients cannot deliver 
high quality care (65 FR 82468 Published December 28, 2000). Privilege in this way 
acts as a zone of no access. The zone of no access enables information to be brought 
into the open. This is the Ex Ante effect – To what extent does the privilege promote 
the creation of information that does not already exist (Saltzburg, no year)? A zone 
where information can be created when one in exclusive possession of certain 
information discloses and subsequently that information is explored. 
Laws have been enacted to protect to protect children by limiting access to 
information about children (COPA)43 access to certain types of information – Gramm-
Leach-Bliley (protect consumer personal financial information held by a financial 
institution.  The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (20 USC 1232g ) – which 
gave the rights to inspect, and get corrections to school records and a right to have 
information in school records not to be released unless certain circumstances are met. 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act and FACTA (Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
of 2003 and PL 105-159) additionally protect the credit information of individuals. 
Sarbanes Oxley was designed in part to protect the financial information of the 
individual from being disclosed.  
                                                 
43 Childrens Online Privacy Act (COPA) – giving parents control over what information is collected 
about their children online and how much of that information can be used,  
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3.1.3 Intellectual Privacy 
3.1.3.1 The purpose 
The purpose of intellectual privacy is to promote the development of individual 
autonomy through self development and self expression.  
When people are watched often time they attempt to conform to the watcher 
(COPA).44 In these cases often they are inhibited and self conscious. Reiman states that 
"when you know you are being observed, you naturally identify with the outside 
observer's viewpoint, and add that alongside your own viewpoint on your action. This 
double vision makes your act different …" (Reiman, 1995). Reiman goes on to say: "To 
the extent that a person experiences himself as subject to public observation, he 
naturally experiences himself as subject to public review. As a consequence, he will 
tend to act in ways that are publicly acceptable" (Reiman, 1995). 
Jed Rubenfeld noted one version of privacy focuses on protection-of-
personhood and the second version on freedom from-normalization (Slobogin, 2002). 
The personhood version views the right to privacy as a means of ensuring individuals 
are free to define themselves. It protects against state interference in decisions that are 
"central to the personal identities of those singled out" (Rubenfeld, 1989). The anti-
                                                 
44 Shoshana Zuboff writes about the phenomenon of “anticipatory conformity" among persons who 
believe they are being watched. 
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normalization version, in contrast, focuses on the extent to which the government 
action standardizes lifestyles (Rubenfeld, 1989).45 
Intellectual Privacy enables this self actualization to occur. This is achieved by 
the providing of a sanctuary that shelters the person from others. It is also achieved by 
as insulating from others the information about the information the person consumes. 
The purpose of the sanctuary permits the necessary growth and exploration by the 
individual to experience life as they desire and become an autonomous being.  
There has not always been a respect over ones thoughts and feelings. Early 
Anglo-Saxon tradition readily recognized tangible right to land and property but largely 
failed to extend these rights to thoughts feelings and intellectual activity. This was 
changed in the post enlightenment period when thought gained respect and the 
individual’s right over his or her thoughts and personality began to be given the respect 
formerly reserved only to bodily integrity and corporeal rights.46 Still this recognition 
was of a limited basis until the writing of Brandeis and Warren in 1890 when they 
proffered that ones thoughts, emotions and sensations should be protected by privacy 
and made the argument that the law should expand its recognition of an individual’s 
                                                 
45  Rubenfeld  ("The point is not to save for the individual an abstract and chimerical right of defining 
himself; the point is to prevent the state from taking over, or taking undue advantage of, those 
processes by which individuals are defined in order to produce overly standardized, functional 
citizens."). Its purpose is guard against a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed 
occupation of individuals' lives. That is the danger of which Foucault as well as the right to privacy is 
warning us: a society standardized and normalized, in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly 
directed. That is the threat posed by state power in our century. @ 784 
46 See Georg W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (T.M. Knoz trans. 1942) (1821), Immanuel Kant, The 
Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor ed. And translator 1996)(1797), John Locke, Two Treatise of 
Government,(Peter Laslet ed., 1988)(1690) 
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interest in his “inviolate personality” (Brandeis and Warren, no year) and forbid others 
to intrude upon a person’s thoughts, emotions and sensations. 
Individuals need this inviolate personality to develop their autonomy in thought 
and action and become autonomous individuals. This is goal of intellectual privacy. 
The autonomous person does not appear but is a developed being that possesses: 
“(the) strength of mind to resist the pressure to believe with the 
rest, and has the courage to act on his convictions. He is the man 
who despises bad faith and refuses to be anything or to pretend to 
be anything merely because the world casts him for the part. He 
is the man who does not hesitate to stand and be counted” (Benn, 
1975). 
 
Autonomy is a developed trait. In order to be autonomous individuals require a 
place where they can go and explore outside the gaze of others. This is because when 
under the watchful eye of another person or entities, a person is often stifled in their 
development. Philosopher Stanley Benn stated: 
“… we need is the freedom to be something else – to be 
ourselves to do what we think best, in a small protected sea, 
where the winds of opinion cannot blow us off course. We can 
not learn to be autonomous unless we can practice independent 
judgment” (Benn, 1975).  
 
To become autonomous, we need a private inner life (Reiman, 1995). To 
develop this character requires a sanctuary and a retreat (Benn, 1975). The private 
retreat is “a private sphere of some sort to enable the recollection of self that makes 
self-presentation possible even if, in the end, the ideas that we develop and affirm are 
the same as those of our peers” (Austin, 2003). This retreat must insulate the individual 
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from the outside and withstand pressures imposed from without. There must be 
preserved in each individual a sphere of privacy that will allow his personality to bloom 
and thrive (Long, 1967) and respect a person’s right to his own thoughts.  
When we are on display we are unable to form our opinions and say that they 
are ours. The ability to develop ourselves and determine our being, to be distinct 
individuals and have an authentic inner life (Austin, 2003) is a value of intellectual 
privacy. In this sense intellectual privacy protects our ability to act and think in 
unpopular ways; explore self and ideas. It protects individuality understood in terms of 
our ability to be different, even eccentric (Blouston, 1962).47 It enables us to form our 
own person and to become what we want to become. Privacy is also seen as an essential 
practice for the formation of a conception of self. .It enables us to find within ourselves 
the resources for better views which in turn improve life itself (Reiman, 1995). 
Intellectual privacy promotes for the individual these abilities and attributes by 
providing a zone of no access to three areas: the individual, the place he or she occupies 
and the information that is consumed 
Individual autonomy is valued by our society. A society of autonomous 
individual help ensure a functioning, viable democratic society as opposed to an 
autocratic society where the individual simply accepted the edicts from above. 
The liberal vision is guided by the ideal of the autonomous 
individual, the one who acts on principles which she has 
accepted after critical review rather than simply absorbing them 
                                                 
47 “The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose every need, 
thought, desire, fancy or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his 
individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass.”  
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unquestioned from outside. Moreover, the liberal stresses the 
importance of people making sense of their own lives, and of 
having authority over the sense of those lives. All this requires a 
kind of space in which to reflect on and entertain beliefs, and to 
experiment with them – a private space. Deeper still, however, 
the liberal vision has an implicit trust in the transformational and 
ameliorative possibilities of private inner life. Without this, 
neither democracy nor individual freedoms have worth. Unless 
people can form their own views, democratic voting becomes 
mere ratification of conventionality, and individual freedom 
mere voluntary conformity. And, unless, in forming their own 
views, people can find within themselves the resources for better 
views; neither democracy nor individualism can be expected to 
improve human life” (Reiman, 1995). 
The development of this autonomy in the individual is a key by product of 
privacy.  
The value of such off limits activity has demonstrated itself in studies involving 
individual creativity where findings were made that creativity is most evident where the 
person has more leeway to develop. 
3.1.3.2 The relationship entities and type of relationship 
The typical entity entitled to the protections of intellectual privacy is the 
individual. The entities the individual is protected from are organizations and society 
itself.  
Organizations and Society are permitted no relationship with the individual 
when intellectual privacy is claimed. This is accomplished by providing no access to 
the individual and no access to information regarding the individual.  
Philosophy Type 
Intellectual privacy embraces the concept proposed by Kant - the ideal of an 
independent minded individual whose actions are governed by principles of his own 
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that he accepts as rational (Benn, 1975). These individuals form their principles “after a 
critical personal review rather than simply absorbing them unquestionably from the 
outside” (Reiman, 1995). 
3.1.3.3 Role characteristics of Intellectual Privacy in terms of control and access 
For optimal results the individual should have high control over the information 
that is viewed, high control over the place the information is viewed and high control 
over when it is viewed. In a line of cases characterized by freedom of speech cases, the 
Communications Decent Act of 1996 (ACLU v. Reno 521 U.S. 844 ) and Children’s 
On Line Protection Act (ACLU v. Ashcroft    (2004)) were declared unconstitutional. A 
major reason for these decisions was the restriction in the free flow of ideas and the 
specter of censorship which threatened the individual’s to access to information 
ultimately hindering the ability of the individual to develop his or her intellectual self. 
Due to changes in information capture, aggregation and transfer, and advancements in 
digital rights management where the holder of the digital right can direct the amount, 
person and time and place of access individuals and even identify the persons, place 
and type and amount of access individuals have no or little control over the information 
they seek in some areas. Awareness that being placed under the gaze of others would 
produce a chilling effect upon the consumption of some material has produced a 
number of laws that declare as safe havens that enable patrons to access material freely. 
Such places as the library, video rental and cable use and pay per view are now subject 
to laws that restrict access to others of who frequents and what sources are viewed by 
their patrons This creates a zone of no access to information about the person. 
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In terms of access to the person a very limited access to the person in his home 
and access to his papers and effects has been strongly supported48 creating a strong and 
strong zone with low interference from others. This would also include access to the 
thoughts and emotions a person has as a result of such access. Protections exist that are 
well established that provided others should have no access to the place were 
information is viewed, consumed or digested including any notes, papers and effects or 
acts that occur as a result of such access.  
3.1.3.4 Character of Information 
Intellectual privacy information involves information about the information that 
the individual is viewing which includes the circumstances of access and how often the 
information is accessed. This would include among other things  what was accessed, 
the nature and character of the information, where the information was obtained, the 
time, place and manner of viewing and digesting of this information, what is being 
done with the information, how the information is being interpreted, used and acted 
upon and how often the information is accessed. In some limited cases it can be 
extended to restrict information regarding who the individual associates with (Roberts 
v. United States 468 U.S. 609). 
                                                 
48 See Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which holds a person should be secured in their 
houses, papers and effects and the Fifth Amendment which reflects the Constitution’s concern for the 
right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life – see Tehan v. Shott, 382 
U.S. 406 @ 416 
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3.1.3.5 Representative Laws and Court Rulings  
Both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
recognize the importance of a private place. The Fourth Amendment provides that 
persons should be secure in their houses papers and effects. The U.S. v. Katz case 
extended the protection beyond the home and beyond tangible items to include any 
place where a person held a reasonable expectation of privacy and extended the 
protection beyond tangible items such as papers and effects to include intangible items 
such as conversations. A year later in the Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 (1968)) the court 
built upon the Katz ruling. In addition to the protections in Katz that the Fourth 
Amendment is a right for a person “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, (which) shall not be violated . . . ." 
and is also  
“… a right of personal security (that) belongs as much to the 
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted 
in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. No right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law”  
 
Later in the case of Tehan v. Shott (382 U.S. 406, 416) the 5th Amendment was 
interpreted as reflecting the Constitution's concern to provide the right of each 
individual to “a private enclave where he may lead a private life.” 
Each of the following acts are designed to protect the individual by providing 
barrier from which others cannot identify what material the individual is sampling. 
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Video Privacy Act (18 USC 2710) forbids any video rental company from providing 
records of people and the videos rented outside those needed for internal control of 
stock. This was enacted in response to an uproar on capital hill when the video records 
for Clarence Thomas were subpoenaed and obtained showing the rental of a number of 
pornographic videos. The Cable Communications Policy Act (47 USC 521 et seq.)49 
forbids cable providers from providing to outsiders the type of cable service a 
subscriber has as well as what type of shows are rented on pay per view. The American 
Library Association adopted a Library Bill of Rights (ALA, 2002) that affirms the 
ethical imperative to provide unrestricted access to information and to guard against 
impediments to open inquiry recognizing “When users recognize or fear that their 
privacy or confidentiality is compromised, true freedom of inquiry no longer exists.” 
Florida has adopted the Library Confidentiality Act (Florida Statute 257.261) which 
makes library registration and circulation records private and imposes penalties for their 
violation. The United Supreme Court on two separate occasions struck down. 
3.1.4 Secret Privacy 
Secret privacy promotes the engagement of others in cooperative activities that 
protect or advances the well being of others.  
3.1.4.1 The Purpose 
Information privacy has long been recognized as important in the business 
world. For the business, customer lists, work allocation techniques, business process, 
                                                 
49 Restricts the collection, maintenance and dissemination of subscriber data. Forbids cable providers 
from releasing information about the subscriber. or from collecting personal identifiable information. 
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product formulation, names of key employees or anything that provides a business a 
sustainable competitive advantage are business secrets. These secrets require privacy 
protection as they enable the distinguishing of businesses one from another, often 
provide for competitive advantages, provide motivation for innovation, produce better 
products and are ultimately what produces profit for the business.   
Trade secrets are also important for society as well. Certain business 
information becomes beneficial to society, producing a greater societal benefit when it 
can remain secret. In general competitive markets tend to produce homogeneous 
products with business sustaining profits near their margin. A differentiation of product 
will not only potentially produce greater profit margins for the firm, it also produces 
greater utility benefits for the consumer as the consumer receives a product it wants, not 
one it must make use of. A second benefit is both the increased availability of a desired 
product and increased employment opportunities as employers hire more people to 
produce it products. There is a also a benefit of information not being lost by the death 
of the holder of the secret, frailty of mind, or misplacement of secrets. By permitting 
secrets to be disseminated coordinated strategies can be engaged. Better ideas, 
products, processes and strategies that are based upon secrets can be realized when you 
can disseminate the secret to those on the project and engage their minds more fully 
into the project. The secret can also become more valuable through its dissemination 
when others with knowledge of the secret can develop the secret itself.  
The Brookings Institution estimates that “at least 50 percent, and possibly as 
much as 85 percent” of the value of American companies is attributable to intangible 
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assets such as trade secrets (Blair, 2000). Trade secrets are rapidly becoming the 
intellectual property of choice due to their advantages in the information economy. In 
the Information Age, trade secret protection is better suited to the fast-moving and non 
patentable confidential information needed to run our companies. 
Trade secrets protect “secrets of the business” from being discovered by outside 
parties despite the fact they are communicated to members or customers of the 
business. The purpose of the trade secret is to promote licensing and exchange of non 
patented know-how between businesses and employees (Dratler, 1991). It has a 
secondary purpose to prevent improper means to obtain secrets (E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Company v. Christopher, 431 F 2d. 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)) such as breaches 
of contract and confidential understandings (Samuelson, Pamela Privacy as Intellectual 
Property? 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000)). 
3.1.4.2 The relationship entities and character of the relationship 
In secret privacy, the entities which can possess a secret can be an individual or 
an organization or a society. Any secret disclosed can be to either an individual or an 
organization or both. The person against whom the secret is held can be another person, 
organization or society. 
The relationship is often a voluntary relationship created between the parties. In 
the case where the secret benefits a society often times governments impose the duty to 
maintain the secrets.  
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3.1.4.3 Philosophy type 
Lockean type philosophy with the principle difference being not only is the 
individual is free from societal control but also that society gives the individual 
additional power than others with in society to control who, what and when information 
is available and accessible. 
3.1.4.4 Role characteristics in terms of control and access 
Initially the holder of information has high control over all phases of the 
information (what information, when and to whom). By virtue of this control the holder 
creates a situation where the information is not accessible to other. In many cases 
access to the person is not important (unless the person is the information or holds the 
information) as what is important is access to the information. When the relationship is 
formed and information is disclosed to third persons, the initial high control yields to a 
situation where the discloser now has low control over the information disclosed. Once 
disclosed, the entity to which information is disclosed is granted a conditional license 
that permits them access to the information and liberty to use the information subject to 
them the duty of using the information for the owner’s self advancement. A duty is also 
imposed upon them to protect this information from others in most cases even after the 
relation between the parties has ended. This role creates a high access to information to 
those within the relationship enabling the relationships purpose to be fulfilled and 
perpetuates the low access to information for those outside the relationship.  
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3.1.4.5 Character of information 
Secret information can be any information that permits a person or an 
organization or a society an advantage over another person, an organization or a society 
because of the possession of the information. This is generally confined to information 
that is not readily available to others and was originally conceived as the result of 
effort, study, expertise, experimentation.  This information is contextually valuable but 
outside this context it has no value.  Thus secret information has an audience targeted 
where the information is not to be disclosed. Secret information is information that is 
neither readily available nor common knowledge to that audience. The character of this 
information provides the holder of the information an advantage over a defined 
audience. The value of the information remaining secret is important to the holder of 
the secret as it is necessary to the holder to serve his selfish purposes.  
Representative Secret Information includes the secret formula for Coca Cola, 
How to the U.S. has organized its national defense, Computer algorithms, how a 
business has a competitive advantage. 
3.1.4.6 Representative Laws and Court Rulings 
Trade secrets and information privacy receive slightly different treatment under 
the law. What distinguishes modern trade secret law from the current state of 
information privacy law are the procedural and substantive ways in which these issues 
were addressed in their development. Information privacy is concerned about 
concealment and control over information. It has as its basis the secrecy paradigm that 
  
151 
 
views privacy as concealment and control. Trade secrets are based upon the Relative 
Secrecy Doctrine. This recognizes at times a secret must be disclosed yet provided 
protection as a secret. A comparison of the Secrecy Paradigm and the Relative Secrecy 
Doctrine shows the similarities and differences. 
The relative secrecy doctrine while it applies to trade secrets, reflects a fact of 
life that is equally applicable to personal information: we live in a social and interactive 
community. Since we must engage with others, there are situations in which personal 
information must be shared. As explained by Daniel Solove:  
"Life in the modern Information Age often involves exchanging 
information with third parties, such as phone companies, Internet 
service providers, cable companies, merchants, and so on. Thus, 
clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the 
practical extinction of privacy in today's world" (Solove, 2002). 
 
Comparison of Secrecy Paradigm with Relative Secrecy Doctrines 
Secrecy Paradigm Relative Secrecy Doctrine 
Privacy is about 
concealment and control 
A secret remains a secret even when it is unconcealed 
and out of the control of the owner, so long as it hasn't 
escaped into the mainstream of public knowledge 
(Pooley, 1975). It is information not generally known 
or relatively ascertainable even if it is known by 
multiple individuals or companies (Pooley, 1975). 
Trade secret owners are not required to exercise all 
possible efforts to protect the secrecy of their 
information, but instead only those efforts that is 
"reasonable under the circumstances" (Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act § 1 (amended 1985)) "Limited disclosure" 
in the context of certain relationships does not destroy 
the trade secret status of information (Stedman, 1962). 
The extent to which the law will recognize legal rights 
in the originator will depend upon the circumstances of 
disclosure (Stedman, 1962). 
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Privacy is invaded by 
accessing the person or 
confidential information 
and/or exercising a public 
disclosure of confidential 
information against the 
originator’s will 
A violation occurs when trade secrets are improperly 
accessed, disclosed or used. Legal protection for trade 
secrets does not cease when information is disclosed to 
another. When trade secrets are disclosed by the trade 
secret owner to serve his purposes, it is generally 
recognized that an implied duty of confidence arises 
that (1) prevents the information from losing its trade 
secret status and (2) renders the subsequent disclosure 
or use of the information improper (Metallurgical 
Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d. 1195 (5th Cir. 
1986)). 
TEST 
Is there a reasonable 
expectation of privacy 
 
TEST 
It is contextually based upon the relationship between 
the parties. A confidential relationship generally arises 
by operation of law from the affiliations of the parties 
and the context in which the disclosures are offered 
(Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 463 (1st 
Cir. 1985)).  
In general, the closer the relationship, the easier it is for 
the trade secret owner to prove that he undertook 
reasonable efforts to protect his trade secrets. Such 
relationships are not limited to express or implied 
contractual relationships but can include any 
relationship in which a duty of confidence can be 
implied (Pooley, 1975).  
Table 8 Comparison of Secrecy Paradigm with Relative Secrecy Doctrines 
 
Dratler points out that the purpose of trade secrecy law is to promote licensing 
and the exchange of non patented know-how between businesses and employees and as 
such the privacy requirement in trade secrecy law is not the absolute privacy required in 
information privacy but relative privacy (Dratler, 2001). Sandeen defines relative 
privacy as a state of secrecy that is not "absolute" (Sandeen, 2006). Still, the trade 
secret must be a secret to some degree. The UTSA defines a trade secret as a condition 
where information is not generally known or readily ascertainable (Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act § 1 (amended 1985)). As explained by Roger Milgrim, the phrase 
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"generally known" means "well known" or "commonly known to the trade in which the 
putative trade secret owner is engaged" (Milgrim, no year). In trade secrets "Absolute" 
secrecy would be illustrated, at the extreme, by being known to only a single individual, 
but a trade secret can be known by the employees of the owner. In this case we employ 
"absolute secrecy" to denote matter known to only one enterprise and "relative secrecy" 
to denote that matter may be known to more than one competitor in a trade or industry, 
but not to all (Sandeen, 2006). Regardless of which definition is used, once it is 
determined that information is not absolutely secret, the degree of secrecy that is 
required to maintain information as a trade secret must still be determined (Milgrim, no 
year). While the term "relative secrecy" is not used in the UTSA, the concept that 
information can be shared among a small group of individuals or companies without 
losing its trade secret status is reflected in a number of its provisions. 
Trade secret owners are not required to exercise all possible efforts to protect 
the secrecy of their information, but instead provide only those efforts "reasonable 
under the circumstances" (Milgrim, no year). The disclosure of information can give 
rise to the claim that the information was not intended to be a secret and could be used 
by the person or entity which received the secret. Thus the person to whom information 
is disclosed is a factor to consider in determining both whether a trade secret exists and 
whether there was a misappropriation (Milgrim, no year). 
One of the ways that the relative secrecy doctrine is applied in practice is by 
paying attention to the relationships that exist between the trade secret owner and the 
persons to whom information is disclosed as in some relationships the disclosure of 
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information imposes a duty to keep the information disclosed, confidential (Protection 
and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARV. L. REV. 976 (1951)). Generally, the closer the 
relationship, the easier it is for the trade secret owner to prove that he undertook 
reasonable efforts to protect his trade secrets and in those cases where it is evident there 
is a confidential relationship and secrecy is strong courts have even relaxed the 
requirement for reasonable precautions (Pooley, 2004). Such relationships are not 
limited to express or implied contractual relationships but can include any relationship 
in which a duty of confidence can be implied (Sandeen, 2006). The relationships that 
have given rise to a duty of confidence include the employer/employee relationship,50 
the relationship between purchasers and suppliers,51 the relationship between a licensor 
and licensee,52 and the relationship between partners and joint venturers.53 They also 
include more attenuated relationships, such as those between a trade secret owner and a 
prospective licensee, (Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 683 (N.D. Ill 1997)) 
the seller and purchaser of the business54, and between an inventor and a prospective 
manufacturer of an invention (Sylmark Holdings Ltd. v. Silicone Zone Intern. Ltd., 783 
N.Y.S.2d 758 (2004)). 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., In re Matter of Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1986); Elm City 
Cheese Co. v. Federico, 752 A.2d 1037 (Conn. 1999); Junker v. Plummer, 67 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. 
1946); Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 115 N.Y.S.2d. 429 (1952); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. 
Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76 (1913); and Christopher M's Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A. 2d 
1272, 1276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  
51 See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. 1980). 
52 See, , e.g., Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1958). 
53 See, e.g., A.L. Labs, Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 381 (8th Cir. 1986). 
54 See, e.g., Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 631 (5th Cir. 1994); Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 435 
(9th Cir. 1975); Heyman v. AR. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1963); Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. 
Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
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The locus of trade secret law is in the behavior of the non-owner and not the 
trade secret (Samuelson, 2000). When trade secrets are disclosed by the trade secret 
owner to serve his purposes, it is generally recognized that an implied duty of 
confidence arises that (1) prevents the information from losing its trade secret status 
and (2) renders the subsequent disclosure or use of the information improper 
(Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d. 1195 (5th Cir. 1986)).  
The modern definition of trade secret encompasses any information that can be 
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable 
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.55 Trade 
secrets can be information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process.56 It is an idea, a physical device, a confidential practice, 
process, design, or compilation of information such as a customer list or marketing 
information used by a company to compete with other businesses (Elias, 1998). It is 
also referred to in some jurisdictions as confidential information. Approximately 40 
states have adopted a model law called the Uniform Trades Secrets Act.57 These types 
of acts discourage the dissemination of Trade Secrets through the entitlement of 
damages and injunctions. They also provide protections over the trade secret during the 
litigation process. Trade Secret protections are offered both in the United States and 
                                                 
55 Restatement of the Law (Third) Unfair Competition § 39 (1995) The two primary requirements are (1) 
that the information not be generally known in the trade and (2) that the trade secret holder take 
reasonable measures under the circumstances to protect the information as a trade secret. See generally, 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4) (Definition of a "trade secret"). 
56 California Civil Code 3426.1d, see also Florida Statute 90.506 
57 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Trades Secrets Act 
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many foreign countries (Taiwan Trade Secret Act, 2005). Federal laws also protect the 
disclosure of trade secrets in open meetings of agencies (5 USCS 552b).  
Frequently companies will require employees to sign non disclosure agreements 
as a condition of employment in order to protect these trade secrets. These agreements 
are also known as a confidential disclosure agreement (CDA), confidentiality 
agreement or secrecy agreement. The purpose of these is to create a confidential 
relationship between the parties. These have been found to be a legal contract between 
parties and proven effective as a means to protecting trade secrets or protect any 
information under a trade secret.  
In Florida and other states contracts which restrict the exercise of a profession 
trade or business are valid (Florida Statute 542.33(1)) and even extend to employment 
contracts (Sentry Insurance v. Dunn 411 So. 2d. 336 (5DCA 1982)). This restriction 
also encompasses the situation where a person sells the goodwill of a business, or any 
shareholder of a corporation selling or otherwise disposing of all of her or his shares in 
said corporation (Florida Statute 542.33 (2) (a)). Federal courts also uphold 
employment contracts and covenants not to compete when a state law provides such 
sanctions (KV Pharm. Co. v Harland (In re Harland) (1999, BC ED Pa) 235 BR 769). 
Because of the potential effect of forbidding a person to ever gain employment in an 
area of expertise, the employee is reasonably restricted in terms of place, geography 
and time of future employment should the parties dissolve the relationship. 
Other uses of these agreements are made when discussing the possibility of a 
joint partnership or the licensing of a patent by either party. These non disclosure 
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agreements are used between companies as well particularly when discussing or 
pursuing a joint venture. These agreements are extensively used in the United States, 
Europe and Asia. One well known agreement was between SCO and IBM where both 
companies agreed to jointly work on a project keeping trade secrets disclosed during 
the course of the relationship secret.  
Another significant development in the protection of trade secrets is the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839), which makes the theft or 
misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime. This has reach not only in the U.S. 
but also has international repercussions as well. This law contains two provisions 
criminalizing two sorts of activity. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a), criminalizes the theft 
of trade secrets to benefit foreign powers; the second, 18 U.S.C. § 1832, criminalizes 
their theft for commercial or economic purposes. As defined in the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, the term trade secret refers to all forms and types of financial, 
business, scientific, technical, economic or engineering information, including patterns, 
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, 
techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, 
and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, 
graphically, photographically, or in writing if: 
• The owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information 
secret, and;  
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• The information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through 
proper means by the public. 
Some secrets are protected due to the need to protect one society from another. 
MIT professor Phillip Zimmerman was placed under investigation for violation of the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 USCA 2778) after his PGP algorithm was placed on the 
MIT server and made accessible to the general public. This act which places authority 
in the President of the United States to control the export of defense articles and 
services is used as a way to keep technology, information and knowledge out of the 
hands of undesirable nations and people as a way to ensure the national defense. 
3.1.5 Transitory Privacy 
3.1.5.1 The purpose 
Transitory privacy is information available in public or public places 
that can compromise a reasonable person's privacy expectations. The purpose of 
transitory privacy preserve public space as a place of expression as well as 
preserve traditional notions of privacy, private information and private space 
Private Area
Intimate       Intellectual     Privilege    Secret
Public Area
       
Figure 11 Purpose of Transitory Privacy 
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People are required conduct at least a portion of their lives and their business in 
public space in the public eye. We work with others, we walk and talk to others, 
purchase items at the store; we travel to places from our home on public highways and 
sidewalks – all without the thought of someone watching and recording our actions. 
Public space appears as a zone of complete access. Entities in public don’t have a place 
to hide: everything done or said is readily available for others there to observe, hear or 
record. Other than the limited duties of don’t stare, don’t stalk, and don’t take notes 
there were few formal duties to respect privacy in public. 
Before the adoption of information technology by the public, public spaces 
despite being open and observable, were very private. Public privacy was “well enough 
protected by a combination of conscious and intentional efforts (including the 
promulgation of law and moral norms) abetted by inefficiency in the ability to collect, 
store and use information (Nissenbaum, 1998). Public spaces provide both low access 
to the entities in public space and to the information about those entities. This was due 
to the inability to efficiently monitor, collect information and aggregate the information 
in public space. Thus entities managed to be in public and keep his or her public life, 
private because of the inability and high cost to access, capture and aggregate public 
information. When conscious efforts are necessary private affairs in public spaces were 
managed easily on a moment by moment basis by behaving in a manner that is 
appropriate to the setting (Bellotti, 1998). This supplemented information stealth.  
Technology has and is fundamentally changing the nature of surveillance 
(Schneier , 2004) as it enables the detection and chronicling of all activities in public 
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space. Since key developments in information technology have allowed the penetration 
of public space and collection and analysis of information about people, a problem of 
privacy in public now exists (Nissenbaum, 1998). Privacy, private information, private 
space is defined by what places are private, what the appropriate access to those places 
is and what information is private. These areas were delineated and constructed taking 
into account the availability and non availability of information in the public realm. By 
its very definition private places, access to those private places, private information and 
access to private information means this is not available or accessible to any entity 
except by those in a private relationship. When public space changed due to the use of 
information technology, access to private places and information increased to the extent 
that they were no longer private but part now of an accessible public space. Thus 
because of the change in the character of public space – the character of private space 
changed. 
A change in the public space brought about by the ability to detect and mine the 
information that previously was private has changed our ability to protect traditional 
private places and private information in turn causing discord because assaults mounted 
on our changing definition of privacy. From information gathered from public sources 
law enforcement have been able to discern illegal activities that take place in private. 
By way of example, through surveillance law enforcement can discern the growing of 
marijuana inside the home through the purchase of specialty lights and fertilizers. It can 
conclude that the manufacture of moonshine is occurring through the purchase of corn 
and other ingredients indicative to its manufacture. In the law enforcement community 
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the fact is well known: The aggregation, collection and use of information gleaned from 
public sources can and will expose activities conducted in private places. To protect 
private spaces is one reason search warrants are mandated. When we are unable to 
protect transitory privacy, we are unable to protect any privacy. 
In addition to the ability to detect action occurring in private spaces, private 
activities conducted in private areas can be influenced from the monitoring of public 
spaces. Using the examples above, once the activity that violates the law is detected, 
law enforcement can effect a change in the activities conducted in private areas though 
interventions such as arrests and the publications of such arrests to alert others of the 
non tolerance. This abuse is so wide spread that Schneier among others has called for 
mechanisms to prevent abuse and hold people accountable that the new techniques 
don’t place an unreasonable burden on the innocent (Schneier, 2004).  
However this type of intrusion is not limited to illegal activities and could be 
extended to socially acceptable activities, such as what books are read or DVDs are 
watched, what are the natures of the secrets of the firm which are protected by 
intellectual and secret privacy. This has a direct effect on the different forms of privacy. 
Intellectual and Secret privacy depend upon barriers being respected. The capture of 
information in public allows these barriers to be penetrated. Relational and privilege 
privacy are relationship based. When private spaces can be invaded from without these 
types of relationships are affected. Relationships are not formed due to fear. 
Relationships are altered due to intrusion. Relationships are created with unintended 
third parties either through direct or indirect influence on the relationship by use of 
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information captured in the public domain.  What a person does in private could be 
seriously influenced by those in possession of this information.  
3.1.5.2 Character of information 
Transitory privacy involves information in the public domain. This information 
can be either private information (relational, privileged, intellectual or secret privacy 
type) or non private information. For this later information to be transitory privacy 
information it must have the character that if captured, possessed and utilized in a 
certain manner, it can lead to a breach of traditionally held privacy or can affect a 
socially unintended change in those values.  
3.1.5.3 The relationship entities and type of entities 
One group of entities is responsible for change. In this group is Society through 
it processes of social interaction. Another in this group is technology which through 
technological determinism effects a change. The final is either an individual or single 
entity (such as an organization) or group of individuals or entities who attempt to effect 
change. At times individuals or entities will use technology to effect change. The other 
group is the same entities of the various forms of privacy.  
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Expression
 in Public
IntimatePrivilege
Intellectual
Technology
Sanctuary or retreat
Existence of a relationship
Relationship formation
Relationship formation
Existence of a relationship
       
Individuals or
Entities
Secret
           
Figure 12 Transitory Privacy's Effect on Intimate, Privilege,  
Secret and Intellectual Property 
 
The second group is the entities of the various privacy types that are affected by 
the efforts of change of the first group. 
3.1.5.4 Philosophy type 
Transitory privacy is underpinned on the Lockean principles of a separation of 
private and public life. The difference between transitory privacy and the other types of 
privacy is the impact. When public space permits an invasion of private life it will 
impact uniquely on each type of privacy as each privacy type protects a particular 
sphere of individual life.  
3.1.5.5 Role characteristics in terms of control and access 
In a well structured society, the values and practices of the society are a 
reflection of its member’s. A society’s chief role is to define, construct, protect and 
change its values.  
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3.1.5.5.1 Define 
Society must define its requirements. These requirements are its values and the 
practice to achieve its values. In a well structured society, the values and practices 
society must be socially defined from the individual members and entities with in that 
society. They are an aggregation of individual and entity desires, opinions and beliefs 
of what is right, important and just. Society must halt an individual, an entity or an 
outside influence from defining, constructing, changing and imposing upon society 
values and practices that are not the will of society’s membership and must ensure that 
these processes are engaged by the entire concourse of society. With privacy values 
must reflect the aggregation of individual and entity desires, opinions and beliefs and 
not be the product of an influential group or individual or an outside influence such as a 
technology that transforms society in ways not desired by its members. 
3.1.5.5.2 Construct 
Once defined, the values and practices of society are constructed by being 
ascribed into congruent laws and norms that supplement and support these values. 
These laws and norms encapsulate relationships and impose these relationships on 
societal entities defining acceptable roles for society’s members. These laws and norms 
place entities on notice of the expectations of the society. In the case of privacy values 
and norms these dictate the following: What access to the person is permitted and what 
access is not permitted? What information about the person is knowable and once 
known what information is capable of being shared?  What degree of control does the 
individual have over their own information and the information of others? A secondary 
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role is to ensure that the values and practices that are ascribed into law and norms 
actually supplement and support the values of society and are flexible to be applied to 
the various events occurring and allow change.  
3.1.5.5.3 Protect 
All relationships are ultimately created by the entities within society. These 
entities determine their choice and form of relationship. Society sanctions and even 
encourages certain relationships through its laws and social norms. Society desires 
relationships that are supportive of societal values. Society discourages relationships 
that are antinomical to societal values. This influence is important to be present for the 
following reasons: Society exerts influence over the formation and evolution of 
relationships for the purpose of protecting and ensuring its values. Society supports 
relationships that support and advance the values of society’s entities. Other 
relationships are enacted and sanctioned to re-direct behavior along socially acceptable 
pathways. Conversely disincentives are also provided by society on those undesired 
relationships and behavior to discourage behaviors. These influences are accomplished 
through laws and social norms. Nevertheless despite this influence, relationships at 
least in the United States are the result of intentional deliberate autonomous acts of its 
members and at times, society oversteps its bounds. 
Transitory privacy provides the structure that ensures the values a society 
reflects are its member’s values. Transitory privacy does so by ensuring that the 
relationship process proceeds according to the autonomous, desired values of the 
relaters and enables them to consider and choose to form and develop desired 
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relationships. It accomplishes this through the maintenance of traditional rights of 
control and access in public space which thwarts the outside influence on the 
relationship process.  
Society is constructed through relationships which require specific information. 
Privacy is a relationship that is constructed through specifications of controls over 
what, when to whom this information is available as well as specifications over whom, 
what and when access to the entity or information about the entity is permitted. When 
privacy and private places are constructed it is done in the context of public spaces. 
Traditionally some of this information was available in public, but it was not easily or 
readily accessible nor was it economically feasible to utilize. When changes occur in 
the ability to control and access public space changes occur to private places and to 
privacy itself change. Transitory privacy protects traditional control and access in 
public and private places. This operates as an important protection safeguarding 
relationship formation which ensures member entities can obtain the values they desire. 
This also ensures social values reflect the values of society’s member entities. 
A society must make obtainable to its members both those values sought by and 
promised to its membership (Lessig, 1999). One such value is the ability to 
autonomously form relationships (Gavison, 1980). Every societal entity forms 
relationships. An entity permitted autonomous choice and the ability to assert his or her 
will can obtain the relationships it desires on the terms desired. Society must provide a 
structure where entities can make autonomous choices in their relationships free from 
influences of others (Gavison, 1980). Part of this autonomy is the entity’s ability to 
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assert its will and choose when they seek and how they develop relationships (Westin, 
1967). That ability to assert the will must be provided even if the desires of their will 
are personally destructive, an irrational choice or results in less than optimal end result 
(Inness, 1992). 
A society’s values also need to be a reflection of the values of its member 
entities. Entities can not obtain a society that reflects their values unless they can 
actually realize and obtain their values. Transitory privacy ensures both the values of 
willfully forming valued relationships autonomously and the value that societal values 
reflect values of its membership. When an entity from outside a relation can influence a 
relationship, the relationship no longer reflects the relater’s values. Instead the 
relationship reflects, at least in part, the values of the entity that influenced the 
relationship. When society seeks to reflect the values of its member in its values it will 
account for this influence through the sum of the relationships created and capture it as 
a member value when in fact it is not as this societal reflection will reflect not only the 
member entity’s values but also the influencer’s values. Additionally the outside 
influencer by the very nature of being able to capture and use information to influence 
a relationship has formed a relationship with the entities negating their ability to 
willfully form a relationship. Therefore it is important that society assure that 
relationships are constructed willfully and autonomously reflecting the desired values 
of the relaters. To do this society must thwart unintended and unwanted relaters from 
forming relationships with its members and influencing the relationship formation 
process. 
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3.1.5.5.4 Change 
Nothing remains the same. As a result change must occur yet be managed. 
There are at least two changes society must manage. The first is an orderly change in 
privacy values. The second is that the change in privacy values is initiated by society 
and its corporate membership body and not imposed upon them through a powerful 
entity, individual or group of individuals thrust upon the society through a powerful 
outside force. 
3.1.5.5.5 Orderly change  
Society has the role to that changes adopted are incorporated into society in an 
orderly fashion, minimizing the disruption of its citizen’s lives. In a sense societies 
harness change as change is interpreted in the context of existing laws, norms, 
relationships and roles. It is debated is the change a benefit or a detriment? Efforts are 
extended to accept beneficial change and discourage detrimental change. Not all change 
is debatable. Some change is thrust upon society and the debate must occur even while 
the incorporation is occurring. Humans change slowly. Rapid change brings confusion 
and unrest. This is true when values change – particularly when privacy values change. 
The change in societal values often occur over the period of many years with most 
value changes taking place in a time no less than one generation.58 
Change is initiated by society and its members, not a minority or an outside influence 
                                                 
58 Quote Norris where they look to generational changes in values 
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A role of transitory privacy is to ensure that changes in values must be initiated 
by the members of society along the lines desired by the members of society and not 
dictated by a technological imperative or an influential minority.  
Ensuring that technological advancement is examined, embraced and 
assimilated into the societal network with a minimum of disruption is an important role 
of society. Challenges exist to create a balance between the avoidance of technological 
determinism where society is changed as a result of the technological advance and 
alternative of resisting all change by not adopting the technology. 
Technological advancement and change often advances a society’s well being. 
Technological advancement enables more work to be done or to enables the same 
amount of work to be done more effectively and efficiently. Technological 
advancement offers changes to everyday life that increases the enjoyment of what life 
has to offer.  Technological changes in the information technologies have enabled the 
cost of information gathering, storage and transport to drop. They also offer the ability 
to quickly and cheaply communicate this information across vast distances and 
geographical barriers. Despite advantages provided by technological advancement these 
very advancements, unchecked, have produced immediate, profound changes in the 
social system which have in turn produced shifts in values and practices including 
privacy values and practices (Inglehart, 1977). This change occurs through a 
technological imperative, separate and apart from the social process that creates values. 
It often occurs without thought or awareness when the adoption and use of the new 
technology is incorporated into the lives of individuals. Changes in information 
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technology has permitted others the ability to access information in new and more 
penetrating ways, often in ways never before imagined. This is especially true with the 
information available in the public sphere that was incapable of being effectively 
gathered and used due to difficulties and cost of detection, gathering and aggregation. 
Unless bounded or directed, the new technology will affect immediate changes in 
values, creating two or more sets of incongruent norms, leaving people angry and 
frustrated and society norms and laws ill equipped to deal with the changes (Spencer, 
2002 and Zweig and Webster, 2002).  
Technology alone is not responsible for these changes. Additional influences are 
brought to value formation and change when powerful individuals or groups seek to 
impose their values on society. Their motivation is to enable the achievement and 
realization of their private interests. They create a change in values through using 
technology in a way that advances or enables the achievement of other socially desired 
values. Sometimes there is no consideration that traditional privacy values are being 
assaulted. More often the assault on privacy values is deliberate and calculated to 
change values that that stand in the way of the goals of the assaulter (Spencer, 2002). 
They are in a sense thrust upon society in a calculated manner to effect changes in 
society values through the use of these technological advances. The individual is often 
powerless to resist this attack due to a number of factors such as asymmetry in 
information, the inability to organize or power disparities (Spencer, 2002). 
Outside the workplace the individual use of this technology have advanced 
personal agendas and enabled certain values to trump traditionally recognized places of 
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privacy. In Olmstead, telephone wiretaps permitted the listening in on conversations 
taking place in a home, outside the earshot of police. In Kyllo v. U.S., police stood on 
the public road and used a thermal imaging detection device to detect the type of 
radiated heat that would be indicative of growing marijuana inside a structure. The 
information gathered was not evasive, it was gathered in public. While the Supreme 
Court of the United States, after a careful review, concluded the use of thermal imaging 
scanner on a road outside a residence where marijuana was being grown was an 
improper invasion of private space using public information we see information in 
public is capable of revealing what is being done in private places. While in each case 
the use eventually was forbidden, there are other cases where the value of privacy is 
being changed by technology or where individuals are accomplishing their own 
designed change. 
As an example in recent times we have seen an assault mounted on traditionally 
held notions of privacy in the workplace through the employ and use of various types of 
information technology. These advances have increased the ability to manage nearly all 
phases of the firm while simultaneously lessened the cost of management through the 
enabling the employer to monitor calls, emails, break rooms and key strokes. These 
types of intrusions have been justified by these individuals through a traditional right of 
the firm to control the workplace. In each of these cases the value of privacy is affected. 
These changes are altering traditional processes of value formation and change by 
taking the individual out of both the process. 
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3.1.5.6 Representative Laws and Court Rulings 
The initial ruling in this area was the Olmstead (Olmstead v. U.S.) case which 
has been detailed earlier in this paper. In Olmstead, the telephone’s invention had 
permitted individual’s to conduct life in ways never before possible. At issue was the 
right of the individual to privacy in his own telephone conversation initiated in a place 
of expected privacy and the ability to listen into a private telephone call through a wire 
tap placed outside that place. At the time of the ruling, new technology, the telephone, 
enabled persons to converse outside their home. Law enforcement placed a wiretap 
outside the residence intercepting all the telephone conversations to and from the 
residence. In the Olmstead ruling, the majority of the court found that privacy was 
protection of a place. The majority also found that since the wiretap took place outside 
a traditionally protected area and in an area of public domain there was no privacy 
violation. Additionally privacy only protected tangible items like papers and writing 
and not conversations and what was seized was a conversation which was not entitled 
to protection. A strong dissent was written at the time of this opinion that urged that 
privacy was not limited to specific places but was an entitlement where there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Additionally it was urged that conversations could 
be protected even though they were intangible. Forty years later the majority decision 
was reversed and the dissent adopted by the Katz (Katz v. U.S.) decision. Katz 
specifically found that privacy protected people not places and was not to be limited to 
tangible items such as papers and writings but to include all things tangible and 
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intangible in which individuals held a subjective expectation of privacy in including 
conversations. 
3.1.5.6.1 Right to associate 
Privacy should protect the right to associate where the association is for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas be they political, economic, religious or cultural. 
The Supreme Court in the case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 
Attorney General (357 U.S. 449 (1958)) kept private the membership list of Alabama 
residents who were members in the NAACP. A court from the State of Alabama 
requested names and addresses of its members and agents of the NAACP. These lists 
were not produced. As a result the NAACP was adjudged in contempt of court and a 
fine was imposed. The matter was eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Concerns were raised that should such list be made public a chilling effect on 
membership in the organization would take place as members would be targeted 
outside the organization. In its ruling, the Supreme Court the members list not being 
disclosed. The court stated the NAACP had immunity from state scrutiny of 
membership lists that was related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful 
private interests privately, and to associate freely with others. The court found: the 
NAACP was an organization which engaged members for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas. It is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by an association 
pertain to political, economic, religious, or cultural matters. Under curtain 
circumstances membership in an organization should not be disclosed in particular. 
This is particularly true when the privacy in group association may be indispensable to 
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the preservation of freedom of association particularly where the group espouses 
dissident beliefs (US v. Rumely 345 US 41). The Court in particular found that the 
NAACP lists of members should not be disclosed because of the chilling effect it would 
have on the advancement of beliefs and ideas particularly because the groups beliefs 
and ideals may seem dissident to the people of Alabama.  
3.1.5.6.2 Communications Decency Act  
This was Congresses first attempt to regulate the content of the Internet in an 
effort to safeguard the raising of children by their parents in the family home. The 
purpose of this act was to protect children from pornography over the Internet. At the 
time the Internet provided ready access to pornography which evidence showed 
children were accessing in their home. Title 47 U. S. C. A. §223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 
1997) criminalizes the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to 
any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending 
or displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that, in context, depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." The CDA prohibited posting 
"indecent" or "patently offensive" materials in a public forum on the Internet -- 
including web pages, newsgroups, chat rooms, or online discussion lists. In the case of 
Reno v. ACLU (1997) this act was struck down for violating free speech rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.  
Children’s On Line Protection Act (COPA) was a second attempt by Congress 
to restrict a child’s access to harmful material commercially distributed on the Internet. 
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The Communications Act of 1934 was amended in 1998 through legislation. The 
purpose of the act was to protect the custody, care and nurture of the child, 
safeguarding the family unit as the place in which children are raised and insulating that 
area and minor children from unwanted intrusions in the form of access to material 
inappropriate to minor children that comes from outside commercial sources59. Among 
the prohibitation was the provision that: 
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the 
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the 
World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial 
purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any 
material that is harmful to  minors shall be fined not more than 
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both (47 USC 
231). 
 
The act further provided a requirement that restricted the disclosure of any 
information obtained from a minor younger than 17 years and to take further 
precautions to ensure that no access to such communications was provided to others 
outside the maker and the recipient. This act was found unconstitutional due to 
infringement on the right to speech. Despite the ruling, it illustrates the recognition of a 
need to protect the home from being intruded upon.  
The Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) is a federal law enacted by 
Congress in December 2000 to address concerns about access to offensive content over 
the Internet on school and library computers. CIPA imposes certain types of 
                                                 
59 See in general ACLU v. Reno (ED Penn., 1998) citing Ginsberg v. New York, 369 U.S. 329 @ 339-40 
(1968) 
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requirements on any school or library that receives funding support for Internet access 
or internal connections from the “E-rate” program – a program that makes certain 
technology more affordable for eligible schools and libraries. In early 2001, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) issued rules implementing CIPA (FCC, 2006). 
Schools and libraries subject to CIPA may not receive the discounts offered by 
the E-Rate program unless they certify that they have an Internet safety policy and 
technology protection measures in place. An Internet safety policy must include 
technology protection measures to block or filter Internet access to pictures that: (a) are 
obscene, (b) are child pornography, or (c) are harmful to minors, for computers that are 
accessed by minors. In the case U.S. v. American Library Association (2003) the court 
ruled that although the U.S. has a compelling interest in preventing the dissemination of 
obscenity, child pornography or material harmful to minors, the use of software filters 
is not narrowly tailored to further that interest and as such violates the First 
Amendment. 
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3.1.5.6.3 Gramm Leach Bliley 
The Financial Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the "Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act" or GLB Act, includes provisions to protect consumers’ personal financial 
information held by financial institutions. These regulations apply to "financial 
institutions," which include not only banks, securities firms, and insurance companies, 
but also companies providing many other types of financial products and services to 
consumers. Among these services are lending, brokering or servicing any type of 
consumer loan, transferring or safeguarding money, preparing individual tax returns, 
providing financial advice or credit counseling, providing residential real estate 
settlement services, collecting consumer debts and an array of other activities.  
There are three principal parts to the privacy requirements: the Financial 
Privacy Rule, Safeguards Rule and pretexting provisions. The Financial Privacy Rule 
governs the collection and disclosure of customers' personal financial information by 
financial institutions. It also applies to companies, whether or not they are financial 
institutions, who receive such information. The Safeguards Rule requires all financial 
institutions to design, implement and maintain safeguards to protect customer 
information. The Safeguards Rule applies not only to financial institutions that collect 
information from their own customers, but also to financial institutions "such as credit 
reporting agencies" that receive customer information from other financial institutions. 
Another provision prohibits "pretexting" - the practice of obtaining customer 
information from financial institutions under false pretenses. The Pretexting provisions 
of the GLB Act protect consumers from individuals and companies that obtain their 
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personal financial information under false pretenses. The FTC has brought several 
cases against information brokers who engage in pretexting. 
The GLB Act requires companies to give consumers privacy notices that 
explain the institutions' information-sharing practices. In turn, consumers have the right 
to limit some - but not all - sharing of their information. The privacy notice must be a 
clear, conspicuous, and accurate statement of the company's privacy practices; it should 
include what information the company collects about its consumers and customers, 
with whom it shares the information, and how it protects or safeguards the information. 
The notice applies to the "nonpublic personal information" the company gathers and 
discloses about its consumers and customers; in practice, that may be most - or all - of 
the information a company has about them. When information is disclosed what can be 
done with the information depends on whether the customer can opt out of the 
disclosure. If the customer cannot opt out the service provider may use the information 
for limited purposes - that is, for mailing account statements. It may not sell the 
information to other organizations or use it for marketing. If the employee can opt out, 
and did not In this case, the recipient steps into the shoes of the disclosing financial 
institution, and may use the information for its own purposes or re-disclose it to a third 
party, consistent with the financial institution's privacy notice. 
GLB Act also impacts how a company conducts business. For example, 
financial institutions are prohibited from disclosing their customers' account numbers to 
non-affiliated companies when it comes to telemarketing, direct mail marketing or 
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other marketing through e-mail, even if the individuals have not opted out of sharing 
the information for marketing purposes. 
3.1.5.6.4 HIPAA 
When HIPAA was enacted in 1996, it occurred at a time when the public voiced 
great concern about their privacy in general. Initial concerns with personal privacy 
surfaced in the 1960’s when the fear was super computers would become Big Brother. 
These concerns further increased over the years with the development of data storage 
and communications technologies that provided new methods of invading one’s 
privacy. By 1994 eighty-four percent (84%) of Americans were either very or 
somewhat concerned about threats to their personal privacy (Consumer Privacy Survey, 
Harris-Equifax, 1994, p vi.). 
An area of great concern was held by the medical patient. Traditional doctor 
patient relationships involved a deep seated trust by the patient that the doctor would 
keep confidential all treatment information disclosed to the doctor. This relationship 
began to be eroded in the years following 1965, when the enactment of the tax 
deduction enabled employers to purchase health insurance on behalf of employees.60 
This benefit enabled a greater access to medical care. Eventually insurance premiums 
rose as demand for care increased. In an effort to contain these costs a number of 
people became party to the patient’s health information, including but not limited to 
insurance companies, employers, expert third parties hired to monitor benefits or 
                                                 
60 In 1965 Congress enabled employers to purchase health insurance on behalf of its employees and not 
be required to pay social security on the premium, as well as allowing the employer to deduct the cost 
of health insurance as a business cost and employees not to be taxed on the health insurance benefit.  
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contain costs. Information began to flow in many new directions: from reports from the 
insurance company to the employer detailing the patient’s medical treatment, from the 
expert third parties hired to monitor these benefits to insurers and employers alike to 
name a few. Self insuring became an option to some. Increasingly businesses and 
insurers began to realize the value of this information and began to request and rely 
upon it more and more to make decisions. This assault on this relationship increased 
when information technology increased the portability of this information and enabled 
it to be easily accessible, transported and aggregated. The patient not longer had a 
privilege to keep their medical information private. Either allow the flow of the 
information to third parties or receive no employment, no treatment, no payment or 
insurance.   
In the rules that enacted HIPAA, it was noted that the effective management of 
a country’s medical information holds many potential benefits. Potential economic 
advantages exist such as health care organizations being better able to follow and to 
review practice guidelines and utilization standards compliance by physicians, 
employers using the studies compiled from computerized medical records to compare 
the performance of different managed care plans or screen workers for preexisting 
susceptibility to workplace health hazards (Field, 2004). Additionally, electronic 
medical records would have enormous value for public health protection and research 
(Tsai, no year).  
[G]lobal access to health records would facilitate not only 
conventional disease reporting but also the development of 
behavioral risk factor surveillance and other more sophisticated 
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analyses of health indicia. And present and future health uses are 
trivial in scale compared with the actual dissemination of 
medical information attendant upon reimbursement (Buris, 
1995). 
 
It was recognized that these benefits were not being realized. At the crux of the 
problem was the fact that information was neither accurate nor timely. Reasons 
provided were patients were being damaged by their own medical histories. In a survey 
conducted by the California Health Care Foundation and Consumers Union, it was 
found many people fear their personal health information will be used against them to 
deny insurance, employment and housing, or expose them to unwanted judgments and 
scrutiny (California Health Care Foundation and Consumers Union, 1999). Seven 
percent of respondents in the Harris survey said "they or an immediate member of their 
family had chosen not to seek medical services due to fear of harm to job prospects or 
other life opportunities" (Health Information Survey, Harris-Equifax, 1993, pp. 49-50). 
In the same survey, two percent reported to have not filed a health insurance claim due 
to concerns of privacy or the lack of confidentiality (Health Information Survey, Harris-
Equifax, 1993, pp. 49-50). The Federal Government found that medical conditions were 
the basis for demotions, firings, being passed over for promotions or even being hired 
in the first place. The government also found many people were finding themselves 
unable to get insurance, unable to get affordable insurance or being dropped from 
insurance altogether.  
The government found evidence that in response to these conditions people 
were providing inaccurate information when seeking medical diagnosis and treatment 
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or failing to seek medical care until conditions became acute (65 Federal Register page 
82777). This provided one explanation why the United States, despite paying four times 
more per person for medical services was woefully behind the world in medical 
treatment results. Significant benefits are available when early treatment is sought. One 
benefit of early treatment is it results in the reduced spread of disease. But early 
treatment has other benefits. It was projected if only 7 percent of those who have cancer 
could be encouraged to seek early treatment, a reduction of cancer mortality of 33 
percent would result. This early treatment was projected to save 1.6 billion annually in 
lost wages (65 Federal Register page 82777). This savings was projected in other areas 
as well. An annual net economic benefit between 497 million and 795 million was 
estimated to be achievable in mental health treatment through the encouragement of 
early treatment (65 Fed R. 250 page 82779). The early treatment of sexually transmitted 
diseases was found to result in lower mortality rates as well as reduced cost associated 
with complications.  
Individual states had recognized the privacy invasion and enacted some 
legislation designed to deal with the issue. They were not effective. Prior to the 
enactment of HIPAA, the American regulatory regime of medical record access has 
politely been characterized as "fragmented" (Lowrance, 1997). Turlington described 
this less politely as a "black hole" (Turkington, 1997). Senator Edward Kennedy 
asserted, "Today, video rental records have greater protection than sensitive medical 
information" (Kennedy, 1999). 
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HIPAA was enacted on the premise that it is necessary to restore the confidence 
in the patient that their medical information will remain confidential. This will be 
achieved once the traditional patient physician relationship is restored. HIPAA achieves 
this objective by a number of means. It provides privacy standards for data storage and 
transmission. Additionally HIPAA provides incentives to protect patient information, 
penalties for the use of information and restores the bargaining power of the patient to 
determine when and what information is disclosed and enforce actions when patient 
privacy is violated.  
3.2 How the Model Works: A Basic Analysis of Privacy Using Access and Control 
The two positions of access and control are necessary to define and to 
distinguish between the different types of privacy. The first step in defining the privacy 
is looking at the laws, norms and agreements which create the relationship and 
determine the degree of control the entity which possesses this information has over 
these issues: what information becomes accessible, who gets the information, and at 
what time the information becomes accessible if at all. The second step involves 
looking at those same laws, norms and agreements and determining the accessibility of 
the disclosing entity in terms of access to the entity and access to information about the 
entity again asking the same questions of what information becomes accessible, who 
gets the information, and at what time the information becomes accessible if at all. 
Once the initial disclosure is analyzed a further analysis must take place on the likely 
possible disclosures of this information resulting after the initial disclosure.  
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While in some cases it may be true that the control over information alone may 
dictate that others have low access to the entity and information about the entity it is not 
necessarily true in all cases. Under conditions of low access, the degree of control 
necessary to establish and maintain the condition is low. Therefore the effect is not a 
one way effect based upon control but rather it is an interactive effect based upon the 
interplay of access and control What also must be examined is after disclosure by an 
entity, that disclosing entity has lost control over their information as well as lost 
control over both access to themselves and to the information about themselves as the 
possibility exists that after the disclosure of information others may obtain the disclosed 
information and would be free to use this information as they desire. 
By way of example, a person seeks the care of a doctor. Initially the patient has 
high control over who he gives his medical information as well as what information and 
when it is disclosed. Access to this information is low, as only the patent has this 
information. In this situation the person also enjoys low access to both his or herself 
and his or her information in large part because they can control the situation and make 
themselves and their information low access. However once the information is 
disclosed a new scenario emerges. The information disclosed to the doctor is now out 
of the control of the person. That person has now lost both the control over his 
information as the disclosee can make decisions on how the patient’s may be used but 
they may also determine who has access. Additionally an entirely new access has been 
introduced. Not only is the information exposed to the caregiver but it is exposed to 
those in the caregiver’s employ. Depending on the situation access may be high to this 
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information giving the caregiver little control over the information. Additionally patient 
information can (and usually must) be disclosed to third parties such as insurance 
companies.  
In general the highest state of privacy occurs when an entity has high control 
over what, when and to whom information is disclosed together with the condition of 
low access by others to both the person and their information. The least optional state is 
one where low control over what, when and to whom information is disclosed is 
coupled with high access by others to the person as well as their information 
Control /// Access High over Person and Information 
Low Access to the Person 
and their information 
High control over: 
To Whom Information goes 
What Information goes 
When the Information goes 
Moderate Condition 
for Privacy 
Optimal Conditions for 
any Privacy 
Low control over: 
To Whom Information goes 
What Information goes 
When the Information goes 
Least Optimal 
Conditions for any 
Privacy 
Moderate Condition for 
Privacy 
Table 9 Control Over Access 
 
3.2.1 Access to the Entity and their Information 
Access to the Entity entails the ability to identify an Entity from their 
information or the ability to gain access to that Entity either physically or virtually. 
Access to information is the ability to gain the information of the Entity. Having access 
to an Entity does not necessarily mean you have access to their information. By way of 
example you can meet an Entity and from that meeting learn a lot about that Entity, but 
you may not necessarily know what they really believe or are thinking.  Under both 
conditions there are two levels: high and low This leads us to 4 potential states: High 
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Access to Information-High Access to Entity, High Access to Information-Low Access 
to Entity, Low Access to Information-High Access to Entity, Low Access to 
Information-Low Access to Entity. : 
 High Access to 
Information 
Low Access to 
Information 
High Access to Entity   
Low Access to Entity   
Table 10 Access to Entity I 
 
Depending upon the role based activity, these different access patterns can 
result in a different level of privacy. Low Access to Information and Low Access to the 
Entity should result in the highest level of privacy while High Access to the Entity and 
High Access to Information should result in the lowest level of privacy. 
 High Access to 
Information 
Low Access to 
Information 
High Access to Entity Lowest Level of Privacy  
Low Access to Entity  Highest Level of Privacy 
Table 11 Access to Entity II 
 
3.2.2 Control over Information 
Control over information can be examined in a way similar to access over 
information. 
Control over information is examined in three dimensions, control over what 
information is disclosed if any, control over to whom that information is given and 
finally control over the timing of the information disclosure. An entity possibility could 
have control over all three spheres, over none of the spheres or over only one or two of 
the spheres. The degree of control can be high, medium or low control. Situations of 
  
187 
 
control would be highest when the entity possesses high information control over the 
what, who and when dimension and lowest when low information control is present 
along all three dimensions. Intermediate positions occur when high positions in one or 
more areas are coupled with low control in one or more area. 
3.2.3 How the various privacies relate in terms of control and access 
Each type of privacy is grounded in a social role. Each type of privacy enables 
values of that role to be realized. This is accomplished through the variance of control 
and access. The Strongest combination of access and control with the highest level of 
privacy is the High Control/High Access to Person – High Access to Information. The 
weakest level of privacy is Low Control/Low Access to Person and Low Access to 
Information.  
 High Access to 
Entity and 
High Access to 
Information 
High Access to 
Entity and 
Low Access to 
Information 
Low Access to 
Entity and 
High Access to 
Information 
Low Access to 
Entity and Low 
Access to 
Information 
High Control    Relational 
Privacy 
Medium 
Control 
Secret Privacy   Privilege 
Privacy 
Low Control Transitory 
Privacy 
  Intellectual 
Privacy 
Table 12 Access to Entity III 
 
Relational Privacy demands the highest level of privacy both in terms of access 
to the entity and information and as to control. In relational privacy, the entity has high 
control over their information. Entities seeking access to that entity or information 
about that entity have low access to both the entity and information about the entity. 
Transitory Privacy by its very definition permits low controls over information coupled 
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with High Access to both the Person and the Person’s information by others. Privilege 
Privacy has the characteristic of having initially high control in the entity over her/his 
information. However this control diminishes. This diminishing of control exists 
because there is a compelling need to obtain assistance, but a precondition to obtaining 
assistance requires that information must be shared. The same occurs with access to the 
person’s information. Initially others have low access to the entity and information 
about the entity. Once disclosed, any number of entities can have access to the 
information despite the fact they may never have contact with the person. In any event, 
low access to the entity and their information must be maintained. In Secret Privacy, 
initially the holder of the information has very high control, but has also strong 
motivations to disclose this information. Once disclosed, not only does the owner of 
information lose a great deal of control, but they also lose the high degree of protection 
afforded them in terms of access to themselves and their information as once disclosed 
the information becomes very accessible. Often time, this accessibility is taken care of 
by agreements that bring control over the entity to which the information is disclosed. 
Intellectual Privacy has the characteristic of the entity having low control over the 
information sought after requiring the entity to have the information made available to 
them or to seek out the information.  Intellectual privacy however demands that the 
request for information as well as the content of the information consumed should be 
very highly protected. Additionally, any tests made with that information should also be 
kept confidential. Therefore access must be low to both the entity consuming the 
information as well as what information is consumed by the entity.  
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3.3 Conclusion 
Combining the control and access paradigms, five distinct types of privacy have 
been specified and distinguished in terms of purpose, philosophy type, relationship 
entities and characteristics of the relationship, role characteristics, and character of 
information. Each has been illustrated through representative laws and court rulings. A 
model of privacy roles grounded in social relationships and supported by legal theories 
using levels of control and access was demonstrated. This model distinguishes the five 
different types of privacy based upon the optimal level of control and access required in 
each type of privacy. 
In Chapter Four this model will be applied to the design of a security system. 
Security defines the methods of protecting information and information systems from 
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Security design and implementation 
is a costly but incomplete, inexact, and imperfect process. For these reasons, demands 
for better design and implementation of security systems exist. 
The both the qualities secure data must possess well as the functional 
specifications of access systems will next be presented. Two categories of access 
mechanisms will next be presented with their strengths and weaknesses. Research will 
next be presented that outlines work done to increase the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms. Chapter Four will conclude with a proposal for improving data access 
mechanisms using the model proposed in this chapter 
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Chapter 4: A Proposed Evaluation 
4.0 Proposal 
The requirements of a security system are defined by its functional 
specifications. Using these functional specifications, the security system defines the 
methods of protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, 
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide requisite 
levels of confidentiality, possession, integrity, authentication, utility and availability 
required to achieve the functional specification. Good security design and 
implementation offers the promise of great rewards but the process is costly and often 
plagued by imprecision. For these reasons, demands for better design and 
implementation of security systems exist. 
A portion of the functional specifications of a security system are the attributes 
that secured data must possess. This will first be presented using the CIA Triad and the 
additions offered by the Parkerian Hexad. Next data access mechanisms of mandatory 
access control (MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC) will be introduced 
together with their respective strengths and weaknesses. Following this role based 
access mechanisms (RBAC) will be reviewed. These use levels of indirection which 
enable and/or disable access and/or functions on objects employing features of the 
DAC and/or MAC systems. Some extensions based on the proposed legal framework 
developed in prior chapters will be presented that improve the effectiveness of role 
based access (RBAC) mechanisms. It will be shown that the research is directed not to 
add new capabilities to security systems but aimed at easing the administrative burden 
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of establishing consistent permissions of access and actions on objects to users in 
similar circumstance and need. Chapter Four will conclude with a proposal to apply the 
privacy model revealed in the previous chapter to create a new conceptualization of a 
tiered RBAC access system that is theory based and adds new capabilities to security 
systems. 
4.1 Introduction 
As firms compete more often on data analytics, issues of data quality and 
security become increasingly important. While the ability to protect critical data assets 
has always been a cost of doing business, data and knowledge management capabilities 
are now embedded in core business processes.  In addition, external forces and 
requirements, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, make the control and security of data an explicit 
obligation with significant costs.  Increasingly businesses are pursuing security as a 
strategic goal or even as a way to obtain competitive advantage in the marketplace. 
Regardless of whether security is viewed as a cost of doing business, a strategic 
goal or a competitive advantage, security design and implementation is often not only 
costly but also incomplete, inexact, and imperfect.  After the security system is 
designed and implemented, there are often unforeseen security gaps, which if not 
heeded could lead to vulnerabilities, security risks and breaches of security.  Because of 
the high cost associated with rectifying these issues, security systems may be 
intentionally over engineered, resulting not only in additional costs, but with a loss of 
functionality and unnecessary restrictions placed on data accessibility.  With each loss 
of functionality, not only does the user suffer a loss of satisfaction with the system but 
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the system breeds attempts to find ways around the system leading to new security 
gaps, vulnerabilities, risks and security breaches. 
4.2 Functional Specifications 
Functional specifications of the security architecture ultimately emanate from 
social norms, laws, and consumer concerns.  
Social norms, laws and customer concerns form the restrictions placed on data. 
Some of the restrictions come in the form of laws such as privacy and intellectual 
property laws which establish duties and the corresponding claims when those duties 
are not fulfilled. From these restrictions confidentiality and possession standards are 
created which dictate the security model, security technology, cryptograph technology, 
DBMS Technology  for the security system as well as the database and data design and 
application technology chosen. These standards define the integrity constraints placed 
upon the data which will determine the authenticity of the data which will affect both 
the availability of this data but its usefulness as well. Through these integrity 
constraints availability is defined with authorized individual given access to data and 
unauthorized individuals prevented from knowing and accessing information. From the 
access obtained, the utility of the data and ultimately the utility the user are determined. 
Social norms, laws and consumer concerns define the functional specifications 
that the security architecture must ensure. These functional specifications in turn ensure 
the attributes that data and information must possess.  
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Confidentiality and
Possession
- Privacy and IP Laws
- Social and Cultural Issues
-Customer Concerns
-Confidential Classification
-Policies and Procedures
- Access Rights
Integrity and Authenticity
-Security Technology
- Security Model
- Cryptography Technology
- DBMS Technology
- Database and Data Design
- Application Technology
Availability and Utility
-Threats and Attacks
-System Vulnerabilities
- Authorization methodology
-Authentication Technology
- Network Interfaces
- Disaster and recovery strategy
Information Security Architecture
Logical and Physical Assets
        
Figure 13 Functional Specifications and the Information Security Architecture 
 
The figure is from Afyouni, Hassan, Database Security and Auditing: 
Protecting Data Integrity and Accessibility, Thompson Course Technology, Boston, 
Massachusetts, 2006 
4.3 The CIA Triad  
The CIA Triad and the subsequent additions to the Triad, provide functional 
specifications that a security system protecting information must possess to ensure 
social norms, laws and consumer concerns. When provided by the security system, 
these in turn provide the protected data and information with these attributes. 
“Security defines the methods of protecting information and information 
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
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destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability [the so-called 
“CIA triad”], whether in storage or in transit” (Plone CMS, 2000). 
Privacy and security regulations take many forms but ultimately they address 
portions of the classic CIA Triad – Confidentiality, Integrity and Availablity. The idea 
of the triad originated with computer security integrity model introduced by David D. 
Clark and David R. Wilson (Clark and Wilson, 1987). Comparing access to data in the 
commercial arena with the access mechanisms utilized by the U.S. Department of 
Defense, they noted that in the commercial realm, emphasis in security was on 
information integrity. In the Department of Defense, security was deemed more as the 
enforcement of confidentiality and expressed through a system of classification labels 
and classifications. They ultimately concluded that confidentiality and integrity were 
important goals of any security system. This laid the groundwork necessary for the 
concept of the CIA Triad which later originated with the National Security 
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC), now 
known as the Committee of National Security Systems (CNSS).  
The CIA Triad is a data security model used in the design of security systems 
that protect logical and physical assets. The CIA Triad specifies the minimal functional 
specifications that a security system must provide for data and information. This model 
has been largely accepted both by government and business. CIA is a mnemonic which 
stands for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability – characteristics that secured data 
should possess after the security system is designed. These attributes in turn support 
each other and together define the information security architecture. 
  
195 
 
4.3.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentially addresses various aspects of security and emanates from three 
sources, social and cultural systems, customer concerns and privacy laws (Afyouni, 
2006). Confidentiality defines what information must be protected and kept private 
(Stone and Merrion, 2004). Confidentiality is an assurance that information is not 
disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or devices (CNSS, 2003) or even 
knowing the information exists (Afyouni, 2006). International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) defines the term in a slightly different manner. In the ISO 
definition confidentiality is seen as "ensuring that information is accessible only to 
those authorized to have access.” Confidentiality has also been defined as the process 
of safeguarding confidential information and disclosing secret information only to 
authorized individuals by classifying information and placing restrictions on its access 
and dissemination (Afyouni, 2006). 
4.3.2 Integrity 
According to the National Information Assurance Glossary: 
“Integrity is the quality of an Information System, reflecting the 
logical correctness and reliability of the operating system; the 
logical completeness of the hardware and software implementing 
the protection mechanisms; and the consistency of the data 
structures and occurrence of the stored data” (CNSS, 2003) 
 
The integrity of the information systems depends upon the integrity of the data. 
In database design there are many aspects of integrity with which the designer must be 
concerned, such as elimination of anomalies, concurrent reads and committed reads. In 
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security the concerns differ as the chief aspects of integrity that concern the designer 
are the prevention of unauthorized modification, insertion or destruction of data in a 
database regardless of whether it occurs intentionally or as a mistake. Integrity 
enforcement ensures that data possesses a quality of being complete, whole, sound and 
in compliance with the intention of the creator of the data, and remain so even after the 
implementation of the system.  
4.3.3 Availability 
Availability is the timely, reliable access to data and information services for 
authorized users (CNSS, 2003). Availability requires the balance of two opposed 
interests. It must enable access yet enforce confidentiality and integrity which restrict 
access. In determining availability you must take into account potential threats, risks, 
and vulnerabilities to the system. Often confidentiality specifications indicate these 
potential threats, risks and vulnerabilities that potentially threaten data integrity.  When 
providing for availability you must provide an authorization methodology, 
authentication technology, network interfaces as well as provide for disaster and 
recovery strategies. 
4.3.4 Additions to the CIA Triad  
Parker, the renowned security consultant and writer proposed three additional 
attributes to the CIA Triad, known as the The Parkerian Hexad (Parker, 2002). Parker 
proposes that information protected by information security should possess in addition 
to the attributes of confidentially, integrity and availability the following attributes: the 
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attribute of utility, the attribute of authenticity and finally the attribute of possession 
(thus adding three additional functional specifications to the security system). 
Parkerian Hexad refines the security guidelines to make them more applicable 
to commercial enterprise. Utility, the quality that the information possesses a usefulness 
and fitness for a specific purpose adds dimension to the concept of availability. The 
reason information is needed is the information is useful to the user’s purpose. 
Authenticity, the quality that the information possesses the correct attribution of origin 
or is the correct description of information supplements integrity. Today in marketing 
often times the value of the information is not only the data item but the linking of the 
data item with the source of the data. Possession is similar to confidentiality yet it too is 
distinctive. Possession is the quality that information is capable of being owned, 
possessed and controlled in a way that it becomes property. Part of control is preventing 
physical contact with data. Another aspect is the preventing of copying or unauthorized 
use of data. Possession in the sense of ownership is of particular value where 
information has consumption value such as the holder of a copyright to a book or 
music.  
There can be other functional specifications to any security system which would 
vary depending upon the security needs of the application. Other such proposed 
  
198 
 
specifications include such specifications such as privacy, repudiation of messages, 
proof of originality and proof of identification61. 
4.4 How the design and implementation of security is accomplished 
From the CIA Triad and Parkerian Hexad the minimal functional specifications 
that a security system must provide for data and information are determined. In most all 
systems, high levels of confidentiality/possession and integrity/authenticity are highly 
desired. However when increasing the levels of either confidentiality/possession or 
integrity/authenticity, decreases in accessibility and utility occur as a result. Access 
control models dictate how data is accessible to users and processes. While systems 
exist that can contain high levels of confidentiality/possession or integrity/authenticity, 
no system has been able to provide both simultaneously. 
4.4.1 Access Control Models and Their Methods 
Until Role Based Access Controls (RBACs) were conceived and implemented 
two types of access control models have been used to provide accessibility to data. 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems accomplish the security design by 
designing the access so the system dictates access. This system best ensures 
confidentiality/possession. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Systems grant control 
over data to the owner of the data. DAC systems best ensure integrity/authenticity. 
Each system has been instantiated in a tool or tools that permit access to data but has 
                                                 
61 See Dridi, Fredj, Muschall, Bjorn, Pernul, Gunther, Administration of an RBAC System, Proceeding of 
the 37th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences IEEE 2004 where additional functional 
specifications were set forward to deliver the required security for the Webocracy Project. 
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been unable to provide simultaneous high confidence/possession and high 
integrity/authenticity. 
 
Access
Control
Systems
Mandatory Access
Control
Discretionary
Access Control
Content Based
(Row Based)
Security
Structure Based
(Column Based)
Security
     
Figure 14 Access Control Systems 
 
4.4.2 Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems utilize a confidentially based system 
where the access policy is determined by the system. These types of systems are called 
structure or column based security systems because they are implemented using the 
structure and columns of the data model.  
Database features can operate at many levels.  MAC uses the most simple and 
common approach to database security by considering the schema or database structure.  
In a relational database, the structure is expressed in terms of relations (i.e., tables) and 
attributes (i.e. columns).  A security policy would then explicitly name the tables or 
columns that particular database users are allowed to read or write. To add a bit more 
flexibility, many database management systems add mechanisms for grouping users so 
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that access rights can be more easily granted or revoked.  Essentially, these structural 
approaches to security borrow from the file systems associated with operating system 
environments.  File systems typically provide access controls that grant computer users 
the right to read, write, or perhaps execute the contents of specific files. This is similar 
considering only database structure in that file names, but not file contents, are used to 
assign access rights. 
In MAC type systems all subjects and objects have a sensitivity level assigned 
to them for the subject it is called a security clearance, for the object it is called a 
security classification (Sandhu, 1996). In the MAC system, the principle sensitivity 
level is checked at the resource (Miller, Yee and Shapiro, no year). To access the 
object, the subject must have a security clearance equal to or greater than the sensitivity 
level of the object they seek to access. Setting fine levels of access granularity at the 
relation or column level is considered cumbersome and very difficult to maintain over 
the long term. When required this is often done through setting up separate tables based 
on the level of granularity of data (Sandhu, 1996). 
MAC security mechanisms can be quite inflexible, using only database 
structure. Access can be granted or denied in an outright manner, but not made 
conditional on the content or values of attributes. In terms of a medical example, there 
might be a code attribute that represents the diagnosis associated with a hospital 
admission. Access to this diagnostic attribute or column can be granted to hospital 
clinical staff. However, access cannot be granted based on particularly sensitive 
diseases. A diagnostic code for an arm fracture is accorded the same security as cancer. 
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The inability to consider the contents of a database does not support the nuanced 
approaches that more complex security policies require. 
Data access processes such as the Bell-LaPudula model utilize a MAC system. 
This system was designed to prevent theft and tainting of high level information using 
processes heavily leveraged toward the protection of confidentiality. Originally 
designed as a Department of Defense project in 1973, access is predicated upon a series 
of classifications of each user and each data object. In the Bell-LaPudula system, a user 
cannot write to an audience lower than the user’s classification. Neither can a user 
access documentation that is classified at a higher level. As a result this is known as a 
read down/write up process.  
4.4.3 Discretionary Access Control 
At the other spectrum are Discretionary Access Control systems (DAC) DAC 
systems and their processes that tend to be leveraged toward maintaining integrity, 
authenticity and utility. In the DAC system, every object has an owner and the owner 
determines the access policy. The theory is any object without an owner is an 
unprotected object. This owner determines who has access to the file and what 
privileges they possess to that object. The owner can also delegate ownership to others. 
To maintain integrity and authenticity, methods of separation of duty, separation of 
function and an auditing tool are employed. Often the auditing tool is a log of some 
type which keeps track of the transactions so that unauthorized access can be detected 
and any actions taken rolled back to remove any destructive effect on the data. Thus in 
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this type of system, integrity is highly maintainable but because of the ability of the 
owner to delegate ownership, confidentiality is not as strong as in a MAC systems.  
DAC type systems utilize content based (row level) access control (Sandhu, 
1996). Here the access and action capabilities rather than being stored with the object as 
they are in column-based security, are stored with the subject, with the access 
capabilities being in the form of a pointer to the object (Miller, Yee and Shapiro, no 
year). DAC systems are more flexible in terms of the granularity of access to objects 
than MAC-type systems (Sandhu, 1996). One type of DAC system is the commercial 
database system from Oracle known as the Virtual Private Database.  Essentially, this 
feature creates a unique view of the database for any specific user. As the Oracle 
documentation describes, a Virtual Private Database provides the ability to dynamically 
filter out rows (based on content) rather than columns: 
“Oracle's row-level security (RLS) feature, introduced in 
Oracle8i, provides fine-grained access control—fine-grained 
means at the individual row level.  Rather than opening up an 
entire table to any individual user who has any privileges on the 
table, row-level security restricts access to specific rows in a 
table.  The result is that any individual user sees a completely 
different set of data—only the data that person is authorized to 
see—so the overall capabilities are sometimes referred to as 
Oracle's virtual private database, or VPD, feature.” 
 
Despite this, pure DAC systems do not possess mechanisms that facilitate the 
management of access rights of many users.  In the MAC system, users similarly 
situated are granted similar access patterns to objects. In MAC, each user must be 
explicitly granted every privilege they need to every object they require largely due to 
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the authorization mechanism being located with the owner and not resident with the 
object (Sandhu, 1996).  
Clark-Wilson type processes utilize DAC type systems. Clark-Wilson type 
processes use a system of enforcement and certification rules to define data items and 
processes that provide the basis for an integrity policy that employs well formed 
transactions that use rules to enable the system to transition from one consistent state to 
another consistent state. These often include monitoring and archiving of transactions 
and functions that can rollback the database to a previous stable state should 
unauthorized actions occur.  
In practice MAC and the Bell-LaPudula model is used more often in military 
applications where confidentiality is a paramount concern. For commercial 
applications, procedures based upon the DAC and Clark-Wilson Integrity Model is 
preferred (Clark and Wilson, 1997). 
High Confidentiality
Low or Lower Integrity
Low or Lower Confidentiality
High Integrity
Bell-LaPadula Clark-Wilson
MAC DACAccess Control Methods
Representative Data Access Model
      
Figure 15 Comparison of MAC and DAC 
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4.4.4 Role Based Access Control 
It has been said that with respect to the design and implementation of security 
“It is difficult to implement but not impossible if you properly classify your information 
and design a process to implement and enforce confidentiality (Afyouni, 2006).  
Access Control
Systems
Mandatory
Access Control
Structure Based
Discretionary
Access Control
Content Based
Role Based
Structure and Content
Based
     
Figure 16 Access Mechanism Family 
 
A role is a semantic construct for formulating security policy (Ferraiolo et al, 
2001). Roles are constructed to perform a specific task for the organization and 
assigned to individuals or processes, objects (Nyanchama and Osborn, 1994) or 
methods (Izaki et al, 2001) to perform. To perform the task a role must be assigned 
permissions to access objects and perform functions on those objects. Once permissions 
are assigned to roles, the various roles are assigned to users to perform their tasks. 
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Figure 17 How RBAC Works 
 
Drawing is from Ferraiolo, R., Sandhu, Gavrila, S., Kuhn, D, and 
Chandramouli, R., Proposed NIST Standard for Role Based Access Control,  ACM 
Transactions on Information and Systems Security, Vol 4. No. 3, pp. 224-274 August 
2001.  
Role based security grants access depending on the current role assigned to the 
user. Initially, research conducted by Nyancharma, Osborn and Sandhu convincingly 
demonstrated that role based access system could model a MAC type system 
(Nyanchama et al, 1994, Osborn, 1997, Osborn et al, 2000, and Sandhu, 1996). Later 
research conducted by Osborn et al showed that role based access systems could also 
model DAC type systems (Osborn et al, 2000). This has lead to the conclusion by Chou 
that role based access control is “a superset of (both) MAC and DAC” (Osborn et al, 
2000). Prior to the role being assigned to the user a role is created. Each distinctive role 
is assigned permissions to columns, rows or both which permits the ability to 
implement finely grained security. A second advantage of roles is there is no need to set 
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for each user a unique set of permissions -users similarly situated are assigned the same 
role. This makes the assignment of security more efficient but also creates greater 
consistency. The final advantage of role based security is that this three pronged 
approach of structure, content and role can be used to express very sophisticated 
security policies. 
4.5 Research on Role Based Data Access 
Researchers have investigated a number of issues related to Role Based Access 
Controls.  Early timesharing operating systems introduced the notion of a group of 
users which can occur as a single entity in access control lists. This had the effect of 
conferring the associated permissions to all members of the group. Some discussion 
existed at the time whether RBAC was in fact a new term for an old idea (Sandhu, 
1996). Regardless of this discussion, it is a vibrantly researched area full of promise 
and opportunity.  
Initial research was directed toward questions on how this would be used. A 
SETA Questionnaire was administered to a private sector supplier, a federal bureau, 
and a federal medical system program office to assess user needs regarding RBAC 
features. The questionnaire had a list of defined RBAC features that might be of interest 
to potential RBAC users. Results were then reported. Each subject found value in 
RBAC but varied on how the application would be applied and of use to them (Sandhu, 
1996). 
While significant research was present before, the seminal model of a role based 
access system was proposed by Ferraiola, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn and Chandraomouli. 
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In this paper a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard for role 
based access control was proposed. The authors developed both a RBAC Reference 
Model and the RBAC Functional Specification. In the Reference Model they described 
a common vocabulary of RBAC element sets and relations for specifying requirements 
and the scope of RBAC features included in the standard. The Functional Specification 
described the requirements for administrative operations for creating and managing 
RBAC element sets and relations and systems functions for creating and managing 
RBAC attributes on user sessions and making access control decisions (Ferraiole et al, 
2001). This model has organized subsequent RBAC research into the categories 
enumerated. 
Roles are the basis of a RBAC system. Role engineering is focused on the 
modeling of a concrete instance of a RBAC model. The process of role engineering 
a/k/a access control realization has two levels: One level includes the development of 
roles of an information system. The second level is that of the security administrator 
who defines the association between roles and system users. Significant research has 
been focused in each area. 
4.5.1 Development of Roles in a RBAC 
Initial work in this area was done by Coyne. To identify roles, he collected 
different user activities and described them as verb/object pairs. The activities then 
were clustered to define candidate roles. In subsequent steps, constraints were defined 
and role-hierarchies built (Coyne, 1996). 
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Fernandez and Hawkins constructed security requirements using role rights 
from use cases. Authorizations and permissions were derived from the preconditions 
modeled for each use case. The permissions that a particular actor needs would be 
determined by the use case the actor participates. Shortcoming of this method include 
that it does not describe when and how constraints are elicited nor does it deal with the 
defining of role hierarchies. Epstein and Sandhu also used UML diagrams. Using a 
health care domain they demonstrated how UML can document a RBAC model. 
However no role engineering process or framework was presented nor did they deal 
with the defining of constraints, role hierarchies or deriving of permissions (Epstein and 
Sandhu, 1999). 
Roeckle et al concluded that RBAC roles are closely related to core business 
functions. They suggested a process oriented approach could be used for role finding. 
Using a case study approach, they distinguished three layers, a process layer where 
business processes were modeled, a role layer which role candidates were defined from 
the business processes and a access rights layer which defined the rights of access from 
the role layer. Roeckle only described the process of role finding on a meta level and 
did not detail how to derive permissions, or to assign permissions to roles or define role 
hierarchies or constraints (Roeckle et al, 2000). 
Epstein and Sandhu introduced three layers- tasks, work patterns and jobs, 
between roles and permissions to divide role permission assignment into smaller steps 
in the effort to make the process more manageable. A task is a specific step of work. 
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This task is associated with permission necessary to perform the step. Work patterns are 
the sequences of tasks (Epstein and Sandhu, 2001). 
A framework for modeling privacy requirements in role engineering was 
undertaken by He and Anton in 2003 (He and Anton, 2003). Later Neuman and 
Strembeck looked at a scenario driven process for functional RBAC roles (Neuman and 
Strembeck, 2002). Differentiating roles between functional (roles that reflect essential 
business functions that need to be performed) and organizational (roles corresponding 
to hierarchical organization of a company), the paper presents a role engineering 
process for functional roles using scenarios. The authors demonstrate that through 
scenarios, every possible or actual event sequence can be discovered. From these, 
possible solutions and reactions can be constructed with permissions, constraints, tasks, 
work profiles, role hierarchies being modeled through an iterative development process. 
Recently Poniszewska-Maranda extended the standard RBAC model by 
applying Unified Modeling Language (UML) for the purpose of role creation by 
defining appropriate role permissions using a two stage process: First definitions of the 
permissions assigned to functions are created. In the second stage the definitions of 
functions assigned to a particular role are provided (Ponsizewsha-Maranda, 2005). 
4.5.2 Administration of RBAC systems  
Much work has been focused on the administration of RBAC systems. In two 
papers working with central administrative non role-based systems role issues were 
studied. Gavrila studied the administration of user role assignments and the 
relationships among roles (Gavrila, 1998). A set of administrative rules were proposed 
  
210 
 
to maintain the consistency of the RBAC system. Using the role graph created by 
Gavrila and Nyanchama proposed a formalized description for administrative 
algorithms of the role hierarchy and role permission assignments (Ponsizewsha-
Maranda, 2005). 
Sandhu developed a role based RBAC administrative model composed of three 
sub models – user/role assignment, permission/role assignment and role/role 
assignment which are used to control user  and assignments, role permission 
assignments and role hierocracy(Sandhu, R.S., Bhamidipati, 1996). 
This model has been accepted as the most mature model for role based 
administration but still suffers shortcomings. These shortcomings include no support 
for the administration of newly introduced relationships, as well as complications from 
a plethora of constraints for the administration of role hierarchies to maintain the 
validity of the role range of each administrative role that reduces the flexibility and 
practicality of the model. This model did not present conflict checking rules to maintain 
the consistency of the RBAC that administrative activity may introduce conflicts into 
the system. A final issue is it failed to support the administration of authority 
constraints (Qui, Jiong, 2005). 
Recent work in RBAC has centered on how to construct, implement and 
administer roles. Roles are viewed as levels of indirection which enable and/or disable 
access and/or functions on objects. One use of roles is aimed at easing the 
administrative burden of establishing consistent permissions of access and actions on 
objects to users in similar circumstance and need. When specifying, constructing and 
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administering roles a ground up approach is used. The focus of this approach is on the 
activities of the user, as directed by the needs and purposes of the customer and the 
rights obligations and duties imposed by law and the social norms. This approach 
requires brute force: employing great numbers of man-hours to examine each specific 
instance and scenario, real and imagined, using an implicit, subjective understanding of 
privacy. Roles created under these systems have the characteristics of being weak and 
disjunctive. Often they are peculiar to a particular place and time. Despite the great 
effort taken, frequently roles need to be reworked because of over and under 
specification and reexamined and redacted as changes occur within and without the 
business entity. It is for these reasons that NIST has placed reducing the cost of 
authorization management a focus of it research effort (NIST, 2003). 
Using functional specifications provided by a proposed NIST standard for the 
Core RBAC model administration, Tittinene studied requirements for managing roles, 
users and permissions using a methodology based upon roles to analyze requirements 
of individual and organizational users of documents as well as those of organizational 
needs related to security and access control (Tittinene, 2003). 
A RBACAM (Role Based Access Control Administrative Model) was proposed 
for the purpose of simplifying the description of role hierarchies. The benefit is it would 
decentralize the administration of RBAC. Each role would have responsibility for role 
administration in its own domain and enhanced domain. This model provides conflict 
checking rules to maintain consistency and the administration of authorization 
constraints as well as administrative algorithms of role hierarchies, user role 
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assignments, permission role assignments, and authorization constraints (Qui, Jiong, 
2005). 
In the context of a Financial Enterprise Content Management System, key 
privacy and access control policies for internal content flow management and external 
access control for Web portal and institutional programmatic users were developed and 
demonstrated. Additionally a language was created to specify privacy and access 
control policies in each part of the system. This system uses EPAL – Enterprise Privacy 
Authorization Language a technical specification that exchanges privacy policies and 
makes privacy authorization decisions. It also uses eXtensible rights Markup Language 
to describe the rights and conditions for owning or distributing digital resources. Using 
a specification of licenses the XrML agent can determine to grant certain rights on 
certain resource to a certain principle or not (Chiu and Hung, 2005). 
One study involved the design and implementation of an RBAC system based 
upon the Core RBAC model as defined by the NIST standard. The study concerned the 
administration of the RBAC based control and authorization facility for the Webocrat 
system, a European project designed to provide citizens, businesses and governmental 
agencies with more convenient access to government information and services, to 
improve the quality of services and provide greater opportunities to participate in 
democratic institutions and processes. The effort focused on a unit of that project the 
CSAP whose purpose was to provide practical and consistent security by providing 
security services for the project such as access control and authorization among other 
things. This group specified administrative requirements for managing roles, users and 
  
213 
 
permissions the group specified and presented an administrative console designed to 
implement these requirements (Dridi, 2004). 
4.6 Proposed Demonstration 
While the CIA Triad and the additions offered by the Parkerian Hexad have 
been largely accepted both by government and business alike for providing functional 
specifications for protecting information, the achievement of the promised secure 
system has proven elusive as evidenced by news reports of security breaches or 
organizations and individuals alike, expressing concern that information about them has 
been accessed or is accessible.  
Security policies have been based upon structure (MAC) and upon content 
(DAC). A security capability based on structure, content, and role (SCR) provides the 
toolkit for implementing meaningful policies using organization-level terms.  Using a 
MAC system, structure-based access rights (column-level) are enabled that allow clear 
and concise restrictions to be imposed irrespective of other concerns.  Bringing content 
into the mix such as DAC systems accomplish supports conditional rules based on the 
range of values, resulting in row-level security.  Roles introduce a third conditional 
dimension based on the context in which a user is manipulating data.  The intersection 
of structure, content, and role supports the dynamic expression of security policies 
based on both data and users within specific task contexts. 
The overarching goal of this project is to create a new method to construct 
information security. Security and privacy are linked concepts. We employ security 
measures to enforce privacy and protect private data. Security restrictions depend upon 
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how privacy and private information are defined. In practice privacy as a concept is not 
often understood, holds significant subjective meaning and as a result it is often subject 
to debate. There are implications of not understanding or being able to specify privacy 
or what data is private in an objective manner. One is the potential for loss when 
security is breached and private data is exposed and improperly accessed. Additionally 
there is an increase in cost of construction of the security system. To ensure security by 
necessity this system must be over developed which results in greater then necessary 
costs in time and money. This over development also often results in an under 
functional system that provides less than achievable utility for the system’s users. 
A new conceptualization of privacy was undertaken to better specify privacy 
more objectively. This has been completed with the multidimensional, type based 
system grounded in philosophy, law and social norms. This system enables privacy to 
be more objectively specified as the basis of this system being grounded in philosophy 
is embraced to the legal-social framework that the organization operates through norms 
and laws. From this understanding functional requirements and ramifications of choices 
are better enabled which assists in creation of more consistent, effective and robust 
privacy driven information system.  
How an individual data item is classified is the first objective in the evaluation. 
To accomplish this goal a tool has been created. This tool incorporates the strongly 
typed systems of roles. Through its use the tool enables data to be classified into a 
privacy type through a review of the data item, the data source and job classification of 
the accessing party. This tool classifies the data item into a privacy type which in turn 
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specifies the level of control and access that are permissible to the data item by the job 
classification. 
The privacy classification and the data classification tool enable a new direction 
to role based security to occur enabling a conceptual designed RBAC system that will 
provide a theory-based type system of access. Determining privacy through the 
classification of an item of data together with the role between the data donor and 
potential user will occur using the conceptualization of privacy proposed in Chapter 3. 
It will be shown that a theory based system of typed roles that mirrors the real world 
can be created with the classification system. Through their rich set of theory, rules, 
laws and directions this theory will be shown to provide a road map of acceptable 
access and privileges to objects that are meaningful at an organizational level and can 
be used within the database design process to more efficiently express the complex 
security policies necessary to meet corporate requirements. The result is a strongly 
typed system of roles offering robustness capable of handling a wide variety of 
situations. Finally it will be shown that this new conceptualization of roles enables a 
global top down approach in establishing access to objects and process upon those 
objects in the end improving both the design and implementation of database security. 
As a proof, interviews have been conducted with stakeholders in a hospital 
setting to determine the existing security requirements and challenges faced to 
provision security. Initial interviews will take place of care givers across different 
hospital settings to determine the privacy needs of the medical profession. Next 
interviews were conducted with medical caregivers in a midsized hospital using a role 
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based access system developed by a third party vendor. As part of the interview process 
it was determined: what roles exist in this setting and how the role is provisioned with 
data - in particular what data is required by those roles including what operations can be 
performed on the available data. Next using the identified roles the accessibility and 
operations to data of various roles in a hospital setting were compared to the predicted 
accessibility and operations using the new construct and data classification tool of this 
proposal. 
These examples conclusively demonstrate that the conception of privacy 
proposed in Chapter 3 can be expressed in terms of an artifact in the form of a 
classification tool. This tool enables data to be classified into relational, privileged, 
intellectual or secret data using the data value, data source and role. Once classified the 
functional specifications of the security system are established through applying the 
protections mandated by that classification of privacy. Finally it is demonstrated that 
the use of this tool can replicate the classifications used in the building of actual 
security systems. 
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Chapter 5: Design, Testing, Results 
5.0 Introduction – Evaluation Design Science Framework 
In design science it is not enough to propose a new model of privacy. Because 
the design science paradigm seeks to extend the boundaries of human and 
organizational capabilities this model needs to be developed into an artifact that can 
assist information systems to address problems and opportunities faced by the business 
organization (Hevner et al, 2004). A classification tool will be introduced that takes the 
conceptualized privacy types and enables the classification of data items into relational, 
privilege, intellectual and secret privacy 62through an examination of three elements: 
the data item itself, the source of the data item and the role of the entity to which data is 
provided or is accessing data previously provided.  The soundness of the tool is 
evaluated by conducting a field study which compares projected classifications using 
this tool, with actual classifications employed in a working EMR system built by a 
commercial manufacturer and modified by the users.  Success will be determined by 
comparing the access and operations on data from existing systems designed without 
the classification tool and classification system with the access and operations that are 
predicted by this tool and classification system. These former systems are designed 
through and instance by instance developmental process that employs many man hours 
in the design and testing of each. Success will occur should the classification tool 
provide a similar classification because this classification tool would have 
                                                 
62 Public privacy was not evaluated in this tool as public privacy is not a privacy type utilized by the 
organizational entity. Rather, public privacy provides the context in which all data is ultimately 
classified as private or non private. 
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accomplished the specification of privacy using far less time and effort that the 
traditional brute force instance by instance development which is currently deployed in 
the commercial development of privacy systems. 
5.1 Operationalizing the Model 
The tool determines a role’s access to a data item using a three step process. 
First it classifies the transaction as a possession or a relational event by looking at the 
purpose for the exchange or access. Next, using this classification plus the data item, 
data source and job classification how the data will be used is next reviewed. This will 
result in an information privacy type classification of relational, privilege, secret or 
intellectual. The final step determines entitled to access of this role to the data item in 
question.  
5.1.1 How to Classify Data 
Prime Entities are entities that are a source of data. A Prime Entity can be a 
person, a data store or a record within a data store. A Prime Entity in the hospital 
setting is the patient as they provide information to the hospital. A second Prime Entity 
in the hospital setting is the patient medical record data store that is sought by various 
roles in the hospital that seek access to patient information. Patient information can be 
any information about the patient such as name, address or it can be patient medical 
information whether given by the patient to the hospital or obtained by the hospital 
through testing and conclusions.  
Collection Entities can be of two types direct and indirect. A direct Collection 
Entity has a direct connection to the Prime Entity which provides the data. It can be a 
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role or an entity within a process or a process or it can be the data store of that 
information. The second types of Collection Entity have indirect connection. These are 
the processes or entities authorized to execute those processes that seek access to or 
control over data which has already been collected by the Collection Entity. These 
entities are frequently roles that hold permissions to access and control data necessary 
for them to execute a process or fulfill their role function. What distinguishes this type 
of Collection Entity is the fact they rely upon an intermediary to have collected the 
information of the Prime Entity as they do not have direct contact with the Prime Entity 
supplying the data. An example of such a Collection Entity in the hospital setting are 
the various caregivers (doctors and nurses) and support personnel (billing, accounting, 
records clerks) that must access the patient’s information but access this information 
through the hospital record system rather than from the patient direct.  
To determine what information is available to a Collection Entity a three step 
process is used. First the desired information is typed as Confidence or Possession. 
Next a privacy type is determined. In this step Confidence types can be Relational or 
Privilege privacy type while Possession type can be Secret or Intellectual privacy types. 
In the final step it is determined whether access is permitted or denied to the desired 
data. 
The first step types the desired information as Confidence or Possession type. 
This is determined by the data item to which access is desired and the source (origin) of 
that item and looking to the motivation of the data recipient when data is exchange or to 
the motivation of the data accessor when data access is sought. In this step it is not 
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important that the data is being exchanged between the parties or that it is being 
accessed after an exchange has taken place. By way of example, a patient can provide 
information directly to the data store or a patient can have tests done which are reported 
to the data store through a reporting agency such as a lab which is later accessed by the 
doctor. In both the data source is the patient.  
 
Figure 18 Desired Information 
 
After identifying the data source and data item the first step is completed when 
the data is classified as being either a Confidence or Possession. Here we assess is the 
data sought, exchanged or accessed for the purpose to form, maintain or fulfill a 
personal relationship. If the information is sought for that purpose it holds the 
Intermediate classification as Confidence type. If the information is not exchanged or 
accessed for the purpose to form, maintain or fulfill a personal relationship it is 
classified as Possession type. 
In discriminating between a possession or confidence information relationship 
the types of questions we could ask could include the following questions: 
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Table 13 Confidence and Posession 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Collection Entity 
Confidence – If Yes Possession – Yes 
Is the character of the data provided 
personal on its face? Is it personal as to 
its provider? 
Is the character of the data provided 
impersonal as to its provider?  
Is it the intention of the Prime Entity that 
the exchange of information starts or 
maintains a personal relationship between 
the Prime and Collection Entity? 
Is the intention of the Prime Entity that 
the  relationship is to exchange 
information starts and maintains no 
personal relationship  
Is the purpose of the Collection Entity in 
assembling this data one to establish or 
maintain a relationship 
Is the purpose of the Collection Entity in 
assembling this data one to advance the 
acquirer’s self interest solely? 
Is the exchange of data conditioned on 
the premise that it will only be used to 
benefit and will be used to harm the 
Prime Entity? 
Does the exchange of data come with no 
restrictions with the Collection Entity 
being allowed to do as they wish with the 
data? 
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In the second step a privacy type is determined. In this step Confidence types 
classify into Relational or Privilege privacy type while Possession type classify into 
Secret or Intellectual privacy types.  
For the Possession type to we ask: Does the information advance or promote the 
proprietary interest of the organizational/individual entity, serve a purpose in the 
business pursuit or record the actions of the entity? If the answer is yes the privacy type 
is Secret privacy. If the answer is no the following question is proffered: Does the 
Information assist in the development of individual/organization or assist in the 
development of the organization/individual knowledge, skills or abilities? If the answer 
is yes the privacy type is Intellectual privacy type. If the answer is no to each type the 
data has no privacy type.  
 
Figure 20 Possessary Type Data 
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Confidential information relationships can be classified as Privileged or 
Relational privacy type. The test for each privacy type here uses the same two 
questions: 
1. Does the entity receiving or accessing this information possesses or is in the 
employment of or employ of person or persons that have professional 
expertise?  
2. In the scope of this professional relationship is this data required as a direct 
input to perform some task that provides a direct or indirect benefit to the 
data provider? 
If yes to each question, the classification is privilege but should the answer be 
no to one or both the classification is relational.  
 
Figure 21 Confidence Type Data 
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The final step is determining whether access is permitted or denied to the role.  
In all privacy types where data is exchanged between the source and accessor 
access is granted. In the situation where access of the data is sought post-exchange by 
an entity other than the one who originally received the data the original exchange 
relationship must be classified into a privacy type and access permitted no greater then 
that that type would allow or the privacy type of the classification made in step two.  
Attached as Exhibit are Data Access Pattern of Control Hospital (Notes on 
CMH) and the predicted Data Access Pattern (Determining Level of Access)   
 
Questions for the Classification of Data Type of an individual data item 
For Question 1: 
If data is being exchanged: Review the data item, data source and entity to which data is 
provided 
If data is post exchange and access is sought: Review data item, data source and entity 
which seeks access to data. 
Question  
1a 
Question 1a 
Is the data/information sought, exchanged or accessed is for the purpose to 
form, maintain or fulfill a personal relationship (Are we attempting the 
mutual exchange of personal information to form/maintain or fulfill a 
personal relationship?)          If Yes Result = Confidence 
Question  
1b 
Question 1b 
Is the data/information sought or exchanged NOT for the purpose to form, 
maintain or fulfill a personal relationship  
If Yes Result = Possession 
For question 2: 
Look at the classification determined in Question One plus the  data item, data source and 
job classification and ask: 
 
For all 
Confidence 
type ask: 
Question 2a 
Does the entity receiving or accessing this information possesses or is in the 
employment of or employ of person or persons that have professional 
expertise?  
Question 2b  
Is this data required as a direct input to perform some task that requires 
professional expertise and provides a direct or indirect benefit to the data 
provider? 
If yes to Questions 2a and 2b the classification is privilege 
If no to one or both Questions 2a and 2b the classification is relational 
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For all 
Possession 
type ask: 
Question 2e 
Does the information advance or promote the proprietary interest of the 
organizational/individual entity, serve a purpose in the business pursuit or 
record the actions of the entity? 
If Yes the classification is Secret 
Else:  
Question 2f 
Does the Information assist in the development of individual/organization or 
assist in the development of the organization/individual knowledge, skills or 
abilities? 
If Yes, Intellectual 
Question 3  
If 
Privilege 
If privilege Question 2 c 
(1)Did this information originate in a relational privacy relationship? If Yes 
Is the disclosure of such information a compelling necessity that access 
should be granted? If yes ask Is access to this information minimally 
necessary to perform this job function for this entity/process If Yes to 
question 2 and 3 grant access but deny access if either or both question two 
or three are no. 
(2)Did this information originate in privilege privacy relationship? Is it with 
in the scope of the privilege to access and use this information? If yes ask Is 
information minimally necessary to perform this job function? If yes to both 
grant access if No to either or both deny access 
(3) Did this information originate in a secret privacy relationship? If yes is 
this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant access. If 
no access denied.  
(4) Did this information originate in a intellectual privacy relationship? If 
yes is this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant 
access. If no access denied. If no does the failure to disclose threaten or harm 
others or society in an unacceptable way. If yes access granted. If No Access 
denied.  
Question 3  
If 
Relational 
If relational Question 2d 
 (1)Did this information originate in a relational privacy relationship? If Yes 
Is the disclosure of such information a compelling necessity that access 
should be granted? If yes ask Is access to this information minimally 
necessary to perform this job function for this entity/process If Yes to 
question 2 and 3 grant access but deny access if either or both question two 
or three are no. 
(2)Did this information originate in privilege privacy relationship? Is it with 
in the scope of the privilege to access and use this information? If yes ask Is 
information minimally necessary to perform this job function? If yes to both 
grant access if No to either or both deny access 
(3) Did this information originate in a secret privacy relationship? If yes is 
this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant access. If 
no access denied.  
(4) Did this information originate in a intellectual privacy relationship? If 
yes is this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant 
access. If no access denied. If no does the failure to disclose threaten or harm 
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others or society in an unacceptable way. If yes access granted. If No Access 
denied.  
Question 3  
If Secret 
If Secret 2g  
 (1)Did this information originate in a relational privacy relationship? If Yes 
Is the disclosure of such information a compelling necessity that access 
should be granted? If yes ask Is access to this information minimally 
necessary to perform this job function for this entity/process If Yes to 
question 2 and 3 grant access but deny access if either or both question two 
or three are no. 
(2)Did this information originate in privilege privacy relationship? Is it with 
in the scope of the privilege to access and use this information? If yes ask Is 
information minimally necessary to perform this job function? If yes to both 
grant access if No to either or both deny access 
(3) Did this information originate in a secret privacy relationship? If yes is 
this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant access. If 
no access denied.  
(4) Did this information originate in a intellectual privacy relationship? If 
yes is this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant 
access. If no access denied. If no does the failure to disclose threaten or harm 
others or society in an unacceptable way. If yes access granted. If No Access 
denied.  
Question 3 
If 
Intellectual 
If Intellectual 2h 
(1)Did this information originate in a relational privacy relationship? If Yes 
Is the disclosure of such information a compelling necessity that access 
should be granted? If yes ask Is access to this information minimally 
necessary to perform this job function for this entity/process If Yes to 
question 2 and 3 grant access but deny access if either or both question two 
or three are no. 
(2)Did this information originate in privilege privacy relationship? Is it with 
in the scope of the privilege to access and use this information? If yes ask Is 
information minimally necessary to perform this job function? If yes to both 
grant access if No to either or both deny access 
(3) Did this information originate in a secret privacy relationship? If yes is 
this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant access. If 
no access denied.  
(4) Did this information originate in a intellectual privacy relationship? If 
yes is this an appropriate entity or process to provide access? If yes grant 
access. If no access denied. If no does the failure to disclose threaten or harm 
others or society in an unacceptable way. If yes access granted. If No Access 
denied.  
Table 14 Questions for Classification of Data 
  
227 
 
5.2 Empirical Study 
As a proof, interviews have been conducted with stakeholders in a hospital 
setting to determine the existing security requirements and challenges faced to 
provision security.   
The choice of the hospital was made as it would demonstrate the privacy types 
and would generalize well to other business entities. The hospital is constructed to 
bring together patient and caregiver to provide the highest level of care possible while 
maintaining the privacy of the patient. A hospital performs services that require very 
high levels of accurate, relevant data from multiple sources and locations to be 
provided in a timely manner to enable mission critical decisions. This information is 
also required in varying levels by all areas of the hospital entity to support the primary 
function of patient care. Primarily its actions are predicated upon information from its 
clients and the tests preformed on the clients. Through its systems and functions the 
hospital brings together the patient information with the requisite knowledge skills and 
ability of its physicians and staff to provide for these high levels of care while at the 
same time safeguarding the information about the patient and the actions of the hospital 
in serving the patient.  Significant information flows come in and out of the hospital to 
provide for these services. In recent years actions to protect patient privacy have been 
enacted by the federal government due to patient information leakage to outside third 
parties.  
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Additionally hospitals are highly regulated by a variety of federal and local 
governmental agencies on a wide variety of areas including but not limited to having to 
meet reporting requirements for a wide variety of the activities and services it performs. 
All businesses have laws and regulations that impose both privacy and reporting 
requirements to some degree. While not every firm has the same requirements as a 
hospital to safeguard others information, financial firms (banks, accountants, brokerage 
houses, lawyers) have much the same requirements to safeguard client information yet 
report certain types of account activity. Increasingly the Federal Trade Commission is 
imposing requirements on the safeguard and use of client information by retailers. 
Homeland Security Act has imposed similar requirements on telephone, power and 
transportation companies. Aside from the mission critical decisions made in the 
hospital and the needs to safeguard patient information, many of these concerns are 
similar to the concerns faced by all businesses.  
The goal of the study is to gather information from this type of entity. From this 
data a determination will be made whether organizational data can be classified into the 
privacy types of relational, privilege, intellectual and secret privacy types and that these 
types can be specified using a classification tool that determines existing access and 
operations on data. This field study would be accomplished through interviews of 
employees working in two hospitals. These interviews would determine the data needs 
of the organization and then examines individual data items with a view of how this 
data is made accessible to its members. Success will be determined by comparing the 
access and operations on data from existing systems designed without the classification 
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tool and classification system with the access and operations that are predicted by this 
tool and classification system If these sets are similar it would show that classifications 
hold and the tool could construct these types of privacy in a way that was useful to that 
business entity.  
5.2.1 Interview Strategy  
.A single interviewer conducted all rounds of face to face interviews. A script 
was used in each interview to ensure that the questioning was complete63. At every 
juncture effort was made to make the interviewee comfortable in order to get them to 
provide anecdotal information that would lead to new information and other sources of 
information. At each interview written notes were taken. Follow up was done on after 
all interviews. At times the notes taken were not clear or follow up questions presented 
themselves during the transcription process. Follow up was used in these cases to 
clarify points and to ask new questions. A second follow up was done with each 
interviewee where they were presented with the transcript of the notes taken and then 
given the opportunity to make changes or add anything they deemed noteworthy. Once 
the notes were all taken the interviews were compared for similarities and differences. 
Where differences were apparent, inquiry again was made in the attempt to gain 
clarification. Where differences persisted, the reasons for the differences were 
examined and noted. To deal with possible bias and guard against reporter error where 
ever possible multiple interviews were conducted across job functions having differing 
                                                 
63 See appendix for the script 
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stakes in the data.64 This data was then transcribed into tables indicating the job, data 
item and operations that could be performed on the data.  
The first round of interviews was conducted at two hospitals both doctor driven 
but having differing approaches in how they classified, stored and made data available. 
The purpose of the first round was to determine the degree of sameness in approach to 
data and operations on data in particular common requirements, needs and challenges 
that hospitals faced with their data and information gathering, storage and 
dissemination.  The second round of interview focuses on one hospital using an EMR. 
Particular attention was paid in these interviews as to the specific instances of regularly 
occurring access to the medical record and operations that can preformed on that item 
by the various roles enabled.  This would provide a baseline for testing the model 
developed. 
The same procedures were followed in each interview. Unless the interviewer 
was the hospital administrator themselves, the interviewee was instructed by his 
immediate supervisor that he had the permission from the hospital administrator to 
cooperate fully in the interview process. A private location was provided for the 
interview to take place on hospital premises during the interviewee’s regular work 
schedule. With the initial exception of the interview with the IT staff during the second 
round, and the interview with one hospital administrator and his chief security officer, 
every interview was a one on one interview. With the IT Staff, it was the suggestion of 
                                                 
64 When Risk Management was consulted only a single interview was permitted with its Director. The 
interview was very limited with the Director providing he has access to everything and every body at 
any time.  
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the IT administrator to meet initially with the whole staff to discuss the issues and for 
the interviewer to get a more global perspective of the hospital’s strategy. A four hour 
interview of the entire staff took place using open ended questions and following up on 
their discussion of the question presented. At the conclusion of that interview, each 
staff member was made available for individual follow up questions. 
During the entire interview process a variety of roles were interviewed 
including the Hospital Administrator, Assistant Hospital Administer, IT director, Chief 
Security Officer, HIPAA Compliance Officer, DBA, Chief of Software Support, the 
entire IT department and the various users throughout the hospital including nurses 
from all levels, doctors, clerical, laboratory staff and supervisors, department heads and 
their staff. A significant amount of the interview time was centered on three positions: 
the Chief Security Officer, the HIPAA Compliance Officer, and the Chief of Software 
Support. 
In the first round the interviews were conducted with two different hospitals and 
two different people from each hospital. Prior to the interview a meeting took place 
between the interviewer and the Hospital Administrator. During this meeting the 
administrator was informed that the thrust of the interview was concerning the data of 
the hospital, how it was generated, stored, made accessible and protected. The 
administrator then provided people with the requisite knowledge and expertise to 
answer these types of questions. From each hospital the Assistant Hospital 
Administrator who supervised the data and privacy protection aspect of the hospital 
was made available to provide answers to these questions. Additionally the each 
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hospital provided one additional person. One hospital provided their Chief Security 
Officer. The other hospital provided their HIPAA Compliance Director. Interviews 
with the hospital providing the Chief Security Officer took place with the assigned 
Hospital Director present and participating. This interview was conducted over a four 
hour time period with breaks taken every 45 to 60 minutes. . The majority of the 
information did come from the Chief Security Officer because he was more familiar 
with the information sought. It should be noted that during this interview both provided 
information to each question when they had differing viewpoints or additional 
information. In the interviews with the other hospital, separate interviews were 
conducted with the Assistant Administrator and the HIPAA Compliance Officer. Like 
the previous set of interviews, the HIPAA Compliance Officer possessed the majority 
of the information with the Administrator referring often to the HIPAA Officer as 
having the more informed answer. The interview with the HIPAA Compliance Officer 
took place over three separate days approximating 2 hours each day. The interview with 
the Assistant Hospital Administrator took place one day for approximately one hour. 
In the second round the roles interviewed were expanded to admission, unit 
secretary, unit nurses, unit supervisors, nurse managers, director of nursing, chief nurse, 
doctors, various laboratory units, and research.In this round while every role 
contributed strong information, the Chief Software Support provided the vast amount of 
information. In part it was due to the design of the work system at the hospital and in 
part this was due to security concerns of the interviewee. The Hospital Administrator 
and HIPAA Compliance Officer were very concerned that any role be aware only of the 
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access patterns of the areas with in their control. Enabling an open inquiry beyond the 
Chief Software Support was a concern that this would be compromised. To 
accommodate the hospital when interviews were conducted with personnel other then 
the Chief Software Support, while conducted in private, the inquiries were very limited 
in the terms of open ended questions of asking what data was accessible to them and 
what operations could be performed. Additionally through agreement with the 
interviewing entity, all access patterns disclosed regardless of source were only 
reviewed by the Chief of Software support.  
Additionally it should be noted that the hospital in the second round of 
interviews had three access systems: patient care, risk management, research. The Chief 
of Software Support by design was the chief officer in the hospital over the data access 
of the EMR only. The other two information access systems, one for hospital research 
and the other for risk management were separate access systems with different 
individuals in control over these schemas. The risk management and research systems 
are not a part of the study.65  
5.2.2 Distinctions between the two hospitals 
Both hospitals are doctor driven and held a commitment to patient care. The 
privacy of patient information was a vital concern as well for similar reasons: 
preservation of the traditional doctor patient relationship, a condition for high quality 
care and the threat of a law suit and financial loss should this duty become breached.   
                                                 
65 It should be noted that a select group has access to all systems. By design the Chief administrator of 
the hospital, the chief of risk management and the chief resident were the only roles that had global 
access to all three systems. No interviews of substance were conducted with any of these individuals. 
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Each hospital was distinctive in how they approached these issues. One hospital 
was in the early stage of conversion to an EMR system. From interviews with the IT 
director, Chief Security Officer and its HIPAA Compliance Officer it was learned that 
this hospital was using a paper based medical record that was powered by people. In 
this system the entire staff was trained in the rudimentary issues of privacy. Certain key 
people were targeted and provided extensive training to enable them to protect and 
enforce the privacy policy of the hospital with respect to its medical records. This group 
each performed a job function of a record custodian of some type or could provide 
gatekeeper functions to the patient record. At the other hospital interviews were 
conducted with the Assistant Hospital Administrator and the HIPAA Compliance 
Officer. From these interviews it was learned that they had purchased an EMR from a 
commercial vendor and implemented the system approximately two and half years 
earlier. This EMR was a semi customized system that permitted further customization 
after delivery. At this hospital it was disclosed the customization of this system was still 
on going with the IT staff still in the process of producing changes to the system. 
These interviews were summarized and reviewed by the author. Next interviews 
were undertaken with the hospital using the EMR where efforts were undertaken to 
determine which roles had access to data. From this information the privacy model 
would be compared.  
5.2.3 Conclusions of the First Interviews 
Interviews from both hospitals provided evidence that both were concerned with 
privacy protection. In both hospitals privacy types were not used. Instead private data 
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was treated as either being patient health information or not patient health information. 
While each had similar access policies to the medical record both differed when access 
concerned non PHI data. This is particularly true in the cases of employee records and 
benefits and hospital administration. However despite these differences, the hospital 
users using the paper based system experienced greater satisfaction in having access to 
needed medical information despite the expression of concerns of time delays in getting 
the information. Users of the EMR based system expressed satisfaction with the speed 
they received records but were frustrated with the system. The basis of concern was due 
to two factors: “black holes” that prevented access to needed information and “white 
holes” that lead unauthorized people to protected data.  
The administrators of hospital using a people powered- paper based system felt 
to a degree they had some risk exposure as the entire record was potentially exposed. 
They openly acknowledged there was no real simple way to restrict access to the file 
once it was out of the record custodian possession. They believed however the 
commitment of their people to patient privacy reduced that risk to acceptable levels. 
Despite the differences between the hospitals neither was distinctive in its 
information needs. Each faced the same issues of making available data to appropriate 
persons and processes while maintaining the privacy of the data. Each has high 
concerns that this data be safeguarded as patient data carries with it an obligation of 
protection. This is interpreted by each to require that once patient data was within their 
grasp, they must judiciously control that data. Secondly each viewed access as given 
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only to necessary persons and processes in an amount reasonably necessary for a 
defined task to be performed.  
The following observations were made from the interviews of both hospitals: 
It is well accepted that high quality healthcare is delivered when appropriately 
trained personnel are coupled with timely information necessary to meet the health 
challenge. The challenge to provide this information is the high volume of data, 
information and knowledge that emanates from a wide variety of sources both within 
and without the treatment facility and which continues to grow exponentially. This data 
is required to drive the various functions of the hospital – from patient care, to billing, 
to research to compliance with governmental regulations – each which can change 
circumstantially. Often to accomplish these purposes a piece of data passes through 
many individuals, departments, organizations and governmental agencies many of 
which have conflicting agendas and goals. Unless safeguards are imposed the privacy 
expectations that surround that data can be easily compromised. All of this requires the 
highest efforts be undertaken to enforce the privacy expectations of the patient and his 
health care providers. Yet even providing this and imposing the best safeguards privacy 
expectations of the patient and health care providers are often compromised.  
In recent years new challenges have emerged. An increased coupling between 
medical care and insurance together with the emergence of medicine emerging as a 
business has increased the portability of medical information outside the hospital most 
notably to insurers and medical reviewers. To counter act the portability, new laws and 
regulations regarding patient medical information are being proposed and enacted. It is 
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imperative to keep up with these changes particularly as patients and their significant 
others are more willing today to seek financial remuneration when disclosures of 
patient information is improperly made or high standards of patient care is not 
achieved. Oftentimes these actions become coupled with additional financial 
repercussions in the form of increased insurance premiums, loss of key personnel, the 
inability to attract talent, loss of funding or sources of funding or loss of trust and 
standing in the community the hospital serves. As a result there is a push to provide 
greater managerial control over the hospital operations to minimize risk and the risk of 
loss. To accomplish this objective will require greater access to patient information by 
non treating personnel which will further drive this cycle. 
Automation of data access is the most viable way to address the above stated 
concerns. While these systems generally work well they are not a panacea. First they 
are expensive to roll out largely due to the complexity necessary to meet the tasks at 
hand and not possessing the expertise and knowledge needed both technically and 
legally. Second many times functionality must be sacrificed at the expense of 
development and the risk of failure. Finally, after roll out an almost endless stream of 
maintenance must be done in part to correct issues that were inherent with the rolled out 
system and in part to implement changes necessary to keep up with the ever changing 
social, business and legal environment that the hospital functions.  
5.2.4 Conclusions from the Second Round of Interviews 
Before purchasing an EMR system many alternatives were considered including 
staying with the old paper based system, the costs of in house development and the 
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attractiveness of obtaining a customized system. Factors including the risks inherent 
with the paper based people automated system, the need for faster access to 
information, the size and expertise of the IT staff, and the large volume of information 
and access patterns to be analyzed and determined were prime factors that motivated 
the decision to obtain an semi customized EMR through a vendor.  
Since the system has been delivered the results obtained have been 
disappointing. In the months following the installation the system lacks the desired and 
specified functionality. In particular, access to data is inconsistent among caregivers 
similarly situated. Often when access is provided it is seldom optimum and is usually 
either under or over established. Existing work patterns in the hospital had to be altered 
to fit the acquired system because it could not be easily altered to support the desired 
work flow pattern without substantial rework. In some cases the staff have initiated 
work-a-rounds that subterfuge the security of the system. Even when rework is possible 
before a project is reworked it must higher priority over all other projects before it is 
initiated. Even when change is initiated frequently the change is an iterative process 
until the desired level of functionality is received or the project is abandoned. In any 
rework of access, before the project is finalized months are taken waiting for 
supervisors and legal to approve the changes while they examine the exposure of risk 
and consider other alternatives.  
Daily changes must be made to the EMR. A person’s absence due to vacation, 
illness, relocation, or firings often lead to vast areas of needed information either 
becoming inaccessible for day to day operations (including routine patient care) or the 
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checks that ensured control over information and limited information access becoming 
disabled. In many cases the reassignment of the absent person’s role permits too great 
of access or eliminates the required people controls that supplement the controls 
imposed by the EMR. Under these circumstances when assigning information access, 
traditional access patterns are generally applied to determine what data is needed to 
carryout the job by that level of employee. All too frequently ad hoc emergency 
measures are implemented that provide or stop the flow of data without a proper 
examination of the risk. Increasingly classifications are becoming less clear with new 
job classifications emerging, new uses of information that require access to be 
expanded, changes in laws and regulations that dictate changes in access, and 
heightened concerns over privacy which forces a rethinking of the traditional access 
patterns.  
Change in the external environment will initiate required changes in the EMR. 
Proposed and actual changes in regulations and laws require access patterns be 
reviewed almost continuously. Often this results in a substantial reworking of system 
access across the hospital subject to examination by the administration and legalHi. 
While laws and regulations provide performance directives they provide no guidance 
on how these directives translate into required system changes. These changes are 
initially implemented using the best practice of limiting access while the redesigning 
process constructs alternative access patterns. This often limits functionality and utility 
to levels below that which is both required and desired by users for many months while 
measures are designed and tested.  
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5.3 Evaluation 
A review was taken of the data collected by the hospital entity and the access 
patterns permitted through the commercial system. It was decided to take a patient 
record as it was built through the system and see how the model compares with the 
specifications of the commercial system. The chart of questions in Section 5.1.2 were 
asked and applied by job description to each pair of information/source of information. 
The following chart records those results and makes posting of results less unwieldy.  
Data Item Source Question asked/Result Second Question asked/Result 
Table 15 Results 
 
5.3.1 Admissions Clerk 
In the interviewed hospital, one method a patient enters the hospital is through a 
referral from a physician. On the assigned date and time, the patient presents 
themselves to the admission clerk. In addition to the patient’s name address and 
telephone, information about the method of payment, insurance, various consents and 
the doctor’s orders are disclosed to this clerk. When the procedure is completed the 
patient is admitted to the hospital and assigned a bed by the clerk. In the commercial 
system, after admission this clerk has access to each of these items but is unable to see 
previous visits or the medical record of those visits. Neither is the clerk able to access 
the patient record as it accumulates during this visit.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Admission 
Clerk: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name 
Patient 
address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d(1)Access 
Granted 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d/(1)Access 
Granted 
Bed Assigned Hospital 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g (3) Yes 
Access 
Permitted 
Dr Order Doctor 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b yes 
Privilege 
2c(2)/Access 
Granted 
Table 16 Tool and Hospital Access 
 
Discussion of results for admissions clerk 
The tool classifies access identically to that used by the hospital. 
Patient name and address classified as relational. Relational privacy requires 
control and access be maintained. The level of control is respect which requires that the 
obtained information must be controlled for the benefit of the information provider. The 
control further protects the control over information by collecting only information 
reasonably necessary for the relationship.  Here the clerk collects only that minimal 
information necessary to create a relationship between the hospital and patient and that 
this information is controlled for the information provider’s benefit. Access to this type 
of information is limited to a compelling necessity. The compelling necessity in this 
case is the need to ascertain the correctness of the name and address. 
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Insurance information was also classified as relational. The purpose of learning 
about a patient’s insurance information on part of the hospital has many functions 
including do we offer services to them and at what level is service provided.  The call 
between relational and privilege was tougher to make. A good argument can be made 
that whether insurance is available or not is a direct input to perform medical treatment. 
The decision to classify this as relational was made because it appears this question is 
more germane to the relationship formation rather than the treatment given after the 
relationship is formed.  
This item can be assessed in two ways. One, insurance determines whether the 
relationship is even entered into. Two, insurance determines the type of care given 
during the relationship. Some hospitals will not take private pay patients. Others take 
patients who don’t have insurance but the care given follows a different protocol from 
that of the insured patient. A third class of hospital would accept the patient regardless 
of having insurance and would not differentiate in care given. Does a better operational 
definition need to be made for the tool or do the facts of the hospital govern the 
classification?  
Bed Assigned classifies as possession/secret. It is possession at it is non 
personal information. It is secret as it is a record of the actions of the entity. This is 
unique as it is a permitted operation on data rather than an access operation to data. 
Additionally this assignment is based upon the operations of the entity and as a result is 
promoting the proprietary interest of the hospital.  
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Dr. Order is confidence/privilege. It is confidence because it is personal 
information necessary to form a relationship. It is privilege as the clerk is in employ of 
person’s who have professional expertise and it is a direct input into the task of 
providing care to the patient. This type of information requires this information be 
safeguarded and access be that of minimally necessary. Here out of necessity the clerk 
must have access to this information as they are the interface between the hospital and 
patient and this information enables the clerk to perform the functions of that position.  
Note there is not any example to demonstrate intellectual privacy for this job 
description. This is likely to the low level of importance that this job has in the hospital.  
5.3.2 Unit Secretary 
Unit secretaries function as the clerical staff for the hospital. A unit secretary is 
assigned to a specific unit in the hospital for her shift. This assignment can change 
daily.  They report to all nurses assigned to the unit as well as all doctors who have 
patients in the unit. Generally a unit secretary has full access to general patient 
information and limited access to patient care information. The general rule is the unit 
secretary can only access and update information for a patient in their assigned unit 
however; the EMR can see and write to any patient in the hospital. General information 
is considered to include the ability to read and update patient demographics, church 
affiliation, opt them out of general census, place staff alerts, and identify next of kin. 
Additionally they can pull a current visit history (when admitted, how admitted, bed 
assignments and transfers, account number) but cannot look at past stays in the hospital. 
Cannot change phone number 
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Patient care information to which this position can read and write includes the 
current care given to the patient both from the nurse and the doctor but they are not 
supposed to have access to any lab test results.66  
                                                 
66 Because this hospital employs a redundant system of faxing results to the unit as well as placing the 
results in the EMR, the unit secretary does in fact have access although it is not desired that they have 
access to these lab results.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Unit 
Secretary: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Doctors orders Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Doctors order 
of a patient not 
in unit 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Table 17 Unit Secretary Results 
 
Discussion of results for unit secretary 
The tool classifies access for patient demographics, patient bed assignment, next 
of kin, nursing notes, doctors’ orders and lab tests identically to that used by the 
hospital in all cases. However in two cases – Lab tests and doctors orders of a patient 
not with in a unit, while the tool classifies the information as privilege, the business rule 
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of the hospital forbids access by the unit secretary because the patient is not in the care 
of that unit. Privilege privacy requires that before access is provided it must be assessed 
whether this is an appropriate individual/organization to provide access to information 
taking into account that access must be limited to that minimally necessary to carryout 
a job function. While the tool asks this question it fails to predict this access and 
demonstrates one of the limitations of the tool – before final classification can be made 
it is imperative that the business rules of the organization, conventions of the industry 
and even common sense be looked at when making this final determination.  
5.3.3 Unit Nurse 
Unit nurses provide care for patients in a specific care unit of the hospital. Some 
care units are specialized such as CCU, ICU, EMR and Cardiac Care. The majority of 
care units handle the general population of the hospital.  
Distinction is made in the hospital between general and patient care 
information. General care information includes staff alerts, gender, date of birth, admit 
date, medical record number and account number all of which is accessible to a unit 
nurse. Patient care information includes diagnosis, nursing notes and doctor orders for 
care. The nurse cannot access the results of any lab tests but can see if a lab results have 
come in. An interesting side bar is the unit nurses only see patients assigned to the unit 
unless they are assigned to the EMR where can see the whole house. 
  
247 
 
The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Unit Nurse: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second Question 
Asked/Result 
Third Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient Address Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors orders 
of patient within 
the unit 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors order of 
a patient not in 
unit 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Patient care 
information 
after patient is 
discharged or 
removed from 
unit 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege  
2c (2) No access 
Denied 
Other employee 
work schedule 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2(3) No Access 
Denied 
Other employee 
vacation 
benefits 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (3) Access 
Denied 
Information on 
how scheduling 
must take place 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access Denied 
Table 18 Unit Nurse 
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For the general and personal care information the tool classifies access identical 
to the hospital examined with the exception of lab tests. The hospital examined did not 
permit the nurse access to the result of the test but did permit them access to 
information that the lab test results were in. This aberration appears to be in the 
business rules of the hospital where they want to keep information the nurse receives to 
the minimum necessary to do the job and it is believed that this is not necessary to do 
the job. 
Another area of interest is the work schedule and vacation benefits. Hospital 
forms the relationship with the other employee. That relationship is confidence. In a 
confidential relationship the hospital must exercise a high level of control over that 
information type of information. When the employee seeks information concerning 
another employee work schedule or vacation benefits, this type of a relationship is a 
confidence type because this information is not for the purpose of forming, maintaining 
or fulfilling a personal relationship. This in turn classifies into relational privacy type. 
Because of the requirements of instituting a high level of control, unless a compelling 
necessity is shown, no access can be provided. When looking at how scheduling must 
take place the information is of possession type as it does is sought not to form, 
maintain or fulfill a personal relationship. This in turn is the type of information that 
would promote or advance the proprietary interest which translates into a secret privacy 
relationship. 
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5.3.4 Unit Supervisor 
Unit Supervisors have access to all the general and patient information that a 
unit nurse has with this exception: A unit supervisor in general can see only their own 
patients information after the patient leaves the unit for so long as they remain a in the 
hospital for this visit. The one notable exception is the of the EMR supervisor who can 
see any patient in the hospital. When a patient is discharged the ability of all these 
supervisors to view the patient’s general and patient information ends.  
The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Unit 
Supervisor: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors orders Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 2c (2) 
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Privilege Access Denied 
Doctors order 
of a patient not 
in unit 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Patient care 
information 
after patient is 
discharged  
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege  
2c (2) Access 
Denied 
Patient care 
information 
after patient 
removed from 
unit but 
remains in the 
hospital 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2)Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
work schedule 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
vacation 
benefits 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g Access 
Permitted 
Information on 
how 
scheduling 
must take 
place 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes Secret 2g (3) Access 
Permitted 
Table 19 Unit Supervisor 
 
The Unit Supervisor has greater access to patient’s general and care information 
over the unit nurse in that they can view the patient throughout the hospital provided 
they once resided on the floor. Looking at work schedules and vacation benefits of 
other employees this information is relational from the viewpoint of the employee but 
secret from the viewpoint of the supervisor. The unit supervisor requires this 
information in order to enable the management of personnel. Still the disclosure of 
information must be limited in part because of the ‘secret nature’ of the information but 
also because of the interest of the employee in not having this detail of his work known 
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by others. Finally information on how to schedule is available to the supervisor as they 
require this guidance on how to set forth coverage on the unit. This is an element of 
know how which requires protection. 
In all ways the access patterns of the tool are consistent with the developed 
system. 
Except for the lab test the tool classifies access identical to the hospital 
examined. As stated before the hospital examined did not permit the nurse access to the 
result of the test but did permit them access to information that the lab test results were 
in. This aberration appears to be in the business rules of the hospital where they want to 
keep information the nurse receives to the minimum necessary to do the job and it is 
believed that this is not necessary to do the job. 
5.3.5 Nurse Manager  
Nurse Managers have specific areas of authority. In the hospital interviewed 
there were six nurse managers one each over the following areas: ICU, CCU, EMR, 
Operating Room, Recovery Room and Same Day Surgery. These individuals require a 
greater global picture of the hospital in order to fulfill their supervisory duties. 
The Nurse Manager has access to general and patient information of any patient 
who has ever been in their unit even after the discharge of the patient from the hospital. 
The one exception is the EMR supervisor who can see any patient in the hospital as it is 
deemed imperative they have global access to all patients in order to provide requisite 
levels of care. Because nurse managers are involved in quality control, nurse managers 
have access to the entire health record of the patient. Additionally this position has 
  
252 
 
expanded capabilities in the management of personnel. They can see the time records, 
job history, supervisor comments and actions and work schedules current and past. 
Additionally they have limited access to benefits such as seeing taken vacation days, 
sick days but they cannot view the total sick days and vacation days an employee has in 
their benefit package. As to the personnel record the only item that is accessible is the 
employee phone number. 
The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Nurse 
Manager: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First 
Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors 
orders 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2)Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied
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Doctors 
order of a 
patient not in 
unit 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
provided 
patient was in 
their unit at 
some point 
Patient care 
information 
after patient 
is discharged 
or removed 
from unit 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege  
2c (2) Access 
Permitted 
Patient care 
information 
of a patient 
not ever in 
supervisor’s 
unit (Still in 
hospital) 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (1) 
Depends if 
patient was 
ever in the 
supervisors 
unit. However 
EMR 
supervisor 
can see this 
information 
regardless 
Employee 
work 
schedule 
(Own) 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Relational 
2d (1) Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
vacation 
benefits 
(Own) 
Hospital/Employee 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Relational 
2d (1) Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
total 
vacation 
benefit 
(own) 
Hospital/Employee 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Relational 
2d (1) Access 
Denied 
Employee 
vacation 
taken 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2d (1)Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
total 
vacation 
benefit (not 
own) 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2d (1) Access 
Denied 
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Pay level of 
employee 
with in unit 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Secret 2g (1)Access 
Permitted 
Pay rates 
associated 
with pay 
level  
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Secret 2g (3) Access 
Denied 
Table 20 Nurse Manager 
 
Discussion of the results of Nurse Manager 
The tool produces access patterns identical to that of the commercial system. 
Looking at the relationship of the Nurse Manager to the vacation, pay level and rate of 
pay produces a good example of how the tool approaches the sensitive area of 
employee benefits and pay. While the information exchanged between the hospital and 
employee in this area would classify as confidence/relational as to those individuals 
when looking at the Nurse Manager accessing this information it becomes apparent in 
this relationship that this data holds a different privacy relation. To the Hospital/Nurse 
Manager relation this information is a possession type which translates into secret data 
as it promotes its proprietary interest and serves a purpose in the business pursuit of the 
hospital. Because the information sought to be accessed is relational information a 
constraint is placed upon the Hospital providing ready access to this data. Instead the 
hospital must exercise the level of control over the data and permit access no greater 
then the level permitted at the relationship level. Relationship data is accessible to 
others only upon compelling necessity and then this must be examined from the stand 
point of is this an entity to which access should be allowed. The compelling necessity is 
provided by the need to supervise employee’s benefits and pay. The difference in 
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access comes from the question is this an entity to which access of this information is 
appropriate. Business rules, industry conventions and common sense will dictate the 
appropriate access. However these same rules and conventions will be testable through 
the performance requirements for each type of privacy. For the vacation days taken and 
the pay level it is appropriate to allow access. For the days left and the rate of pay this 
level of employee is not appropriate to have access to this information.  
5.3.6 Director of Nursing  
The Director of Nursing has the same access to general and patient care 
information as does the Nursing Manager – they can see any patient who has been in 
any unit they have supervision over even after the patient leaves the unit or is 
discharged from the hospital and they have have access to the entire health record of the 
patient because they are involved in quality control. The director in charge of the EMR 
still has access to all patients regardless where they are resident in the hospital. The 
second difference here with the Director of Nursing and the Nursing Manager is what 
employees they can see and do reports on. This level has access to the entire nursing 
staff including all supervisors in their department but they cannot see pay rates, 
benefits, unused sick or vacation time.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Director of 
Nursing 
 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold.  
Data Item Source First 
Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors 
orders 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors 
order of a 
patient not in 
unit 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
provided 
patient was in 
their unit at 
some point 
Patient care 
information 
after patient 
is discharged 
or removed 
from unit 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
Privilege  
2c (2) Access 
Permitted 
Patient care 
information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b 
Yes 
2c (2) 
Depends if 
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of a patient 
not ever in 
supervisor’s 
unit (Still in 
hospital) 
Privilege patient was 
ever in the 
supervisors 
unit. However 
EMR 
supervisor 
can see this 
information 
regardless 
Employee 
work 
schedule 
(Own 
Employee) 
Hospital 1a/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g (1) Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
vacation 
benefits 
(Own) 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Secret 2g (3) Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
total 
vacation 
benefit 
(own) 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Secret 2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
vacation 
taken 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2d (3) Access 
Permitted 
Employee 
total 
vacation 
benefit (not 
own) 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2d (1) Access 
Denied 
Pay level of 
employee 
with in unit 
Hospital/Employee 1b/Possession 2e Secret 2g (1) Access 
Permitted 
Pay rates 
associated 
with pay 
level  
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Secret 2g (3) Access 
Denied 
Table 21 Director of Nursing 
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The classification tool largely follows the classification schemes of the other job 
functions with the exception of employee vacation taken, remaining vacation time pay 
level of employee and pay rates associated with pay level. Vacation taken, vacation 
remaining, pay rate and pay classification present a challenge in classification. From 
the vantage of the employee, this can appear to be a relational type of privacy. Yet from 
the vantage of the hospital entity this can be a form of secret privacy as it can 
demonstrate the strategy of the hospital entity in the way of staffing and cost that must 
be expended. How to approach this is not as straight forward as many other 
determinations. The decision was made to classify this as a secret and allow access to 
reflect the relational aspect between the hospital and employee to that of not revealing 
this unless compelling necessity was demonstrated. Here again the tools classification 
is 100% agreement with the hospital system.  
5.3.7 Chief Nursing Officer 
The Chief Nursing Officer is the highest nursing position in the hospital and is 
considered on level with the executive suite. As a result a chief nursing officer has 
access to every piece of information related to the patient both past and present and full 
access to all employee records with the exception of other executives records. 
Additionally due to their involvement in the financial aspects of the hospital, the CNO 
has access.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Chief 
Nursing Officer: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient Address Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Granted 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors orders Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors order 
of a patient not 
in unit of direct 
supervision 
Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient care 
information 
after patient is 
discharged or 
removed from 
unit 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege  
2c (2) Access 
Permitted 
Patient care 
information of 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
 Access 
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a patient not 
ever in the 
hospital during 
this employees 
tenure 
Permitted 
Employee 
work schedule  
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g (1) Access 
Permitted 
Employee total 
vacation 
benefit 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2a Yes  
Secret 
2d (1) Access 
Denied  
Pay 
classification 
of employees 
non executive 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Pay rates of 
employees 
(non executive) 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e Yes 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Table 22 Chief Nursing Officer 
 
Chief Nursing officers have broad duties that require access to information 
throughout the hospital. Because of their high status as supervisors they are entitled to 
access to almost every bit of information in the hospital.  
Work schedule pay rate and pay classification present a challenge in 
classification. From the vantage of the employee, this can appear to be a relational type 
of privacy. Yet from the vantage of the hospital entity this can be a form of secret 
privacy as it can demonstrate the strategy of the hospital entity in the way of staffing 
and cost that must be expended. How to approach this is not as straight forward as 
many other determinations. The decision was made to classify this as a secret and allow 
access to reflect the relational aspect between the hospital and employee to that of not 
revealing this unless compelling necessity was demonstrated. Using this type analysis 
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permitted agreement between the tool and the hospital. Agreement for this role was 
identical to the commercially developed system. 
5.3.8 Doctor accessing Patients 
Doctors have complete access to all medical records of their own patients but 
when viewing other information, it is restricted. In the hospital studied a doctor could 
not view another doctor’s patient unless he was provided permission by the patient’s 
doctor.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Doctor: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) Access 
Permitted 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors orders Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
Others 
Doctors’ 
patient not this 
doctor’s 
patient and no 
permission 
Patient 1a/Possession 2e Yes 2f Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) No 
access 
permitted 
Patient care 
information 
after patient is 
discharged or 
removed from 
unit 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege  
2c (2) Access 
Permitted 
Table 23 Doctor-accessing Patients 
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For the most part the tool predicts access identical to that permitted. From 
interviews of both hospitals and interviews of various doctors, there appears to be no 
set way in which doctor’s access to a patient not their own is covered. Each hospital 
was adamant that post HIPAA unless permission was given no doctor saw another 
doctor’s patient record without permission. However when carefully looking at the 
access mechanisms these permissions are often loosely handled. In other cases the 
business rules of the hospital favored access to all patients by a doctor with precaution 
taken of accounting for access and actions. This laxness is often to account for how 
doctors will cover for one another. Another reason for the laxity are two reasons: the 
great amount of trust a hospital has that the doctor will not abuse his authority in this 
area and the power the doctors wield over the hospital often makes the hospital provide 
to the doctor mechanisms that potentially expose the hospital to loss. 
5.3.9 Lab 
Lab personnel have very limited access to general patient information – this is 
limited to patient name, account number, date of birth and gender. As to patient care 
information, it receives only what the doctor directly sends the lab in the form of a 
doctor’s order for a particular test.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for the Lab:  
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2c (1) 
Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes/2b No 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1a/Confidence 2a yes/2b no 
Relationship 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e 
Secret 
2g (3) 
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b No 
Relational 
2d (1) 
Access Denied 
Nurses notes Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access Denied 
Doctors orders Hospital 1a/Confidence 2a Yes 2b Yes 
Privilege 
2c (2) 
Access 
Permitted 
only for test 
order all other 
is denied 
Table 24 Lab 
 
Doctor’s orders are not always accessible to the lab. In the interviews taken in 
most cases the only doctor order the lab sees are the orders for the test. However in 
interviews with the lab supervisors and the doctors both stated that at times the lab 
personnel want more in the way of a history on the patient than is contained in the 
doctor order. In this situation (which is rare) the lab and the doctor will consult and the 
doctor will provide to the lab the precise medical history or patient medical information 
that the lab seeks in order to provide the lab sufficient background to effectively 
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administer the testing. The tool in this scenario classifies data in ways identical to the 
commercially developed system but does not account for the work around devised by 
the hospital staff. 
5.3.10 Risk Management Team 
The risk management team is a separate function inside the hospital whose 
purpose is to identify potential risks and then eliminate or limit the risk exposure. 
Because risk can appear in any department and in many different forms the members of 
the risk management department have broad reaching powers that approximate or even 
exceed that of the executive management in the hospital. 
  
266 
 
The following table contains the results and predicted access for Risk 
Management: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(1) Access 
Permitted 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(1) Access 
Permitted  
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(1)  Access 
Permitted 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(3)  
Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(1)  Access 
Permitted  
Nurses notes Hospital 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(2)  
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors orders Hospital 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(2)  
Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(2)  
Access 
Permitted 
Doctors order 
of a patient not 
in unit 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(2)  
Access 
Permitted 
Patient care 
information 
after patient is 
discharged or 
removed from 
unit 
Patient 1b/Possession 2e/Secret 2g(2)  
Access 
Permitted 
Table 25 Risk Management Team 
 
Risk management seeks data not to form a personal relationship but to protect 
the hospital entity from real or potential loss. Using any data but particularly personal 
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data that is classified as relational or privileged becomes an important basis of their 
work as they assess the risk that the hospital faces. Often it is this same data the reveals 
the risk the hospital seeks to identify. In each case the proprietary need of the hospital is 
so very high that they trump all interests of relational or privilege privacy and enable 
risk management to have access to all data in the hospital regardless of its source and 
category and value. The tool enables classification of data in this area to in ways 
identical (100% agreement) to the way the commercial system functions. 
5.3.11 Research Team 
Research wing of the hospital seeks to develop understandings and capabilities 
that will assist the hospital in it meeting the challenges of its unique environment. 
Research will draw its data from many areas of the hospital but will not have the carte 
blanche access that the risk management posses.  
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The following table contains the results and predicted access for Research: 
Where tool and hospital access are identical the final column value will be bold. 
Data Item Source First Question 
asked/result 
Second 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Third 
Question 
Asked/Result 
Patient name Patient 1b/Possession 2f Yes 
Intellectual 
2h(1) No 
Access Denied 
Patient 
Address 
Patient 1b/Possession 2f Yes 
Intellectual 
2h(1) No 
Access Denied 
Insurance 
Information 
Patient 1b/Possession 2f Intellectual 2h(1) No 
Access Denied 
Patient bed 
assignment 
Hospital 1b/Possession 2f Intellectual 2h(3) Access 
Permitted 
Next of kin Patient 1b/Possession 2f Intellectual 2h(2) Access 
Denied 
Nurses notes Hospital 1b/Possession 2f Intellectual 2h(2) Access 
Permitted 
Doctors orders Hospital 1b/Possession 2f Intellectual 2h(2) Access 
Permitted 
Lab tests Hospital 1b/Possession 2f Intellectual 2h(2) Access 
Permitted 
Table 26 Research Team 
 
As demonstrated from the table certain items of data are accessible to the 
researcher while other items are not. This access pattern corresponds nicely (100% 
agreement) to that of the hospital for most studies. In general personal identifying 
information is not available in any study.  
However the pattern of access can change depending on the nature and purpose 
of the study conducted where personal identifiable information is not a permissible data 
item.  
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5.4. Conclusion 
The review of the results of classifying hospital data using the privacy 
classification tool demonstrates a number of points. The tool classified 116 data items 
and compared the tool classification with that classification used by the hospital. The 
tool mirrored the hospital classification 95.6% of the time. In the incorrect 
classification, the classification for the unit secretary (access to doctor orders and 
access to lab tests), Unit Nurse (access to lab tests) and lab (access to doctor orders) 
could be explained as the result of a debatable perspectives on who should have access 
to this information. Each of these items had ways to which these roles easily could gain 
access outside the information system and had this been classified as an access (these 
items were classified as no access and the tool classified them as access) the fit would 
have been over 99%.  
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Comparison of Tool Classification  
with Hospital Classification 
Position 
Number 
of Data 
Items 
Frequency of  
match with 
Hospital 
Classification
Percent of 
Agreement 
Unit Secretary 9 7 77.78% 
Unit Nurse 13 12 92.31% 
Unit Supervisor 14 14 100.00% 
Nurse Manager 18 18 100.00% 
Director of 
Nursing 18 18 100.00% 
Chief Nursing 
Officer 10 10 100.00% 
Doctor 10 9 90.00% 
Lab 6 5 83.33% 
Risk Management 10 10 100.00% 
Research 8 8 100.00% 
Total 116 111 95.69% 
Table 27 Tool and Hospital Classification 
 
The tool also handles two situations that are regularly confronted with data 
access. The first situation is when the role/privacy type accessing the data is identical to 
the role/privacy type that initially procured the data. Here the determination of access is 
very simple – the predicted access was always identical to the access provided by the 
hospital. The second access pattern occurs when there is a difference between the 
role/privacy types accessing with the role/privacy type that initially procured the data. 
In this situation it is imperative to check to see if access is permitted that is in line with 
that of the initial relation. In each of the cases using the control and access rules it was 
possible to construct the appropriate limitations of access.  
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This study demonstrates that privacy while traditionally treated as a single 
dimensional construct can be classified into four distinct privacy types of privacy: 
relational, privilege, secret and intellectual. It has been shown that each of the 
classifications has a unique signature of control and access that has a basis in 
philosophy and law. It has been shown that this model can be instantiated in a tool that 
enables data to be classified. It has also been shown that this tool produced a data 
model that closely resembled that of an acceptable, commercially developed 
information system that did not use this tool in its development of its access patterns.  
The commercial system developed data classifications and access using and 
instance by instance classification. As there is no consensus on what is privacy 
objective functional specifications are not available for system development. Instead 
subjective notions of privacy are used. With use of this tool that has its basis in law and 
philosophy some objective notion of privacy is available. This objectivity enables the 
tool to act as a top down development tool enabling development to proceed both from 
a top down and bottom up development approach rather than the bottom up approach 
that has been the traditional development method.  
Additionally the unique signature of the various types of privacy can be used to 
produce fine grained controls and access to data that the business organization requires. 
The fine grained approach enables access to be best specified to meet the needs for 
access and control over each privacy type data enabling the user to receive relevant, 
quality data in amounts necessary but not exceeding that required to perform their task.  
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Chapter 6:  Contributions, Limitations and Future Research 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the contributions of the study, together with its 
limitations It will conclude with the anticipated future research. 
6.1 Contributions 
This study proposed and demonstrated a new privacy model. This model is 
based not upon subjective understandings of privacy but being grounded in law and 
philosophy produced an objective standard. This privacy model proposed not one but 
five distinct types of privacy, relational, privilege, intellectual, transitory and secret 
privacy. Each of these privacy types have a distinguishing signature of control and 
access. Each of these privacy types have differing philosophical backgrounds which 
were supported in through laws and social norms. This model also differs from the four 
prong classification proposed by Prosser. As previously stated, Prosser’s taxonomy of 
privacy posited that a person has a right to be protected from intrusion, a right to 
control the disclosure of private facts, a right to protect the commercial value of one's 
name or likeness, and a right to protect against "false light" disclosures. Prosser did not 
go beyond this classification other than providing support for the classification itself. 
The taxonomy proposed here, while having a basis in right theory goes beyond Prosser 
and identifies relationships that embody the rights Prosser speaks of by looking upon 
the character of the information and the relationship between the information donor and 
information recipient and providing a classification that defines the degree of control 
and access that should be afforded to the target information.  
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This study addressed the call for better understanding of privacy and for new 
paradigms of privacy. It provided an explicit, objective standard to specify privacy. 
This standard captured the social and legal requirements for privacy. It has as it base 
law and philosophy and is expressed in relationships that are defined through a mixture 
of control and access. The end result produced a multidimensional type based construct 
which is capable of acting as both a goal and method of development that provides 
guidelines to all types of privacy as well as specific guidelines unique to each particular 
type of privacy. Through these developments privacy is not able to be constructed in a 
bottom up manner but it can now proceed to be constructed from a top down method. 
It was demonstrated this model could be constructed into a data classification 
tool. This tool would initially classify a data item and source into a confidence or 
possession type. From this classification an intermediary classification ensued which 
was followed by a final step which determined whether a given role was denied or 
given access to the data. 
Finally it was time to determine if the model would actually classify data in a 
real life setting. Applying the model to a data classification schema determined by a 
commercially developed RBAC system the model was able to recreate the access 
scheme with a 95.69% agreement. When work-a-rounds constructed by the hospital 
staff was taken into account, the model actually replicated the system plus work-a-
round at with an over 99% agreement.  
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A number of objectives were not met. No evidence was produced that this 
system produces a better specified construct of privacy.  Despite the fact the existing 
system specifications were replicated in hours this is insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that systems could be proposed, selected, implemented more effectively 
and efficiently and understood more completely using this specification.  No proof was 
demonstrated that would show that less time and effort will be spent on reworking 
systems to add unanticipated functionality or in designing into systems the 
requirements to meet mandated functionality for both the present and the future. Finally 
nothing was shown that would demonstrate this system will provide a better way to 
exploit technological change and preserve status quo or at least reconcile status quo 
with technological changes  
This study however gives business the promise of a new tool to address 
problems and opportunities presented by privacy – once further work is done on testing 
the tool. Before this occurs it is incumbent to take this tool and apply it out of this 
context across the business community, not just a hospital.   
6.2 Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations. The test was done only on two medium 
sized hospitals. In order to see if the model holds future research should include 
information from additional hospitals of varying sizes. Additionally this was tested only 
in the hospital setting. Taking this into a non medical setting particularly one which 
heavily relied upon secret type privacy or which had a significant numbers of test cases 
in intellectual privacy would produce interesting results. 
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The model was not thoroughly tested. On question three of the model there were 
test cases that originated from relational, privilege and secret privacy. However no test 
cases originated as an intellectual privacy classification. Information which originates 
as intellectual privacy that is later accessed will need to be procured in order to fully 
test the model. Additionally no testing was done showing that Public Privacy is a 
distinct privacy type.  
A final limitation comes from how the test was conducted. During the study the 
notes were coded by the taker of the notes. In the future the verified notes need be 
coded and summarized by two coders who are blind to the privacy taxonomy. 
6.3 Future Research  
There are many areas that present ripe vistas for future research. Because this 
model was applied in a medium sized hospital, we must ask will it hold in hospitals of 
all sizes. Having accomplished this then effort should be addressed to apply this in 
other commercial areas where privacy is important. Looking at businesses that deal 
with finances, intellectual property or rely upon creativity would be interesting areas to 
apply this model.  
The question should be asked: Is this model better than competing models of 
privacy for explaining and understanding privacy? Does the model promote a better 
understanding of the functional specifications of a privacy driven project? Does it assist 
in the construction of a better security design? As a tool is it easier to use than 
traditional developmental tools? Is the privacy tool an improvement over the ways in 
which privacy is presently incorporated into systems?  
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What are model’s relative strengths and weaknesses when compared with the 
competing models when the model is applied to development of systems? Here 
measuring time and cost of development and comparing development with and without 
the tool would be an interesting test of the model. Another area of research would 
address the question of whether this tool can lower the cost to build a system in terms 
of time and money. Does the tool enable modules to be created that can be used on 
different systems eliminating cost of development? Does the tool enable benchmarking 
of like existing systems where systems can be more directly compared, lessons learned 
and understandings incorporated in new systems? 
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Appendix A 
Questions For first round administrative interviews 
Name 
Position 
Responsibility and Tasks performed 
Tell me about the hospital 
- Size 
- Functions performed and who performs  
- Organizational chart 
- Resources 
- Data Management 
- How does data get into the system and eventually to the hands of the person or 
function that requires it? 
- What are the standards used for this? Where did they come from? What are the 
competing standards? Why did you chose the one you did?  
What should I know about hospital information systems in general/specifically? 
- What is unique to the hospital setting when compared to industry in general and 
other medical providers? 
- How are your regulated? 
- Who regulates you? 
- What must you do to fulfill your regulation requirements? 
- What are the potential penalties? 
- What data must you provide to whom as part of your regulation requirement? 
Who are your stakeholders? 
- Strengths and weaknesses of each stakeholder?  
- The needs and requirements of each stakeholder?  
- How do you provide for them?  
- Who must you provide information to?  
- Who must you cordon information from? 
What are your challenges with information management? 
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What departments depend upon what information? 
How do you enforce separation of authority? 
How do you manage security?  
- Setting goal 
- Implementing 
- SOA issues 
- Stakeholder issues 
How do you manage your information and information flow? 
- How does this impact security? 
-  
Who are the people/department that perform what function for you?  
What other things should I know about this area? 
If unaware of any questions answer ask: Who knows, how can I reach them? 
 
For Second Round Interviews (For Interviews with each job function) 
Name 
Position 
Responsibility and tasks performed 
Length of time at job 
Other jobs held in past 
For each responsibility and task (past and present) 
- What information do you require to do your job function? 
- How do you access this information?  
- What is the source of that information?  
- How you access that source? 
- Nature and character of that information 
- Responsibility you must exercise once you obtain the information 
If unaware of any questions answer ask Who knows, how can I reach them? 
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For Interviews with IT Personnel 
Name  
Position 
Responsibility and task performed 
Length of time at job 
How does your job impact the data management/data access schema? 
Do you have access to the data access/data classification portion of system?  
- If yes what access 
- What can you perform 
What are the policies of access? 
Who sets the policy? 
Who has access to what type of data in what amount? 
If unaware of any questions answer ask Who knows, how can I reach them? 
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Appendix B 
Name Characteristics Limitations on 
Acquistion, Use and 
Disclosure
Control Access to Entity and 
Information about the 
Entity
Relationship
Personal Information that 
forms impressions and 
relationships   
Representative 
relationships include  friend 
to friend  Husband and wife  
employer employee               
The disclosee should only 
obtain information 
reasonable and necessary 
for the relationship to form 
and be maintained  
Regardless of whether the 
relationship is  professional 
or intimate  information 
personal to the discloser is 
provided to the disclosee  
Respect  A high level of 
control is provided over this 
type of information by the 
owner of this type of 
information  In general this 
information is voluntarily 
released  Once obtained the 
information must be 
controlled for the benefit of 
the information p
Necessity  Access only on 
a compelling necessity   
Low access to 
individual/individual and 
individual/organization  
relationships  Low access 
to information contained 
in those relationships
C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
Secret
Information of the 
organization  
Representative 
relationships include  
Employer-Employee  
Employer-Independent 
Contractor  Consultant-
Consultee  Secret 
information is any 
information maintained by 
an individual or an
The organization or 
individual discloses this 
information to employees  
contractors or other 
organizations in order to do 
business more efficiently or 
effectively  Once given 
access  the disclosee can 
only use this information to 
futher the interests of t
Selective Lockdown  Control 
the use and dissemination of 
the information of the 
individual/organization in 
order to protect and advance 
the Individual/Organization's 
goal's and Interest  
Selective Access  To the 
appropriate 
individual/organization 
provide high access to the 
information of the 
individual/organization        
To the appropriate 
individual/organization 
provide and/or hi
Privilege
Highly Important 
information of another 
person or organization that 
in the hands of an 
appropriately trained 
professional can greatly 
assist that person or 
organization in its goals or 
problems Sharing this 
information with 
appropriately trained 
individua
 To acheive this value an 
incentive is provided to the 
disclosed to use this 
information only for the 
benefit of the discloser and 
to safeguard further 
disclosure all information 
obtained
Safeguard  Collect all 
information reasonable and 
necessary to accomplish the 
task at hand  Control the use 
and dissemination of the 
information collected or 
generated inorder to protect 
the interest of the information 
donor
Minimum Necessary   
Acess only to those 
appropriate trained and 
then only in amounts 
reasonably necessary to 
do their task  Low access 
to individual/organization    
Low access to information 
C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
Intellectual
Information being digested 
by individuals or the 
organization  This 
information is input into the 
organization or the 
individual Representative 
relationships  Library - 
Patron  Information provider 
- information consumer  
Representative information 
includ
Only those obtaining and 
using this information are 
entitled to know the source  
content of this information 
and any tests using this 
information
Unavowed  Control everything 
including what data is 
collected  how it is used  and 
who is using the data   In 
controling what data is 
collected it is not only what  
data and/or information has 
been collected but that data 
and/or information is being 
colle
Safeguard   Unless others 
are threatened or harmed 
in socially unacceptable 
ways  there is no access 
to this data  Low access 
to individual/organization    
Low access to information 
C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
Transitory
Information available in 
public or public places that 
can compromise a 
reasonable person's privacy 
expectations 
Traditional values of data 
collection and use of data 
found in public spaces need 
to be respected
On all information collected in 
a public place  be certain it 
does not violate relationship  
secret  privilge  or intellectual 
privacy or affect these types 
of privacy adversely in 
absence of a compelling 
reason
High access to 
individual/organization  
High access to 
information
Types of Privacy
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